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ABSTRACT 
Corruption has been heavily researched in the past decade, garnering attention from a number of 
different fields, such as political science, organizations, sociology, and information systems. As a 
result, focus on anti-corruption strategies has also increased. Motivated by the notion that individuals 
are mindfully rationalist (Palmer 2012), such policies fall under two categories: the manipulation of 
the incentive structure, thus increasing the cost of corruption, and enhancing transparency so that 
individuals will feel less inclined to engage in corruption under the watchful eye of citizens. In order 
to support such investments, e-government has been deemed the platform for it. However, studies in 
this field have been limited in their generation of theoretical frameworks. In addition, it has been 
observed that most of the studies have adopted a technological deterministic view to technology, 
overlooking any social factors which might affect the deployment of transparency. As governments 
are highly complex institutions, this has meant that many of the e-government initiatives have failed 
to yield the expected results. In regards to transparency specifically, much of the research has been 
normative in nature. Part of the issue lies in how transparency has been conceptualized. As identified, 
there are over fifteen working definitions for transparency, most of them elusive in nature, making it 
difficult to measure and study it. As a result, and based on Taylor and Lips’s (2008) definition, it was 
proposed that transparency be conceptualized as an information flow, comprising of three distinct 
stages: creation of information, publication, and public access to information. When viewed in such a 
manner, it is possible to identify that most of the research conducted on transparency has been to 
address the publication and access phases, leaving the creational aspect of transparency vastly under-
researched. Based on this, this thesis thereby proposed to adopt a socio-technical approach to 
technology and study a cognitive system (based on the distributed cognition theoretical – Dcog – 
framework – adopted) situated within a governmental agency in the Brazilian federal government 
(referred to as Agency X). Brazil, as a focus for this research was chosen due to its documented efforts 
in investing in transparency which thus far have failed to result in reduced levels of corruption. Coupled 
with distributed cognition, moral disengagement theory (MD) was also adopted due to the presence of 
ongoing acts of corruption at Agency X which had been previously identified. This thus made it the 
perfect setting under which to understand how transparency is created and why it has failed to deter 
corruption. The methodological approach was therefore a case study and, in order to analyze data 
effectively, the DiCoT (distributed cognition for teamwork) methodological framework was adopted. 
Drawing from DCog literature, DiCoT proposes a structured way in which to analyze findings, 
generating five different models (physical layout, artefact, information flow, social structure, and 
evolutionary), which together generate a powerful overview of how cognitive processes are distributed 
between human agents and artefacts, and what role the environment plays in such a setting.  Coupled 
with MD, findings indicated that this cognitive system is unevenly distributed between the human and 
the technical components, with individuals leading the information flow and transformation, largely 
dictating how information is stored and processed. This has created opportunities for “breakdowns” 
whereby the quality of information has been compromised, thereby affecting the overall state of the 
transparency system. In addition, findings indicated that corruption has persisted due to three factors: 
(1) technical systems’ failings to address local needs; (2) hierarchical structures, with unethical leaders 
leading the unethical decision-making at Agency X; (3) the high levels of informality. This dynamic, 
as findings suggested, was facilitated by moral disengagement mechanisms. The result has been a 
unique study that has provided an in-depth account of how transparency is created and how unethical 
individuals have dealt with the technical changes that resulted from transparency deployment. In doing 
so, this study filled a gap in the literature and provided a framework for future studies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation and Object of Research   
Corruption has been heavily researched in the past decade by scholars from a variety of 
fields, such as political science, organizations, sociology, public administration, and information 
systems (Heidenheimer et al. 1989; Bardhan 1997; Heeks 1999; Rose-Ackerman 2006; Moore 
2008). In this regard, Chang and Chu (2006: 259) state that “political corruption is considered one 
of the most destructive yet unresolved problems common to most societies. Importantly, political 
corruption represents a direct and brutal betrayal of trust placed in institutions”. 
As a result, a number of theories have emerged to explain such a phenomenon, as has 
research on how to combat it and e-government has been hailed as an effective tool against it.  The 
rationale behind such investments has been two-fold: first, e-government is a seen as a mechanism 
towards streamlining and automating governmental process thereby reducing opportunities for 
corruption. Second, e-government is seen as a tool towards enhancing levels of transparency and, 
as a result, making inner government operations more visible and giving citizens the chance to 
monitor them.  
However, as Calland and Bentley (2013) contend, there is a lack of evidence corroborating 
the effectiveness of technology-mediated transparency, as well as a lack of studies that can 
effectively demonstrate the links between transparency and corruption. Gaventa and McGee 
(2013) further add that most studies seem to rely on normative assumptions; in addition, “the 
assumptions underlying the causal chain, from inputs to outcomes and impact, are absent, vague, 
or only implicit (…) few initiatives provide concrete claims”. 
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Therefore, this thesis originated as a result of that query: what exactly are the links between 
transparency and corruption? Past research on transparency in Brazil (as part of an MSc degree in 
Comparative Politics, concluded in 2012) had led to the conclusion that transparency had not acted 
as an effective deterrent against corruption. This apparent gap in the literature, coupled with an 
interest in understanding the issue in Brazil thereby formed the basis for how this thesis was 
structured.  
The aim of this Chapter is to present some of the literature and findings which have 
motivated this present piece of research (section 1.2). In addition, it aims to present previous work 
produced on transparency in Brazil which has served to motivate the research undertaken in this 
thesis (section 1.3). Section 1.4 will then present how this thesis is structured, in addition to the 
research questions which have been proposed and the methodology adopted. This Chapter ends 
with a few concluding remarks (section 1.5). 
 
1.2 e-Government and Transparency 
E-government can be loosely defined as “the use by government of digital technologies 
internally and externally, to interact with citizens, firms, other governments, and organizations of 
all kinds” (Margetts 2009: 114). According to Brown (2005), it was around the early 2000s when 
the term gained traction, in spite of the fact that the use of information technology by governments 
can be traced back to at least the 1950s.  
Currently, e-government is considered one of the main ways of achieving transparency. 
Corroborating this, Avgerou et al. (2006: 2) state that “ICT2 came to be associated not only with 
                                                          
2 Information and Communication Technology 
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efficiency gains but also with reduction of corruption and the strengthening of the institutions of 
democracy”. The speed with which governments across the world have adopted ICTs has been 
impressive (Gallego-Alvarez et al 2010). Calland and Bentley (2013) note that in 1990, only two 
countries had Freedom of Information legislation regulating Open Government initiatives, whilst 
currently over eighty do.   
Furthermore, scholars observe that the best way of achieving transparency is through the 
use of technology, most notably in the form of transparency portals (Wescott 2003; Bertot, Jaeger 
and Grimes 2010; McGee and Gaventa 2010; Pina et al. 2010; Holmen 2011). As a result, a 
growing number of papers have been published, hailing the benefits of technology as a 
democratization tool and introducing a series of terms to express this mindset, such as e-
transparency, e-participation and Open Government. 
Fox and Haight (2011: 353) state however that transparency is not “an all-powerful magic 
bullet”. To this effect, Kling et al. (2005: 594) affirm that “Technological determinism treats ICTs 
as information processing systems whose technical characteristics cause specific social changes 
when they are adopted and used. . . Technological determinism cannot adequately account for the 
interactions among ICTs; the people who design, implement, and use them; and the social and 
organizational contexts in which technologies are embedded”. 
Thus, heavily reliant on a technological deterministic view, many e-government studies 
seem to overlook the “government” factor, focusing instead on the electronic component. As such, 
they overlook the complex environment that a governmental institution is, and the entrenched 
structures that have been constructed over time, relying instead on the supposition that investments 
will automatically translate into the desired results. In addition, current models overlook the 
specificities of individual national contexts, instead determining that all processes must occur 
20 
 
along the same pattern and that any failed attempts are naturally the result of implementation errors 
(Bussell 2011). As Rose (2005: 1) contends, “E-governance is necessarily influenced by its 
national context”. Therefore, technology itself cannot be regarded as the means of institutional 
reform, but rather as a tool (Margetts, 2009). 
To counterbalance such deterministic views on transparency, an emerging body of research 
which favors a socio-technical view of technology has started to emerge. As Bostrom and Heinen 
(1977: 17) explain, under a socio-technical optic, an organization is conceived as a socio-technical 
system which is “made up of two jointly independent, but correlative interacting systems – the 
social and the technical”. Hence when analyzing the impact of technology deployment, both 
organizational and social processes must be considered (Bostrom and Heinen 1977; Kling and 
Lamb 2000). 
In spite of this emerging body, when it comes to transparency specifically, these are still 
minority voices. Moreover, it is important to note that efforts to relate transparency and corruption 
have consisted mainly of statistical analyses that, despite demonstrating that a negative correlation 
between such concepts does in fact exist, have often resulted in weak findings, failing to explain 
variations in results and the reasons for the existence of so many outliers to the model (Wong and 
Welch 2004; Gaventa and McGee 2013). Such is the case of Brazil, as concluded in a previous 
research effort  (Martinez 2012). 
This will be discussed in the next section.  
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1.3 Transparency in Brazil 
 As mentioned in the introductory remarks of this chapter, part of the motivation for this 
research rested on the fact that it had been concluded previously that Brazil, despite its many efforts 
in transparency, had failed to effectively deter levels of corruption. This section, therefore, aims 
to give an overview of what the transparency framework in Brazil consists of and the data that 
confirms that corruption is still an issue that is very prevalent. 
e-Government deployment in Brazil officially began in 2000 (Barbosa et al. 2007; Matheus 
et al. 2011). The rationale for such investments, according to Magalhães et al. (2009), stemmed 
from: 1) the idea that this would allow Brazil to join the ranks of developed countries, and 2) an 
extensive initiative to reform budgetary legislation and allow for transparency of these processes.   
As part of this strategy, Brazil enacted the “Fiscal Responsibility Law” (Complimentary 
Law N.101) in 2000, which imposed certain spending limits on all spheres of government. This 
legal framework would then be consolidated with additional legislation being enacted in 
subsequent years: the Transparency Law in 2009, and the Access to Public Information Law in 
2011. Moreover, in 2004, the Brazilian federal government launched its Transparency Portal, 
which provides comprehensive information on spending, transfers, social programs, and 
personnel.  
The information made available on the Transparency Portal is real-time and very detailed. 
Furthermore, the information contained in the Portal is subject to auditing twice a year and is 
deemed reliable and trustworthy. In this respect, Brazil was considered the 7th most transparent 
country in the world (Open Budget Index 2017). In spite of this concerted effort, the expected 
outcome – of decreased corruption – failed to materialize (Martinez 2012).  
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Brazil’s Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2012) remains at a high 
level,  and has done so over the years. Comparing its position prior to 2004, when the Transparency 
Portal was deployed, and after, it was possible to ascertain that levels of corruption have remained 
relatively stable through time (see Figure 1.1). Moreover, data shows that the cost of corruption 
has been significant: it is estimated that in the past decade, over US$355 billion were embezzled, 
which equates to 2.3% of Brazil’s GDP (FIESP 2010). Corruption investigations in the past few 
years (dubbed “Car-Wash” investigations, launched in 2014) have also revealed the extent of 
corruption within Brazilian government institutions, which has spread to all levels and spheres. 
Also, it is estimated that the probability of a civil servant who engages in corruption being 
criminally prosecuted is less than 5% (FIESP 2010). 
 
Figure 1.1 – Brazil Corruption Index 1995 – 2017 
Source: Transparency International  
 
 
 
Based on findings regarding Brazil, coupled with the need for e-government studies to 
adopt a more socio-technical view of technology, the question of how exactly transparency 
operates started to emerge. The next section of this Chapter is therefore to demonstrate how this 
research has been framed. 
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1.4 Framing the Study 
As discussed, previous research (Martinez 2012) concluded that efforts in Brazil to curb 
corruption through transparency had failed to materialize. In addition, it was also previously 
identified that most research conducted in e-government (the platform which allows transparency 
to exist) and transparency itself has been of a technological deterministic nature. As a result, this 
thesis favored a socio-technical approach. This section will thus review how this thesis is 
structured in order to address the research questions that will be proposed. 
 
1.4.1 Thesis Structure 
As will be reviewed in Chapter 2, transparency in this study is conceptualized as a flow of 
information which comprises three distinct phases: creation of information, publication, and public 
access of information. Based on the literature review undertaken, it is possible to determine that 
most studies on transparency have concentrated on the publication and public access phases, 
overlooking the creation stage, which, as argued, is critical to how effective transparency can be. 
As a result, it was concluded that that would be the focus. The intent would be to find out how 
information is created and how it is linked to existing corruption levels. 
In order to approach such study, Chapter 3 presents two theoretical frameworks which were 
adopted: distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995) and moral disengagement (Bandura 1986). 
Distributed cognition is considered a socio-technical theory and, as such, takes into account both 
technical and social elements in its analysis. Moral disengagement, on the other hand, is rooted in 
social cognitive psychology, and is used to study corruption amongst the individuals that integrated 
the unit of analysis which, in accordance with the distributed cognitive theoretical approach 
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adopted, was the “cognitive system”. As a result of the discussion in Chapter 3, three research 
questions were defined:  
 
R1: How are cognitive processes distributed between agents (human and artefact) at 
Agency X? 
 
R2: How do breakdowns impact the cognitive system at Agency X? 
R3: How do moral disengagement mechanisms facilitate the breakdown of cognitive 
systems? 
 
 
             Based on these research questions, the object would be to comprehend how information is 
created, in terms of its distribution between human agents and technical artefacts, but also assess 
“breakdowns”, i.e. instances in which the information flow was subject to workarounds or 
deviations, which impacted the quality and accuracy of the information being produced. 
Additionally, the third research question aimed to address the role morally disengaged individuals 
(which, as will be reviewed are more prone to unethical decision-making) had in such breakdowns.  
 Agency X, as will be reviewed more extensively in Chapter 5, is the locus for the unit of 
analysis. A government agency within the Brazilian federal government, it was identified there the 
presence of ongoing acts of corruption, making it the ideal scenario for studying the creation of 
information in an unethical environment.  
 Chapter 4 presents discussion on the research design which allows for these research 
questions to be addressed. As will be discussed, this study adopts a case study approach. It thus 
makes use of qualitative data gathering techniques, such as interviews and participant observation. 
Chapter 5 then provides an overview of the context in which the unit of analysis is embedded in. 
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As will be reviewed, government institutions are complex organizations. As such, the unit of 
analysis is subject to a number of influencing variables including (but not limited to) the legal 
framework under which it operates.  
 Chapter 6 focuses on presenting the data analysis. As will be reviewed, this study applied 
the distributed cognition for teamwork (DiCoT) by Furniss and Blandford (2006) to the data 
analysis. DiCoT draws principles from distributed cognition in order to apply it to the analysis of 
data in a more structured way. Chapter 6 also presents the analysis through the moral 
disengagement theoretical lens. As a result, Chapter 7 is then able to present findings and address 
the research questions proposed. Chapter 8 ends with concluding remarks. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 This introductory Chapter served the purpose of presenting the motivation for this piece of 
research and situating the reader as to how this thesis is structured. Each of the aspects mentioned 
will be more extensively discussed throughout the Chapters. 
 As a result of this study, some firm conclusions as to how information is created and its 
links to corruption will be drawn. In addition, a framework for future studies will be delineated, as 
well as contributions made to the field of e-government.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Corruption is a theme that has received a great deal of attention, both in academia and by 
practitioners and civil society. Likewise, how to combat it has equally received a great deal of 
attention. In this regard, transparency has been hailed as an anti-corruption mechanism, especially 
with the advent of technology and its potential to amplify it, with a growing number of studies in 
several fields (political science, management, information systems etc.) seeking to confirm its 
effectiveness as a deterrent (Meijer 2001; Pina et al. 2007; Andersen and Henriksen 2006; 
Andersson and Bergman 2009; Shim and Eom 2009; Heald 2012; Carlitz 2013). Part of a wider 
and more concerted investment effort in e-government, most research conducted in these fields 
does indeed demonstrate a negative correlation between transparency and corruption, indicating 
the effectiveness of such a tool. However, there has been little evidence as to why such strategy 
works. In addition, as will be reviewed in this Chapter, there are several aspects of transparency 
which have been under-researched, largely due to how the concept has been approached.  
This Chapter seeks therefore to review the main literature on corruption and e-government 
and thus offer the basis for how this thesis has been framed. As such, it is divided as follows: 
section 2.2 will review the literature on corruption and two different approaches as to how 
individuals rationalize when engaging in corruption. Section 2.3 presents anti-corruption 
measures, more specifically the use of e-government and transparency to curb corruption. Section 
2.4 aims to then discuss two differing approaches to technology and e-government: a technological 
deterministic view and a socio-technical view. Section 2.5 focuses on presenting an alternative 
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way of conceptualizing transparency which aids in comprehending how it functions, and where 
gaps in the literature exist. Section 2.6 then ends this Chapter with a few concluding remarks. 
 
2.2 Corruption 
The theme of corruption – its causes, effects, and measures to combat it – is an area that 
has been heavily researched throughout the course of the past sixty years (Gaskins 2013). 
According to Tanzi (1998), corruption is not a new phenomenon and can be dated back to at least 
two-thousand years ago; Machiavelli and Rousseau, for example, both wrote about it, with the 
former describing it as a gap between collective moral standards and everyday conduct (Warren 
2004). The difference now (and has been in recent decades) relates to the attention it now garners 
both amongst scholars, as well as amongst the general public. Several arguments can be raised to 
justify why corruption now receives more attention than in the past, amongst which, the 
availability of information that is now available, an increased role played by non-governmental 
organizations such as Transparency International, and the third wave of democratization along 
with its ideology of rule of law, freedom of speech and greater accountability (Tanzi 1998; Della 
Porta 2004). 
The vast and rich amount of studies produced has led to a number of different approaches 
and conceptualizations. Warren (2004: 328), for example, states that corruption should be defined 
as the reduction of “public agencies of collective action to instruments of private benefits”. Nye 
(1967: 38) on the other hand offers a more comprehensive definition, stating that it is “behavior 
which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close 
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family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain 
types of private-regarding influence”.  
Johnston (2005: 11) offers an additional explanation, whereby corruption is the “abuse of 
a trust, generally one involving public power, or private gains which often, but by no means 
always, come in the form of money”. Nye’s and Johnston’s definitions point to the difficulty in 
coming up with a single workable definition, partly due to the fact that corruption does, in fact, 
take many different forms. To this extent, Johnston (1997: 6) goes on to affirm that: 
“No issue is more enduring in the corruption debate, and none has so frequently preempted 
promising discussions, as that of definitions. Despite the fact that most people, most of the 
time, know corruption when they see it, defining the concept does raise difficult theoretical 
and empirical questions.” 
 
Certainly, the most used definition can be summed up as the abuse of public power for 
private gain (Heidenheimer et al. 1989; Bardhan 1997), though Pillay and Dorasamy (2010) affirm 
that this definition is a gross over-simplification of what corruption actually entails. 
This lack of a single workable definition is also reflected in the number of different 
approaches to studying the concept of corruption. Graaf (2007) and Pinto et al. (2008) suggest that 
corruption can be approached at a micro or macro level, either focusing on an individual- or 
organizational-level. Others suggest studying it a national or cross-national level, or indeed at 
multiple-levels (Azfar et al. 2001; Huberts 2010). The different approaches do not only refer to 
the level at which it is studied, but also to the theoretical approach of it. Upon conducting research 
on this topic, at least ten different theoretical approaches were identified (Boudon 2003; Pillay and 
Dorasamy 2010; Palmer 2012), many of which themselves functioned as an umbrella for further 
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approaches, in addition to over forty reasons listed as to the determinants of corruption (see Table 
2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 – Research on Corruption: Determinants 
Political Economic Social Legal 
Bureaucracy: 
Nowak (2001); Gupta 
(2001) 
Competition: 
Shleifer & Vishny (1993); 
Ades & DiTella (1997) 
Culture: 
Husted (1999) 
Legal System: 
Theobold (1990); Ali 
(2003) 
Civic Participation: 
Shen & Williamson (2005) 
Economic Freedom: 
La Palombara (1994); 
Paldam (2002); Goel & 
Nelson (2005) 
Education: 
Treisman (2000); Truex 
(2011) 
Penalty System: 
Shleifer & Vishny (1993); 
Tanzi (1998) 
Decentralization: 
Shleifer & Vishny (1993) 
Economic Growth: 
Husted (1999); Berdiev et 
al. (2013) 
Ethics: 
La Porta et al. (1997) 
Property Rights: 
Nas et al. (1986); 
Acemoglu & Verdier 
(1998) 
Delegation of Power: 
Klitgaard (1988); Cartier-
Bresson (2000) 
Income Distribution: 
Gupta et al. (2001); Serra 
(2006) 
Gender: 
Dollar et al. (2001); 
Swamy et al. (2001) 
 
Democracy: 
Treisman (2007) 
Inflation: 
Getz & Volkema (2001) 
Geography/History: 
Bloch & Tang (2004); Goel 
Nelson (2010) 
Organizational 
Government Size: 
Goel & Nelson (1998) 
Poverty: 
Evans (1999) 
Human Development: 
Rose-Ackerman & Truex 
(2012) 
Informality: 
Smith-Crowe et al. (2015) 
Information Asymmetry: 
Rose-Ackerman (1996); 
Kolstad & Wiig (2009) 
Regulations: 
Tanzi (1998); Treisman 
(2000); Gerring & Tacker 
(2005) 
Population Size: 
Fisman & Gatti (2002); 
Knack & Azfar (2003) 
Institutional: 
Collier (2002);  
Political Competition: 
Brunetti & Weder (1998) 
Taxation: 
Flatters & Bentley 
MacLeod (1995) 
Religion: 
La Porta et al. (1999); 
Paldam (2001) 
 
Power:  
Brown et al. (2005); 
Moore et al. (2018) 
Political Instability: 
Leite & Weidemann 
(1999); Persson & 
Tabellini (2001) 
Trade Openness: 
Sandholtz & Koetzle 
(2000) 
Urbanization: 
Meier & Holbrooke (1992) 
Social Influence: 
Anand et al. (2005); 
Goette et al. (2006); 
Treviño et al. (2006) 
  Values: 
Gibbons (1982); Fisman & 
Miguel (2007) 
 
 
30 
 
The aim of this Chapter, however, is not to present an exhaustive discussion of every single 
theoretical approach to corruption, as this would detract from the focus of this thesis. Instead, as 
Palmer (2012) suggests, these can be grouped into two categories, which refer to corrupt 
individuals themselves regarding their intent to engage in corruption: mindful rationality, and 
mindless (bounded) rationality (Palmer 2012). Both categories serve as an umbrella for theoretical 
approaches (see Table 2.2) and have produced a significant number of studies (though the former 
has been the predominant approach). In addition, they both offer diametrical views on corruption 
and corrupt-intent. These will be reviewed in more detail in the next section. 
 
Table 2.2 – Mindful and Mindless Approaches 
Approach 
Examples of Theories Which Adopt This 
Approach 
Examples of Studies 
Mindful and 
Rational 
Rational Choice, Deterrence, Principal-
Agency, Ethical Decision 
Rasmusen and Ramseyer 1994; Rose-
Ackerman 2006; Hastie and Dawes 
2001; Holmes 2009; Chen 2011; 
Voliotis 2011; Shalvi 2016 
Mindless and 
Bounded Rationality 
Cognitive Psychology, Culture, 
Situational Social Influence, 
Administrative, Institutional 
Collier 2002; Anand et al. 2005; 
Darley 2005; Lorenz et al. 2006; 
Treviño et al. 2006; Moore 2008; 
Carson 2014; Moore et al. 2018 
 
 
2.2.1 Mindful Rationality  
Mindful rationality is the most dominant account of corruption (Palmer 2012) and assumes 
that individuals are rational beings, engaging in rational decision-making. Downs (1957: 4) 
summarizes this type of individual by claiming that “conscious rationality prevails”. This approach 
assumes that people engage in corruption when they perceive that the potential benefits will 
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outweigh the costs (Rose-Ackerman 2006). In other words, individuals are “rational utility-
maximizers” (Collier 2010: 12) and utilize a cost-benefit framework when deciding whether or not 
to engage in corruption (Becker 1962).  As Oliveira (2007: 16) explains, “rational individuals 
establish a weighing mechanism between choice and value. Rational methodologies lead to the 
optimization of the outcomes by emphasizing the process of choosing rather than what is chosen”. 
Hence, under this approach, emphasis is given to the rational thought process undertaken by 
individuals in order to evaluate the situation and hence make a choice of whether or not to engage 
in corruption. 
Mindful rationality also posits that individuals act on the basis of self-interest preferences 
(Hall and Taylor 1996). By calculating costs and benefits, individuals are also seeking to achieve 
their preference, whatever that may be (happiness, power, money etc.). Thus, this approach tends 
to regard rational beings as people of a dubious character, or “bad apples”. As Graaf (2007) 
explains, “bad apples” are “people with a faulty (moral) character. . . There is a causal chain from 
bad character to corrupt acts; the root cause of corruption is found in defective human character 
and predisposition toward criminal activity”.  In regard to the morality of individuals, Graaf (2007) 
explains however that there is little empirical evidence for this claim which is mostly based on 
assumption.  
Two theories which adopt this approach are deterrence theory and principal-agency theory. 
In the case of deterrence theory, Carson (2014: 13) claims it refers to raising levels of penalty and 
maximizing chances for detection and prosecution, actions that would result in deterred behavior 
due to the increased costs (see also Rose-Ackerman 2006 and Cooter and Ulen 2014). To this 
extent, Greve et al. (2010: 60) explain that “Rational-choice modeling assumes self-interested 
actors who need to be controlled in order not to choose actions that would be beneficial for them 
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but harmful for transaction partners or third parties”. As such, the solution for curbing corruption 
is to increase levels of sanctioning. 
Regarding the principal-agency theory, this refers to the relationship between principals 
(i.e. citizens) and agents (i.e. bureaucrats). Both enter into a relationship in which the former 
delegates power and responsibility to the latter. If, however, there are little chances for the principal 
to monitor the activities of the latter, since these are assumed to be rational and maximum utility-
seekers, then there is a high probability that agents will take advantage of principals and seek to 
benefit and abuse that relationship. The lack of opportunity for monitoring the activities of the 
agent by the principal is due to that agents possessing knowledge that principals do not as a result 
of the fact that it was delegated to them by means of power and responsibility. This imbalance is 
referred to as “power asymmetry”, hence the only way to curb corruption in this instance is to 
reduce the asymmetry by means of increased transparency. 
The mindful rationality approach has not, however, been immune to criticism, with some 
highlighting what they perceive to be a reductionist quality to it. According to Mercer (2005: 80-
81), studies which adopt this approach “explain how one should reason, not how one actually 
reasons” nor do they adequately address how people “make decisions to reach an outcome”. 
Carson (2014: 19) adds that “despite the theoretical and intuitive elegance of the rational actor 
model, the reduction of human decision-making processes to autonomous calculations of 
probabilities and outcome appraisals fails to explain why individuals frequently make choices that 
do not maximize their total expected utility and thus appear ‘irrational’”.  
To this extent, mindless rationality represents a diametrically opposite view. This will be 
reviewed in the next section.  
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2.2.2 Mindless Rationality 
Mindless rationality is diametrically opposed to mindful rationality. Whereas in the former, 
individuals are theorized to be rational beings, in the latter, individuals can act in ways that are 
irrational, making decisions that can even go against their own best interest. In addition, as opposed 
to the mindful rationality approach which has dominated corruption studies, research is still 
emerging in this area (Palmer 2012). 
Under this approach, individual decision-making is subject to the influence of many 
factors, such as motivation, mental capacity, social influence, and cultural context. Moreover, it 
encompasses several theoretical approaches, such as cultural, institutional, and cognitive 
psychology theories. The fundamental idea that unites this group of theories is its emphasis on the 
social context. In other words, these theories emphasize context as an influencing factor of human 
behavior. As Palmer (2012: 15) affirms, “the human experience consists largely of exposure to 
socially constructed input. . . [people] react automatically to one’s environment, following innate 
predispositions, learned social codes, or organizational rules and protocols”. What this means is 
that individual behavior is subject to social influence and how that individual construes their 
reality.   
Cognitive psychology specifically has emerged as a group of theories which adopt this 
view of the individual whereby attitudes, personal beliefs, and subjective norms play a decisive 
role (Darley 2005). As Oliveira (2007: 13) states, this body of work “has been able to explain at 
some extent why people may deviate from rational behaviors. One of these explanations, for 
example, is based on the principle that people’s set of beliefs, or culture, might influence and 
corrupt information processing” (Oliveira 2007: 13). Studies that adopt this approach thus suggest 
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that individuals are subject to conducting faulty analyses of costs and benefits, even to the 
detriment of their own personal benefit. 
This approach to corruption can be traced to the human agency model in social cognitive 
psychology theory by Bandura (1986), which determines that human functioning is the result of a 
“three-way, interactive causation”, a model he labels as “triadic codetermination” (Bandura 2016: 
6). This means that human functioning is the “product of the interplay of personal influences, the 
behavior individuals engage in, and the environmental forces that impinge on them” (ibid). This 
three-way interplay takes place in a bi-directional way, with each of the three factors listed actively 
reinforcing one another. Thus, individual behavior is both subject to the influence of their 
environmental context, and an influencer in their environment around them. Likewise, their 
behavior stems from personal determinants, but the result of their behavior will also bear an 
influence on them personally. This adds a higher level of complexity as to why individuals would 
engage in corrupt behavior, with no straightforward answer.  
The theory of reasoned action is another which falls under this category. It posits that 
human behavior is the result of motivational influences (Madden et al. 1992). In this regard, 
Madden et al. (1992: 3) affirm that beliefs represent “the underlying influence on an individual’s 
attitude toward performing the behavior”. Corrupt behavior is therefore subject to psychological 
determinants, which are not always the result of rational information processing. The main 
difference between the theory of reasoned action and social cognitive psychology is that the latter 
does not posit that behavior is solely due to internal cognitive processes. Rather, it states that 
individuals are influenced by their social contexts. 
Researchers who adopted this approach to organizational studies have established some 
common factors as to why corruption occurs: 
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1. Power. According to them, individuals in a position of power are more likely to engage 
in corruption. This is due to a series of different factors, amongst which, the belief that 
power grants individuals the right to pursue self-centered goals. Darley (2005) also 
suggests that those in a position of power are able to easily influence those who they 
hold power over. Unethical leadership has been found to be positively correlated with 
corruption levels (Moore et al. 2018).  
2. Rationalization. Dupuy and Neset (2018) describe this as the action to rationalize or 
justify behaviors that would otherwise be morally reprehensible. Palmer (2012) refers 
to this process as reframing, whilst Bandura (1986) expands on this notion and offers a 
full range of mechanisms through which individuals “morally disengage”, thus 
eliminating any feelings that might otherwise result in self-condemnation. Gino (2016: 
83) further explains that “self-serving justifications can be viewed as a form of ‘moral 
disengagement’ in which cognitive mechanisms deactivate moral self-regulation”. 
3. Informality. Smith-Crowe et al. (2015) contend that informality within an organization 
allows for corruption to flourish. In this regard, formal arrangements (i.e. norms and 
codes of conduct) serve to constrain behavior. In lieu of such formal arrangements, 
corruption tends to grow. 
4. Social Influence. Researchers affirm that the degree of interaction between individuals 
in a work setting is high. Due to the social relationships formed, this dynamic has the 
ability to shape behavior (Cialdini 2001). Individuals within work environments where 
levels of corruption are high will therefore present a greater propensity towards 
engaging in corruption themselves because of the influence of their immediate context 
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and social influence experienced. This proposal is congruent with that posited by 
Bandura (1986) in his model of human agency. 
 
For researchers who have adopted this approach, the notion of the “bad apple” should be 
contested, since they believe that those who engage in corruption are not necessarily bad people 
or of a morally dubious character. On the contrary, studies have shown that morality is flexible in 
that you may behave immorally in one aspect of life, but righteously in another (Bandura 1986; 
2016). To this extent Gino (2016: 83) adds that “people who value morality often show moral 
flexibility, behaving unethically if they are able to convince themselves that their behavior is not 
immoral. As this body of research suggests, morality is malleable”. Dimant (2013: 14) adds that 
an “individual’s actual behavior is unlikely the result of a sound business calculation, as the risk 
is not properly assessed”. Thus, the cognitive processes that compel an individual to engage in 
corruption are diverse and subject to a confounding number of factors.  
In summary, this view on corrupt individuals posits that individuals are bounded in their 
rationality. Moreover, such individuals are viewed as complex, whose decisions may or may not 
be rational, and subject to external influences. Oliveira (2007) cites that the main differentiator 
between bounded rationality and mindful rationality is that the former focuses on how individuals 
make decisions, whereas the latter clarifies how individuals should decide.  
As stated previously, most of the research in corruption conducted thus far has adopted the 
rational approach which, due to the way it views individuals, has been able to provide a more 
parsimonious body of work (Gino 2016). As a result, most of the anti-corruption measures devised 
to date have based themselves on it.  
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2.2.3 Summary 
 The great interest in the study of corruption has generated plenty of studies on the topic, 
originating from a varied range of fields: public administration, political science, law, among 
others. This has resulted in several different explanations for why corruption exists (as can be 
viewed in Table 2.1) and reflects the diversity of the topic and difficulty in pinpointing one single 
solution. 
 Such diversity is also the result of the many different theoretical approaches that have been 
adopted to study corruption. These tend to fall into two categories: those that view the corrupt 
individual as rational, and maximum utility-seekers, and those that view the individual as bounded 
in their rationality and how they construe their realities, subject to influence from their 
environment. 
 The great interest in corruption has resulted in a range of anti-corruption studies and 
solutions, amongst which investments in e-government. This will be reviewed in the next section 
of this Chapter.  
 
2.3 Anti-Corruption Measures 
In the mid-1990s, a range of international organizations such as the United Nations, the 
IMF (International Monetary Fund), and the World Bank began to raise awareness to the issues 
resulting from corrupt practices and lobby for measures which had the intent of curbing corruption 
(Bukovansky 2006). Several NGOs, such as Transparency International, also played a pivotal role 
in advancing the anti-corruption discourse, which has resulted in a range of different policies and 
recommendations as to how to tackle the issue (Hopkin 2002).  
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Collier (2002: 13) states that the purpose of “anti-corruption programs is to strengthen state 
boundaries separating public office from private interests”. In that regard, the recommendations 
made have been mostly inspired by the mindful rational view of individuals and the bulk of anti-
corruption policies fall into two categories. The first refers to the manipulation of the incentive 
structure. Based on the notion that individuals are maximum utility-seekers, these policies aim to 
increase the cost of corruption for those who engage in it and offer benefits or incentives for those 
who refrain from it (Hopkin 2002; Dupuy and Neset 2018). Such mechanisms have resulted in 
recommendations for enhanced levels of sanctioning and strengthening of legislative frameworks 
on the one hand, and financial and business incentives on the other. 
The second recommendation refers to reducing the “information asymmetry” and 
reengineering the institutional design so as to strengthen oversight and control (Rothstein 2011). 
This means making more information available to principals (e.g. civil society) and creating 
opportunities for the behavior of agents to be monitored. Such a notion, based on the principal-
agency theory, has resulted in recommendations for organizations and governments to increase 
levels of transparency (Arellano-Gault and Lepore 2011). From this perspective, transparency is 
considered to be “the ability of the principal to observe how the agent behaves and the 
consequences of the agents’ behavior”. Bertot et al. (2010: 264) add that “transparency ultimately 
serves to keep government honest”.  
Largely facilitated by the Internet and information and communication technologies 
(ICTs), the number of governments across the world that have adopted transparency as an anti-
corruption mechanism has grown considerably (Bertot et al. 2010). Norris (2002) notes that in the 
early 2000s there were already over fourteen thousand agencies online worldwide. These topics, 
transparency and the means for promoting it, will be discussed in the next section of this Chapter. 
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2.3.1 Defining Transparency  
Transparency is an important instrument in democracies and is considered one of the 
central elements of a democracy, considered to be a “key way to address both developmental and 
democratic deficits” (Gaventa and McGee 2013: 4) and one of the most powerful tools against 
corruption (Lindstedt and Naurin 2010). One of the main reasons for this is that a transparent 
government is capable of revealing “whether representatives really represent, whether 
functionaries actually function, and whether the system of justice is truly just” (Fox and Haight 
2011: 354). 
The term gained relevance in the 1990s when it became associated with elements of “good 
governance” (Schmitter 2004: 990). According to Margetts (2011: 518) promoting transparency 
means to “fulfil citizens’ ‘right to know’ about government and policy making”, in addition to 
being the “‘key to better governance’ by enhancing certain administrative values, such as integrity, 
fairness and efficiency”. Due to its perceived importance in both political and management 
sciences, it has become a term that has been widely discussed, with the number of studies on the 
topic growing considerably over the years (Fox and Haight 2011; Schmitter 2010; Heald 2012) 
(see Figure 2.1), with many different interpretations being attributed to it (Matheus et al. 2012). In 
his study, Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2016) identified more than fifteen different meanings 
attributed to the term transparency in articles released between 1990 and 2009. 
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Figure 2.1 – Papers on Referencing Transparency in Business Journals 
Source: Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2016) 
 
 
Definitions for it have been mostly vague and often confusing as it is commonly mistaken 
for accountability, sometimes considered a dimension of the latter, sometimes synonymous with 
it, despite the fact that the two are not the same (Stirton and Lodge 2001). Furthermore, due to its 
perceived democratic virtues, “transparency is often presented as a public virtue, which it is 
discreditable or inadvisable to oppose” (Heald 2012: 31). In this sense, Kim et al. (2005: 649) add 
that the concept of transparency “carries with it a powerful array of moral and political 
associations, including honesty, guilelessness, and openness”.  
Meijer (2009: 258) puts it simply as “lifting the veil of society” and Birkinshaw (2016: 
189) posits that it refers to the “conduct of public affairs in the open or otherwise subject to public 
scrutiny”. More than simply gaining an insight into the conduct of public institutions, transparency 
refers to openness of processes, procedures, rules, regulations, decisions, operations, functioning 
and performance; in other words, all information that is necessary for evaluating the institution in 
question (Bellver and Kaufmann 2005; Kim et al. 2005; Hood 2006; Etzioni 2010; 
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Grimmelikhuijsen 2010; Lindstedt and Naurin 2010). Roberts (2009: 957) reflects that 
transparency, therefore, serves to “cast light upon what would otherwise remain obscure or 
invisible”. Thus, information is vital for the promotion of citizen rights, and an essential part of 
good public governance (Margetts 2011).  
Heald (2006: 26) explains that “transparency extends beyond openness to embrace 
simplicity and comprehensibility” and “requires external receptors capable of processing the 
information made available”. Both Birkinshaw (2006) and Heald (2006) allude to the possibility 
of a system being open but not necessarily transparent. This, therefore, is an important 
consideration for those evaluating the extent to how transparent an institution really is.  
Such an array of different definitions for the term have led to a range of different studies, 
several of which have adopted different understandings towards the topic. Moreover, the lack of 
definition for transparency has often resulted in it being treated as something “elusive” and over-
simplified, resulting in superficial analyses of the issue (Heald 2012). Heald (2012: 30) contends 
that “the conceptualization of transparency has to be more sophisticated than current rhetoric 
implies”.    
In this regard, Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2016) affirm that though the definitions vary 
widely, especially across the different fields of research, there is one consensus, in that 
transparency refers to “information”. Angélico (2012) adds that the term relates to the information 
flow and also to the quality of information and its use. Hence, transparency, in its broadest sense, 
pertains to all the variables that may affect information flow in a polity, such as information that 
is regular and accurate, timely and reliable, and which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders 
(Stiglitz 2002; Stasavage 2003; Hollyer et al. 2011). As will be further discussed in a subsequent 
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section, transparency is also subject to the influence of a range of different factors, such as the 
legislative framework, technical constraints, and the people who actually produce the information. 
Another important consideration is the form in which transparency is delivered. Scholars 
in the field agree that transparency has increased due to technology (Oliver 2004; Meijer 2009). In 
that regard, Meijer (2009: 258) affirms that “modern transparency is computer-mediated 
transparency”. Hence, transparency has largely been facilitated by e-government investments. This 
will be discussed in the next section. 
 
2.3.2 e-Government and Transparency 
e-Government can be broadly defined as “the use by government of digital technologies 
internally and externally, to interact with citizens, firms, other governments, and organizations of 
all kinds” (Margetts 2009: 114), and the speed with which governments have adopted ICTs has 
been impressive (Gallego-Alvarez et al 2010). In the early 2000s, there were already over fourteen 
thousand agencies online worldwide (Norris 2002). Likewise, in 1990 only two countries had 
Freedom of Information (FoIA) pieces of legislation regulating Open Government initiatives, 
whilst currently, over eighty do (Calland and Bentley 2013). According to Brown (2005), it was 
around the early 2000s when the term gained traction, in spite of the fact that the use of information 
technology by governments can be traced back to at least the 1950s. 
The rationale behind investments in technology by governments across the world is two-
fold: first, the use of e-government is viewed as a means of making government processes more 
efficient, reflecting governance practices adopted by the private sector (Pina et al. 2007; Gaventa 
and McGee 2013). In addition, automating government processes is seen as a form of curbing 
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corruption since it is believed to restrict discretion by agents. In this regard the experience in Seoul, 
Korea, whose local government deployed a platform that allowed for the automation of civil 
applications (the Government Online Procedures Enhancement – OPEN), is seen as a success story 
(Kim et al. 2009). 
The second main driving force refers to the democratization effects e-government is 
perceived to have. As mentioned previously, e-government is seen as the platform towards 
achieving greater transparency, thus increasing levels of accountability and curbing corruption. In 
this regard, studies such as the ones developed by Andersson and Bergman (2009), Kim (2014), 
Shrivastava and Bhattacherjee (2014), Srivastava et al. (2016), Bauhr and Grimes (2017), and De 
Simone et al. (2017) all provide evidence that a negative correlation between transparency and 
corruption does in fact exist, reinforcing the need for investments to be made in e-government 
platforms that support such actions. 
Justice et al. (2006) affirm however that there is a clear gap between normative theory and 
actual practice since they believe many of the models presented in the e-government literature are 
vast over-simplifications of what in reality happens. Adopting a deterministic view of technology, 
most e-government studies seem to overlook the “government” factor, focusing instead on the 
electronic aspect. As such, they overlook the complex environment that is a governmental 
institution and its entrenched structures that have been constructed over time, relying instead on 
the supposition that investments will automatically translate into the desired results.  
In addition, current models overlook specificities of individual national contexts, instead 
determining that all processes must occur along the same pattern and that any failed attempts are 
naturally the result of implementation errors (Bussell 2011). As Rose (2005: 1) contends, “While 
Internet technology is much the same around the world, states and societies are not . . . E-
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governance is necessarily influenced by its national context”. Therefore, technology itself cannot 
be regarded as the means of institutional reform, but rather as a tool (Margetts 2011). 
The result has been, according to Elahi et al. (2011), that approximately 85% of 
government initiatives fail, criticizing this rapid adoption of ICTs by governments without proper 
and careful analysis. Luna-Reyes et al. (2005) cite a 1998 survey which showed that e-government 
failures occurred 90% of the time due to socio-organizational factors. Regarding transparency 
efforts specifically, a few dissenting views have emerged contesting the notion that transparency 
should result in less corruption (Fox 2007; Hood 2010; Fox and Haight 2011; Frølich 2011; 
Arellano-Gault and Lepore 2011; Gaventa and McGee 2013). Bannister and Connolly (2011:1) 
note however that these are still “minority voices”, 
 To counterbalance this deterministic view, studies proposing an alternate view to 
technology have emerged, proposing that they are in fact socio-technical systems. In this regard, 
Damodaran et al. (2005: 1) affirm that e-government “systems and their associated processes, like 
many systems and processes, are inherently ‘sociotechnical’ in nature, i.e. they involve people 
interacting with technology to deliver outcomes not achievable by either the technology or the 
people working alone. . . There is a substantial body of evidence which suggests that this one-sided 
approach to design is one of the main reasons why new systems fail to achieve their expected 
benefits”. Heeks (2006: 4) complements this notion by affirming that e-government systems 
“combine both the social – that is, people – and the technical. This is the first indication that, when 
managing e-government, both social and technical (otherwise known as soft and hard) issues will 
have to be dealt with”.  
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Based on what has been discussed thus far, it is clear that two different approaches to the 
study of e-government have emerged: a technological deterministic view and a socio-technical 
approach. This will be reviewed in the next section. 
 
2.4 Socio-Technical vs Technological Deterministic 
As reviewed, most of the research in e-government and transparency has followed a 
technological deterministic approach, whereby technology is the driving force behind change. 
Bimber (1990: 9) observes that this view was developed due to the fact “that technology is 
generally accompanied by unintended consequences, which even willful interveners are unable to 
anticipate and control. This phenomenon is interpreted to mean that technology is at least partially 
autonomous and that it is responsible for determining certain social outcomes”. Furthermore, 
technology-enabled investments are invariably perceived as positive and desirable due to the 
proposition that it makes information more readily and easily available (Margetts 2006; Luna-
Reyes et al. 2014), and more structured (Margetts 2006). Technology is also able to handle large 
amounts of data, lower the cost of transparency and response time, and allow for less discretion by 
public servants, since they are forced to more strictly adhere to moral standards and performance 
indicators (Margetts 2006; Meijer 2009; Bannister and Connolly 2011; Luna-Reyes et al. 2014).  
As Mackenzie and Wajcman (1999: 5) note however, “the view that technology just 
changes, either following science or of its own accord, promotes a passive attitude to technological 
change. It focuses our mind on how to adapt to technological change, not how to shape it”. Shane 
(2012: 12) further affirms that “if technology were the key to democratic success, then we would 
now be living in an age in which we all, without regards to class or social status, would have 
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unprecedented opportunities to achieve our personal aspirations and to shape the collective lives 
of the communities in which we live”. 
 To counterbalance technological determinism, social shaping of technology (and other 
variants, such as the social construction of technology) emerged, which, instead, focus on how 
social, institutional, and cultural factors aid in shaping technological change (Williams and Edge 
1996). However, as Kallinikos (2002: 289) points out, how far the social aspects can shape the 
technology is restricted by its design and thus, not infinitive. To this extent, he affirms that “prior 
commitments and choices prefigure developments of a particular technology at a given moment”. 
Sitting therefore in between these two ideological stances is the socio-technical approach, 
which deems neither the social nor the technical the dominant force (see Table 2.3 for comparison). 
Rather, these are mutually reinforcing. Sawyer and Jarrahi (2013) explain that this is an important 
point since: 
“a singular focus on technology leads researchers into inappropriate materialism. On the 
other hand, a focus on technology as a solely social production has led to an overreliance 
on social orders as primary drivers, potentially leading to social determinism. In contrast, 
the sociotechnical perspective . . . speaks directly to the complex and dynamic interactions 
among technological capacities, social histories, situated context, human choices and 
action rather than looking for simplified causal agency” (Sawyer and Jarrahi 2013: 4-5). 
 
 
Sawyer and Jarrahi’s (2013) view expresses what the reality of public organizations are 
like: complex and dynamic. In the case of the Brazilian federal entities, it is made up of an 
inordinate number of agencies and people, all of which is embedded in a cultural context, hence 
the need to consider these aspects when studying technological change. On the other hand, an 
overreliance on these social aspects would mean disregarding any technological impact, which 
can, and does, alter technical procedures in some way.  
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Table 2.3 – Approaches to Technology Diffusion 
Source: Adapted from Kling and Lamb (2000: 302) 
 
Technology-Deterministic Socio-Technical 
IT is a tool. IT is a sociotechnical network. 
Business model is sufficient. Ecological view is needed. 
One-shot implementation. Implementation is an ongoing social process. 
Technological effects are direct and 
immediate. 
Technological effects are indirect and 
involve different time scales. 
Incentives to change are unproblematic. 
Incentives may require restructuring and 
may be in conflict with other organizational 
actions. 
Politics are bad or irrelevant. Politics are central and even enabling. 
IT infrastructures are fully supportive. 
Articulation work is often needed to make IT 
work, and sociotechnical support is critical 
for effective IT use. 
Contexts are simple (described by a few key 
terms or demographics. 
Contexts are complex (matrices of business, 
services, people, technology, history, 
location etc.). 
Knowledge and expertise are easily made 
explicit. 
Knowledge and expertise are inherently 
tacit/implicit. 
 
 
Barley (1986) notes that the same technology can incur different outcomes across different 
organizations. In addition, “different social groups can conceptualize the same technology in 
different and often contradictory ways” (Orlikowski and Iacono 2000: 356). In other words, social 
forces do matter in helping to shape technological outcomes. Cultural and cognitive contexts 
matter too. The approach reflects what Orlikowski and Iacono (2000) identify as the ‘ensemble 
view’ of technology. That is, “hardware and software are components of a more complex socio-
technical ensemble that includes people, work processes, and institutional and cultural factors” 
(Luna-Reyes et al. 2005: 94). 
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Based on these arguments, it seems reasonable to affirm that transparency systems can and 
should be theorized as socio-technical systems since they imply change and disruption in 
organizations in ways that affect both social and technological forces. Implementing transparency 
requires introducing new systems and processes, the impact of which can be felt on both the 
technical and the social sides, hence why they must be considered a socio-technical system. As 
Bostrom and Heinen (1977: 17) explain, under a socio-technical optic, an organization is 
conceived as a socio-technical system which is “made up of two jointly independent, but 
correlative interacting systems – the social and the technical”. Hence when analyzing the impact 
of technology deployment, both organizational and social processes must be considered (Bostrom 
and Heinen 1977; Kling and Lamb 2000). 
In spite of evidence that indicates that an overreliance on the technical aspect leads to 
failure, this approach has dominated the literature in e-government. The result of such a 
deterministic view of is that it has failed in its attempts to produce theoretical frameworks (Heeks 
and Bailur 2007; Yildiz 2007) and few studies have aimed to offer explanations as to why things 
happen the way they do. Taylor and Lips (2008: 142) further add that current studies on e-
government, with its heavy positivist emphasis, prohibit “deeper and more qualitative evidence-
gathering and judgement about what is happening to the polity – the myriad of relationships that 
make up a political system – whilst e-government projects are being devised and implemented”. 
 Regarding transparency specifically, a technological deterministic view has also been the 
driving force behind such investments, with the intent being that investments in transparency 
should automatically result in less corruption. This notion has led many studies to overestimate 
the effectiveness of transparency. Over the course of the years, there have been an increasing 
amount of studies attesting to the negative correlation between transparency and corruption (see 
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Table 2.4). Yet, such studies have failed to discuss the outliers to this proposition, such as Brazil 
and South Africa, both of which have consistently ranked high in the Open Budget Index but have 
struggled with grappling corruption.  
 
Table 2.4 – Studies on Transparency and Corruption  
Study Journal 
Andersson and Bergman (2009) Information Economics and Policy 
Bertot et al. (2010) Government Information Quarterly 
Abu-Shanab et al. (2013) International Journal of Electronic Governance 
Kim (2014) Public Organization Review 
Shrivastava and Bhattacherjee 
(2014) 
Twentieth Americas Conference on 
Information Systems Proceedings 
Srivastava et al. (2016) MIS Quarterly 
Bauhr and Grimes (2017) Crime, Law and Social Change 
De Simone et al. (2017) 
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and 
Policy 
Brusca et al. (2017) Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 
 
  
In the case of Brazil specifically, though it has been one of the leading countries in opening 
up its governmental data and making it available online, it has failed to experience decreasing 
levels of corruption as discussed in Chapter 1. It is possible to conclude therefore that, though 
desirable in any democratic environment, transparency will not on its own automatically translate 
into reduced corruption and enhanced participation – it is not per se a transformative initiative 
(O’Neill 2006). As Roberts (2009: 958) notes, “the effects of transparency depend on how it 
changes behind closed doors”. It becomes thus apparent that a shift towards a more socio-technical 
form of conceptualizing transparency is required. This will be discussed in the next section of this 
Chapter.  
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2.5 Conceptualizing Transparency  
As discussed previously, there is no single way of defining transparency, with different 
researchers adopting a range of different definitions. Perhaps the most commonly used definition 
is “lifting the veil of society” (Meijer 2009). This is, however, a somewhat vague definition, 
making it difficult to measure it or study it. This is why it is necessary to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of the term.   
 Taylor and Lips (2008: 142) categorize transparency as referring to information flows, 
determining that it, in fact, refers to “the creation, flow and holding of information”. Hosseini et 
al. (2018: 253) add that “transparency is generally defined as the open flow of information amongst 
stakeholders”. In this regard, they suggest that in order to understand transparency within any 
given context, it is necessary to, first of all, understand who the stakeholders are, i.e. who provides 
the information and who receives it. In addition, Hosseini et al. (2018) affirm that it is necessary 
to understand the information medium, that is, the channels used to relay that information.  
In the case of government transparency portals, such as the one managed by the Brazilian 
federal government, it is possible to identify that it consists of information flowing from the 
creators of it (a “source”, i.e. civil servants) to a recipient (i.e. citizens). In addition, the medium 
would be the web portal, or the technology platform (see Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2 – The Transparency Systems Environment 
 
 
Thus, transparency can, in fact, be conceived of as a system whereby the information 
touches upon a range of different actors and is transmitted via a technical artefact. In addition, in 
the context of a governmental web portal, it is important to consider that this system is subject to 
processing rules, i.e. the legal framework, different interest groups, cultural-historical aspects, and 
technology itself.  
The environment under which information is produced – especially in public settings – is 
a highly complex one. Referring back to Figure 2.2, it first of all comprises several different 
stakeholders, both internally and externally. Civil servants, when producing information, are 
accountable to a range of different people: their direct supervisor, the head of the office at which 
they work at, the Ministry under whose authority their agency is, as well as agencies at other 
Ministries within the federal sphere.  
In addition, the information produced is done so in accordance with an existing legal 
framework and a range of norms. In Brazil, for example, budget information that is published on 
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the Transparency Portal must attend to a series of legal requirements regarding timeliness, format, 
accuracy etc. Furthermore, it is subject to the constraints imposed by the technical system itself.  
Referring back to Taylor and Lips’s (2008: 142) definition of transparency as information 
flows, “the creation, flow and holding of information”, and Hosseini et al.’s (2018) definition, it 
is possible to affirm that transparency is, in fact, an information system. Moreover, it is possible 
to identify that it comprises three distinct stages: the creation of information (i.e. the “source”), 
the publication of information in its various formats (i.e. the “medium”), and the public access 
stage which allows for citizens to interact with the published information (i.e. “the recipient”) 
through which information flows (see Figure 2.3). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Transparency as an Information System 
 
 
Conceptualizing transparency in such a manner facilitates the comparison between 
research that has been produced thus far on the matter since each phase raises different concerns 
regarding how to make transparency more effective. In this regard, studies that sought to 
understand how to enhance citizen participation would be categorized as studies pertaining to the 
“public access phase”.   
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In fact, when reviewing the literature on transparency (see Table 2.5 for overview), it is 
regarding this phase that most studies have emerged. Though they range somewhat in focus, most 
discuss the issue of public participation and interaction, such as studies by Bertot et al. (2010), 
Chuna et al. (2010) and Bonson et al. (2012) which suggest the use of social media to promote 
interaction. Others discuss the issue of trust and how transparency can enhance that (Wong and 
Welch 2004; Tolbert and Mossberger 2006; Kim and Lee 2012). There are also studies that have 
analyzed characteristics of citizens who access government web portals (Cunha et al. 2011). Most 
studies, however, approach the issue of corruption and how transparency can be used as a deterrent 
for it (Hazell and Worthy 2010; Lindsted and Naurin 2010; Filgueiras 2011; Cordis and Warren 
2014; Harrison and Sayogo 2014). 
Another approach to the study of transparency refers to concentrating efforts on the 
publication phase of the information system depicted in Figure 2.3. Studies that have done so have 
discussed technical aspects of web portals and their design (Gant and Gant 2002; Esteves and 
Joseph 2007; Lourenço 2015; Ruijer et al. 2017). Studies that concern themselves with this phase 
of the information system have also analyzed aspects regarding the data itself, such as quality and 
relevance (Lausen et al. 2005; Correa et al. 2014; Palmirani et al. 2014). 
The creation phase, however, has received far less attention than the other phases. Research 
by Arellano-Gault and Lepore (2011) in Mexico and by González-Zapata and Heeks (2015) 
regarding open government in Chile are some of the few exceptions, a surprising fact since it is at 
this phase, the creation of information, in which the quality of information is dictated, and therefore 
the degree to which external stakeholders (civil society) will be effective in its efforts to monitor 
what the government is doing.  
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It seems appropriate therefore to assume that the success of transparency thus depends on 
a government’s ability to create reliable and high-quality information, the key issue here being 
what its abilities to do so are. As such, an analysis of the effectiveness of a transparency system 
must therefore necessarily involve the analysis of conditions under which information is produced, 
in other words, the “creation” stage. Attending exclusively to the other two stages of information 
flow is a fallacy, as it cannot accurately give a full account of why transparency fails. 
 
Table 2.5 – Overview of Studies on Transparency by Phase 
Creation Publication Public Access 
Arellano-Gault and Lepore (2011) Gant and Gant (2002) Welch et al. (2004) 
González-Zapata and Heeks (2015) Lausen et al. (2005) Torbet and Mossberger (2006) 
  Esteves and Joseph (2007) Bertot et al. (2010) 
  Correa et al. (2014) Chuna (2010) 
  Palmirani et al. (2014) Hazell and Worthy (2010) 
  Lourenço (2015) Lindsted and Naurin (2010) 
  Ruijer et al. (2017) Cunha et al. (2011) 
    Filgueiras (2011) 
    Bonson et al. (2012) 
    Kim and Lee (2012) 
    Cordis and Warren (2014) 
    Harrison and Sayogo (2014) 
 
Referring back to discussions regarding the different approaches to technology 
(technological determinism vs socio-technical), the dominant account of studies which have 
adopted a deterministic approach may explain why the creation phase of information has been 
overlooked. If technology is transformative, then those responsible for creating information will 
necessarily be transformed by it and abide by the new technical systems’ processing rules and 
constraints. However, if adopting a socio-technical approach, then that will not necessarily be the 
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case. As Kling et al. (2005: 426) affirm, “ICTs do not exist in social or technological isolation. 
Their “cultural and institutional contexts” influence the ways in which they are developed, the 
kinds of workable configurations that are proposed, how they are implemented and used, and the 
range of consequences that occur for organizations and other social groupings”. 
This lack of research adopting a socio-technical approach to transparency, especially at its 
creation phase, therefore represents a gap in the literature. Understanding the dynamics under 
which information is created may aid in clarifying why transparency has been unable to curb 
corruption in certain national contexts such as, in this case, Brazil.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter aimed to review the literature on e-government, transparency, and corruption. 
The first part of this Chapter reviewed two differing approaches to the individual who engages in 
corruption, clarifying that one approach (the mindful rationality) has been more dominant than the 
other (the mindless approach, or bounded rationality). In other words, it has been the former which 
has driven much of anti-corruption efforts. Thus, according to this approach, in order to curb 
corruption, one must raise costs of engaging in such acts and enhance visibility of these actors’ 
actions via transparency. 
The result has been an increase in investments in e-government and transparency in order 
to heed such calls to action. However, as noted, such investments have adopted a technological 
deterministic view to technology, overlooking social aspects of the setting in which these 
technologies are deployed. To counter such a deterministic view on technology, studies adopting 
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a socio-technical view have become more prevalent in the field. However, with regards to 
transparency, these are still minority voices and certain aspects of transparency have remained 
overlooked. 
This Chapter then presented a discussion on how transparency can be conceptualized in an 
alternative manner in order to facilitate comparison between studies and view where exactly the 
gaps lie. As a result, it was identified that the “creation” phase of information in the transparency 
model presented has been severely overlooked. This will therefore be the way this research will 
be approached: studying how information is created in order to assess its actual impact on 
corruption. Heeding to calls from Heeks and Mathisen (2012: 535), who affirm that there are “far 
too few resources [that] are spent on learning from interventions, and little is understood about the 
factors that make them happen”, this thesis seeks to do precisely that: conduct an in-depth analysis 
of how the creation of information takes place within a governmental agency, and learn what the 
factors are that impact this dynamic.  
Complementing the socio-technical approach adopted in regards to transparency, a 
bounded rationality approach to corruption will be undertaken. This is due to the fact that it has 
been the mindful rationality approach which has driven technological deterministic investments in 
transparency. It thus seems appropriate to adopt a more cognitive and less deterministic approach 
to corruption as well. As such, this thesis will adopt Palmer’s (2008: 108) definition which 
determines that: 
“Organizational wrongdoing consists of behavior perpetrated by organizational officials 
(i.e. directors, managers, and/or employees) in the course of fulfilling their organizational 
roles that is judged by social control agents (i.e. prosecutors, regulatory agency officials, 
judges, journalists etc.) to be illegal, unethical, or socially irresponsible. Collective 
organizational wrongdoing involves the sustained coordination of multiple organizational 
participants”. 
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In summary, this research will take a socio-technical approach on transparency in order to 
comprehend how information is created at a micro-level. The next Chapter will discuss the 
theoretical approach that has been adopted in this study.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction  
As discussed in the previous Chapter, for the purposes of this research, transparency is 
theorized as an information flow, which comprises three distinct stages: creation of information, 
publication and public access of information. 
The creation stage can be understood as an information system, one which comprises both 
social forces as well as a technical base through which information propagates until it reaches its 
final state of presentation on the Transparency Portal. As such, transparency systems can and 
should be theorized as socio-technical systems, since they implicate in change and disruption in 
organizations in ways that affect both social and technological forces. Heeks (2006: 4) 
corroborates this idea, as previously discussed, by affirming that the management of e-government 
systems goes beyond the management of technical aspects but should also consider social ones.  
How information is produced, from the perspective of those at the forefront of such 
processes, actively creating it is, as identified in the previous chapter, an area that has been heavily 
overlooked by scholars. Hence, it has become the focus of this thesis with the intent of bridging 
this gap, by providing an in-depth account of how such processes take place and, in turn, provide 
a meaningful contribution to studies in the e-government field. 
This Chapter is therefore aimed at delineating the theoretical frameworks that will support 
data collection and analysis. As Merriam (1998) determined, a theoretical framework serves as the 
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scaffolding of the study, from which the research questions will be established. This will be 
reviewed here.  
This Chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 will present a discussion on distributed 
cognition theory, one of the theoretical frameworks adopted. At the end of that section, how this 
theory applies to this research and two research questions will be presented. Section 3.3 will then 
discuss moral disengagement theory, the second theoretical framework adopted. At the end of the 
section, one further research question will be presented, in addition to how this theoretical 
framework will be adopted. Section 3.4 will focus on the meaningfulness of this study, whilst 
section 3.5 will end with some concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 A Socio-Technical Approach  
Amongst the many theories that are available – such as structuration theory, activity theory, 
and situated action – one seemed to be a particularly good fit for this study: distributed cognition.  
As established in Chapter 2, transparency can be conceived as a socio-technical system. 
Socio-technicality, however, is not a theory per se, but rather an approach. To this extent, Luna-
Reyes et al. (2005: 94) affirm that the socio-technical approach is the result of other theories which 
together inform its approach: “structuration theory, institutional theory, social construction, and 
theories of organizational change”. Thus, an actual theoretical framework must be chosen, one 
which aligns with the socio-technical vision, which emphasizes both technical and social aspects. 
Halverson (2002) suggests that a theory can only be considered useful to a study if it 
possesses four important attributes: descriptive power, rhetorical power, inferential power, and 
application. 
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The first attribute, descriptive power, refers to how a theory can aid a researcher in making 
sense of the world and describing it. The second attribute, rhetorical power, is in reference to 
whether it provides a conceptual structure which aids in mapping the real world. The third aspect 
Halverson (2002) lists is inferential power. As she explains, “we do want a theory to help us make 
inferences. In some cases, those inferences may be about phenomena that we have not yet 
understood sufficiently to know where or how to look” (Halverson 2002: 245). The fourth 
attribute, application, refers to how the theory can be applied to the real world. 
One such theory that she herself suggests and which fits that criteria is distributed cognition 
(DCog). Due to its natural fit to my line of inquiry, this was the theoretical framework chosen and 
will be reviewed in the next section of this Chapter. 
 
3.2.1 Distributed Cognition (DCog) 
Devised by Edwin Hutchins in the 1990s (Flor and Hutchins 1992; Hutchins and Klausen 
1992), DCog emphasizes the role of cognition, though not constrained to the individual mind, but 
rather extended and expanded to encompass both the social and cultural contexts. It draws 
influence from Vygotsky’s Social Development Theory1. As Hutchins (2000: 5) explains: “He 
[Vygotsky] argued that every high-level cognitive function appears twice: first as an 
interpsychological process and only later as an intrapsychological process. The new functional 
system inside the child is brought into existence in the interaction of the child with others (typically 
adults) and with artifacts”. Based on that idea, Hutchins (1995) conceived the notion that cognitive 
                                                          
1 Lev Vygotsky’s Social Development Theory is considered one of the foundations of constructivism. It 
establishes, among other things, that consciousness and cognition are the result of social interaction. As such, 
throughout his work, his focus was on the connections between individuals and their socio-cultural context 
(Vygotsky 1980; Crawford 1996). 
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processes are not only constrained to an individual mind but also take place in interaction with 
others. Hutchins (1995) would go on to develop his study on a navigational system and develop 
the concept of  “distributed cognition”, borrowing from traditional cognitive science concepts such 
as representations and processes, and applying them to social sciences concepts, such as division 
of labor and organizational learning (Rogers 2005). He defines cognitive processes “to be those 
that are involved in memory, decision making, inference, reasoning, learning, and so on” (Hutchins 
2000: 1).  
Distributed cognition, as a theoretical framework, is focused on studying the cognitive 
distribution of work activities between individuals and artefacts as they interact in a particular 
environment. Rogers and Ellis (1994: 122) posit that the aim of DCog is “to explain cognitive 
activities as embodied and situated within the work settings in which they occur. By explicitly 
adopting this broad focus, the distributed cognition approach provides a theoretical and 
methodological framework for analyzing complex, socially distributed work activities of which a 
diversity of technological artifacts and other tools are an indispensable part”. 
An aspect that should be highlighted about DCog is how it approaches the cognitive 
architecture and its focus on the ways information flows in a particular context. Thus, an activity 
such as the creation of transparency (or information) could be analyzed in terms of how it is 
distributed across a system, which comprises an array of agents, both human and technical. The 
focus in DCog is therefore in the interplay between agents, and how cognitive processes are shared 
between them. Figure 3.1 depicts how cognition expands across individuals and artefacts. It 
captures a moment in the workplace, whereby the different information sources (the computer, the 
phone, the technical systems within the computer, documents, the personal interactions) work in 
tandem and share the distribution of cognition. DCog therefore does not emphasize the individual 
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over the artefacts, as both will shape the cognitive process in some way. To this extent, Hollan et 
al. (2000: 175) affirm that “distributed cognition refers to a perspective on all cognition, rather 
than a particular kind of cognition”.  
 
Figure 3.1 – Distributed Cognition in the Workplace 
 
 
The distributed cognitive theory establishes two important principles (Hollan et al. 2000; 
Hutchins 1995): 
• The unit of analysis should be the cognitive system. As Hollan et al. (2000: 175) affirm, 
DCog looks for processes wherever they may occur, on the basis of the functional 
relationships of the elements”. In other words, a group of people and artefacts who do not 
interact do not constitute a cognitive system (Rogers and Ellis 1994).  
• Cognitive processes may involve various processes of coordination, such as between 
members of a social group and between people and artefacts. There is also a temporal 
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aspect that may warrant consideration, as the coordination between all these elements may 
not necessarily occur all at once, but in incremental stages through time.  
 
Zhang et al. 2002 establish that the unit of analysis comprises of a “triples rule”: individual, 
artefact, and context. In addition, the various coordinating mechanisms need to be taken into 
account. In this regard, it is a shift away from the traditional approach to cognition which 
establishes that cognitive processes are constrained to a single user (Nilsson et al. 2012: 61). Figure 
3.2 represents that difference. On the one hand, there is a single individual’s perspective of the 
world. On the other, there is the unit of analysis as established by DCog which comprises the entire 
cognitive system. To this extent, Lindblom and Thorvald (2017: 63) explain that “DCog offers a 
shift from studying individual cognizers to studying the whole functional system, including the 
people, the tools and artefacts that they use in order to perform their work and cognitive activities”. 
DCog thus expands the focus of cognition and approaches the concept of cognition as distributed 
across people, artefacts and the environment. In other words, cognition is no longer characterized 
as bound to an individual’s mind; it exists beyond the mind. 
Sharp and Robinson (2006: 2) argue that DCog provides a unifying approach to studying 
socially complex work situations that pulls together different disciplines that have traditionally 
studied such phenomena, i.e. the cognitive, social and organizational sciences. The framework, 
therefore, supports analysis of a situation that takes a more holistic view of the work and how 
information propagates through the system.  
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Figure 3.2 – Representation of Traditional Cognitive vs Distributed Cognitive 
Source: Adapted from Lindblom and Thorvald (2017) 
 
 
In terms of research enquiry, what this means is that it is not enough to study people 
individually. Instead, it is necessary to comprehend how they interact and are influenced by one 
another. The focus is on the interaction, not on the individual, both amongst individuals and in 
relation to the artefacts. Likewise, to understand a transparency system, it is necessary to 
understand the human agents involved as a social group, in addition to how they relate to the 
technical artifact, both how they shape it and are constrained by it and its various rules of 
processing. Moreover, it is also of interest how agents – both technical and human – align within 
a distributed process. That is, how tasks are organized and shared. In that regard, the depiction to 
the right of Figure 3.2 perfectly represents how government officials, in tandem with artefacts, 
represent a cognitive system. The output of this interaction will be the information displayed on 
the Transparency Portal. 
Another important aspect concerns how artefacts are studied. Both people and artefacts are 
considered agents within a cognitively distributed system. That means that, like individuals, 
artefacts are considered in relation to their human counterparts. It is necessary to understand the 
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properties of such artefacts insofar as the role they play in shaping information flows. Hence, 
artefacts are not blank slates, rather they possess innate properties which will shape the cognitive 
system in ways which must be understood (Nardi 1996).  
DCog uses the same theoretical language for people and artefacts. That does not mean 
however that both are treated equally. To this extent, Halverson (2002: 247) affirms that “This 
common language has led others to critique the theory for assuming people are equated with 
artifacts in some ways that denies their humanity. This is, in fact, not the case”. Instead, the weight 
each will carry – human or artefact – will be relative to the system in which they are embedded in. 
As affirmed before, it is this dynamic that is of special interest. 
Clegg (1994: 460) affirms that “Organizations are also cultural systems of shared meanings 
and understandings”. That is not to say, however, that organizations are merely the sum of different 
cognitive agents. Quite the contrary: when placed together, the aggregate sum will be transformed 
in ways which must be analyzed in-depth in order to be understood. Hutchins (1991, in Nardi 
1996: 39), supports this notion when he affirms that “because the system is not relative to an 
individual but to a distributed collection of interacting people and artifacts, we cannot understand 
how a system achieves its goal by understanding the ‘the properties of the individuals alone, no 
matter how detailed the knowledge of the properties of those individuals might be”.  
In distributed cognition, the core focus is on the general flow, propagation and 
transformation of information in the distributed system. This, according to Lindblom and Thorvald 
(2017: 66) allows the researcher to clearly identify issues such as “what happens when the 
information flow breaks down or when alternative ways of handling the information flow emerge 
in the system. . . Accordingly, different workarounds (i.e. the discrepancy between the prescribed 
work practice and the current work practice) that humans develop when dealing with various 
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demands during work performance become salient through a proper DCog analysis”. These 
“workarounds” are therefore conceptualized as “breakdowns” since the outcome of such actions 
directly impacts the flow of information and the sequence of tasks (Sharp and Robinson 2006; 
Galliers et al. 2007).  
As applied to this study, it could be said that every time participants diverge from what 
constitutes their regular work practice, provoking a misrepresentation or a rupture of the 
information flow, a breakdown has occurred. Previous studies, such as the one by Heeks (1999), 
posit that in a corrupt work environment, the deployment of ICTs may implicate in individuals 
deviating from their regular work practices in order to conceal their illicit activities. In other words, 
individuals who engage in corruption cause a breakdown in the information flow. Regarding 
transparency specifically, and the creation of information by civil servants, the idea that 
information is distorted, thus causing a breakdown in the information flow, seems plausible and 
should merit the attention of the researcher. In this regard, Sharp and Robinson’s (2006: 4) 
definition of a breakdown seems particularly well suited, i.e. they are considered “potential failures 
in communication or information flows that will impair the system’s performance or prevent the 
system from achieving its goals”.   
Rogers (2005) affirms that, in addition to breakdowns, other instances merit the attention 
of the researcher, such as the distributed problem-solving, coordinating mechanisms such as rules 
and procedures, the ways in which communication takes place, and how knowledge is shared 
amongst individuals. 
Nardi (1996: 46) notes that this is a very different approach to that of a technology 
deterministic approach, in that “they ignore the subjective”. This dominant ‘rationalist tradition’ 
in information systems, according to Winograd and Flores (1986), should be challenged, with more 
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‘cognitive science’ research needed. As Shane (2012: 12) affirms, “if technology were the key to 
democratic success, then we would now be living in an age in which we all, without regard to class 
or social status, would have unprecedented opportunities to achieve our personal aspirations and 
to shape the collective lives of the communities in which we live”. Hence, this aspect, the human 
component, cannot be disregarded. 
There has been some recognition of the importance of cognitive processes in information 
systems. Orlikowski (1992), for example, acknowledges both cognitive and organizational 
elements in her studies regarding changes in work practices resulting from the implementation of 
a new technology. However, such recognition is still overlooked in most studies. Moreover, even 
when mentioned, they fail to consider the cognitive processes that are inherent to tasks within an 
expanded work environment encompassing other individuals and artefacts, as opposed to 
individual cognitions (Rogers and Ellis 1994: 121). When it comes to governmental institutions, 
these are highly complex environments, as will be reviewed in Chapter 5. Such interplay of 
activities and people cannot be overlooked if one is to gain an in-depth understanding of how 
information is created within a governmental institution.  
DCog has been applied to a number of different settings: Hutchins (1995) who pioneered 
the model by applying it to U.S. Navy’s navigation system; Rogers (1992) who studied engineer 
practice; Halverston (1995) who applied it to air traffic control; to name a few. It is also particularly 
suited for workplace studies (Hollan et al. 2000). Such disparate settings reflect its wide-ranging 
application. Thus, though it has never been applied in the context of a governmental agency, its 
diverse ranging applicability, coupled with its interest in “work systems” makes  DCog a suitable 
approach to this study. Moreover, government agencies are information-intensive. As Heeks 
(2000: 197) observes, “government has been, and still remains, the single largest collector, user, 
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holder and producer of information”. DCog’s emphasis in the information system also make it an 
ideal fit for this study. 
One piece of criticism to the DCog theoretical framework, however, regards its 
abstractedness. Berndt et al. (2014: 432) highlight that “most accounts of DCog omit details of the 
process by which data were gathered, structured, or analyzed, making it difficult to follow or 
replicate”. To counter this, methods that facilitate the application of DCog in practice and aid in 
articulating DCog principles have been developed, such as the Distributed Cognition for 
Teamwork framework (DiCoT) by Furniss and Blandford (2006). The adoption of DiCoT as a 
methodological framework will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.2.3 Distributed Cognition for Teamwork (DiCoT)  
 DiCoT was developed by Furniss and Blandford (2006) as a semi-structured way of 
applying DCog principles to research, thus facilitating and aiding in data gathering and analysis. 
As they explain:  
“DiCoT is an approach to facilitate the application of DC (Distributed Cognition) theory 
to teamwork settings. DC provides a theoretical lens in analysis which revolves around the 
idea of a ‘complex computational system’. These systems are complex because they involve 
physical, social and representational factors that impact on the system’s performance; they 
are computational because they are concerned with the propagation and transformation 
of information; and they are systems because they involve many interacting elements” 
(Furniss and Blandford 2010: 1). 
 
 DiCoT builds on DCog literature in order to build models which reflect different aspects 
of the “complex computational system” (see Appendix II for full details). Each model has DCog 
principles associated with it, which act as focal points for the researcher, guiding him/her through 
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the analysis. Each one is interrelated, highlighting different aspects of the system. Together, they 
paint a clear picture of how the system works, highlighting how the system interacts and functions. 
In addition, it aids in identifying points of breakdown and issues that impact the information flows. 
The five models are: physical layout, artefacts, information flow, social structures, and 
evolutionary.  
The physical layout model addresses the physical organization of the work setting where 
cognitive processes take place. It is concerned in addressing the different physical structures that 
may have an impact on cognitive processes, such as spatial arrangement (e.g. the disposition of 
desks), barriers and walls that may inhibit communication (or indeed facilitate it), disposition of 
equipment. The DCog principles associated with this model are: space and cognition, perceptual, 
naturalness, subtle bodily supports, situation awareness, horizon of observation, and arrangement 
of equipment. 
 The artefact model is concerned with inherent properties of the artefacts that aid in the 
information flow and through which cognition is distributed. Artefacts are considered an integral 
part of the system. DCog principles associated with this model are: mediating artefacts, creating 
scaffolding, representation – goal parity, coordination of resources. 
 The information flow model, considered by Furniss and Blandford (2006) as the most 
representative of how cognitive processes are distributed, concerns itself with highlighting aspects 
regarding the propagation and transformation of information. It addresses properties of the 
communication channels, whether informal or formal, and what media is used to facilitate the flow 
of information. DCog principles associated with this model are information movement, 
information transformation, information hubs, buffering, communication bandwidth, informal 
communication, and behavioral trigger factors. 
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 The social structure model highlights the responsibilities of each individual in this system 
and how cognition is distributed between them. It also addresses aspects such as social 
relationships, distribution of knowledge, and division of tasks and goals. Admittedly one of the 
least developed models in DiCoT (Berndt et al. 2014), it has only two DCog principles associated 
with it: social structure and goal structure, and socially distributed properties of cognition. 
 The last model established by Furniss and Blandford (2006) is the evolutionary model. 
Like the social structures model, it is also somewhat underdeveloped. It focuses on aspects 
concerning how the system has evolved over time in order to understand why work is arranged the 
way it is. The DCog principles associated with it are: social structures and cultural heritage, and 
expert coupling. 
Structuring data through these models allows the researcher to create diagrammatical and 
narrative representations of the unit of analysis. In this regard, four benefits of adopting DiCoT as 
a methodological framework can be highlighted (Furniss and Blandford 2010): 
1.  It provides an understanding of the mechanics of the system, giving an insight into 
what makes it work; 
2. It provides a deeper conceptual insight into what constitutes the most important 
elements of the socio-technical system; 
3. It provides design considerations, i.e. if the system were to be redesigned, what would 
be the issues to address; 
4. It provides the tools needed to reflect on design considerations. 
 
71 
 
In summary, DiCoT “provides a structure for organizing information, steps to engage with 
the context, and a lens in which to view the analysis” (Furniss and Blandford 2010: 2); see Table 
3.1 for an overview of the methodological framework. An aspect that needs to be highlighted is 
the differentiation between DCog and DiCoT. DCog is the theoretical framework, whilst DiCoT 
is a methodological framework which draws principles from the DCog theory in order to provide 
a structured and meaningful way through which engage with the data and perform the analysis. In 
other words, it aids in the application of the theory. Hence, DiCoT does not replace DCog. Quite 
the contrary, in order to apply DiCoT effectively, a deep knowledge of DCog and its principles is 
required. Moreover, the interplay between humans and artefacts remains the unit of analysis. 
 
Table 3.1 – DiCoT Methodological Framework 
Source: Furniss and Blandford (2010) 
Purpose 
Understanding the propagation and 
transformation of information at work. 
Related theory 
Used to facilitate the application of Distributed 
Cognition (DCog). 
Data gathering 
Mainly observations and interviews, in addition to 
documents. 
Models developed 
in analysis 
Information flow 
Physical 
Artefact 
Social 
Evolutionary 
Subsequent 
analysis 
Constructing account of work in terms of DCog 
concepts and assessment against DCog principles. 
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3.2.4 Discussion  
 DCog adopts a socio-technical approach to information systems, emphasizing the cognitive 
element of it. Thus, in DCog, cognition is distributed between agents who actively engage in a 
shared space, working in tandem to produce an outcome. This definition represents perfectly the 
process of creating transparency, which consists of civil servants working both with each other 
and the technical systems deployed, the output of which will be information which will be 
publicized through the Transparency Portal so that civic society can access it and interact with it 
(see Figure 3.3). The interplay between human agents and artefacts within a governmental agency, 
whereby cognitive systems are shared and through which information propagates thus constitute 
the unit of analysis in this study.  
As discussed, the one downfall of adopting DCog as a framework is its difficulty in 
applying it to the case in question, which would have made it difficult for others to replicate it. As 
a form of addressing that, the DiCoT methodological framework was adopted. This will give the 
research a clear structure from which to analyze data and reach definitive conclusions. 
It was also discussed that, in distributed cognition, the core focus is the propagation and 
transformation of information in the distributed cognitive system. This, however, is subject to 
breakdowns, such as work-arounds and errors, which may or may not be intentional, but will 
certainly bear an impact on the information produced. Since the cognitive system that will be 
studied is one that comprises human agents who behave unethically and engage in acts of 
wrongdoing, it seems plausible to assume that such breakdowns do in fact occur based on previous 
research by Heeks (1999). An area of interest, therefore, is to investigate in which ways such 
breakdowns affect the information that is produced. Thus, based on the discussion presented so 
far, two research questions have been proposed: 
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R1: How are cognitive processes distributed between agents (human and artefact) at 
Agency X? 
 
R2: How do breakdowns impact the information system at Agency X? 
 
 
Figure 3.3 – The Transparency System Under a Distributed Cognitive Perspective 
 
  
 Agency X, as will be presented in Chapter 4, is the locus of the unit of analysis. It refers to 
a governmental agency within the structure of the Brazilian federal government. Its main mission 
is to aid in the procurement of services and supplies, fielding purchase requests from various other 
agencies within the particular Ministry whose authority they are under. Such processes result in 
spending, and therefore in budget execution, information which must then however be published 
on the Transparency Portal. It is also an agency where ongoing acts of corruption were identified.  
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 In order to study the issue of corruption and measure its impact on the distributed cognitive 
system, it seems appropriate to adopt a second theoretical framework which can aid in addressing 
this. In this instance, Bandura’s (1986) moral disengagement theoretical framework was adopted. 
One of the reasons for this was due to its compatibility with DCog. This will be reviewed in the 
next section of this chapter.  
 
3.3 Moral Disengagement  
Albert Bandura proposed the moral agency concept in the 1980s as part of his social 
cognitive theory which, like DCog, derives from cognitive psychology. His concept of moral 
agency is used to explain the adherence of individuals to moral principles. As Bandura (2016: 1) 
explains, “In the development of a moral self, individuals adopt standards of right and wrong that 
are guides and deterrents for conduct. They do things that give them satisfaction and a sense of 
self-worth. They refrain from behaving in ways that violate their moral standard because such 
conduct will bring self-condemnation”. Thus, in developing a moral self, people establish 
standards of right and wrong. Through a process of self-regulatory behavior, individuals monitor 
their conduct and avoid violating their moral codes in order to avoid the feeling of distress that 
would ensue as a result. 
However, self-regulatory mechanisms are not always activated. And as Bandura (2002: 
102) explains, “there are many psycho-social maneuvers by which moral self-sanctions can be 
disengaged”. This process of disengaging self-regulatory behavior is thus the basis for Bandura’s 
moral disengagement theory. 
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Moral disengagement (MD) is the act of reframing one’s actions “in ways which downplay 
their ethical content or import, thus suspending self-regulatory processes that socio-cognitive 
theory suggests govern individual moral behavior” (Moore 2008: 130). As Moore (2008) explains, 
moral disengagement has been used predominantly to predict anti-social behavior. In his latest 
publication, Bandura (2016) goes so far as to present how it may be applied to a series of activities 
such as terrorism, the gun industry, and environmental sustainability. Bandura does introduce the 
concept to the organizational environment but does so in a limited way. To date, Moore (2008) has 
been the only one to more extensively discuss how it may be applied to explain corrupt behavior 
and intent in organizations. 
 The basis of MD theory is explaining why and how people engage in deviant behavior 
without experiencing remorse or guilt. Rooted in the social cognitive theory of human agency 
(Bandura 1986), MD explains the process through which people disengage their moral 
mechanisms (Herath et al. 2017: 1137). 
MD consists of an extension of the social cognitive theory of human agency (Bandura 
2002; 2016). As Detert et al. (2008: 375) explain, “social cognitive theory offers an agentic 
perspective on human behavior whereby individuals exercise control over their own thoughts and 
behaviors through self-regulatory processes. . . According to social cognitive theory, moral 
disengagement is governed by a self-regulatory system that includes self-monitoring of one’s 
conduct as well as self-reaction to that conduct in light of internal moral standards”.   
Bandura (2016) explains that self-regulatory processes are governed in two ways. The first 
is the exercise of restraint, that is, refraining from engaging in deviant behavior even if chances of 
detection are low. The second refers to the feeling of guilt, remorse and self-criticism for having 
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violated their internal moral code. Both these processes are the result of self-control. In society 
today, social norms are regulated by external social control. However, for Bandura (1986), when 
self-sanctions have eroded, then social control carries little weight.  
Most people will have developed a high standard of moral behavior that will act as a self-
sanctioning mechanism. To this extent, Detert et al. (2008: 375) add that “these standards guide 
good behavior and deter bad because individuals use their personal standards to anticipate, 
monitor, and judge their own actions. . . Thus, individuals usually behave in ways that are 
consistent with their internal moral standards because they anticipate their own positive and 
negative evaluations of possible conduct choices”. But self-regulation can be deactivated 
selectively and the mechanism through which that takes place is moral disengagement. 
 This “selective” quality to MD needs to be highlighted. What this means is that the same 
individual may adopt different standards of morality depending on context. Bandura (2016: 27) 
notes that “even the same individuals may adhere to different moral standards in different settings 
and domains”. Moore (2008: 131) adds that “Research on business ethics has been quite consistent 
in finding that individuals segment their moral lives, applying a different set of ethical standards 
in different contexts”. Thus, it is possible to affirm that MD is socially learned. 
To understand why and how, it is necessary to refer back to Bandura’s (1986) social 
cognitive theory and his proposal on human behavior. As he explains, “human functioning is a 
product of the interplay of personal influences, the behavior individuals engage in, and the 
environmental influences that impinge on them” (Bandura 2016: 6). This interplay, which he refers 
to as triadic reciprocal causation (Bandura 1986; 1996; 1999; 2016) (see Figure 3.4), rests on three 
pillars (personal determinants, behavioral determinants, and environmental determinants) which 
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influence one another in a bi-directional way, in other words, “as interacting determinants that 
influence each other” (Wood and Bandura 1989: 362). 
Personal determinants refer to “biological endowment and intrapsychic influences in the 
form of competencies, belief systems, self-conceptions, emotional states, goals, attitudes, and 
values” (Bandura 2016: 6). The second determinant refers to behavioral patterns and how behavior 
is performed (physical, social, and emotional). The third determinant is in reference to 
environmental influences. As Bandura (1999: 23) affirms, the “environment is not a monolithic 
entity” and exerts its presence in people’s lives whether they like it or not. However, they do have 
a certain degree of freedom in how they construe it and react to it. In other words, different people 
may experience the same reality in different ways based on their construal of it. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 – Triadic Reciprocal Causation 
Source: Bandura (1999) 
 
 
 
This means that people have some influence in shaping events in their lives. However, 
there is no absolute freedom and individuals will be constricted in activities and actions. In other 
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words, social structures will impose constraints, in addition to providing resources and 
opportunities. As such, “in the theory of triadic reciprocal causation, sociostructural and personal 
determinants are treated as co-factors within a unified causal structure” (Bandura 1999: 26). 
Linking this back to MD mechanisms, it is possible to ascertain that “people do not operate as 
autonomous moral agents, impervious to the social realities in which they are enmeshed. In 
keeping with the socially situated causal structure, social cognitive theory adopts an interactionist 
perspective on morality” (Bandura 2016: 10). In this regard, Bandura (1986) claims that people 
may behave differently in different settings, in accordance with the codes of conduct of that 
particular environment. As a result, they may selectively disengage morally depending on the 
context. 
Human agency takes place in three ways: individual, proxy, and collective. In individual 
personal agency, human beings exercise direct control with no external influence. In proxy agency, 
they delegate control to someone else. In collective agency, people will work together to shape 
their future. In this regard, Bandura (2016: 13) affirms that “there is no such thing as a disembodied 
group mind that does the reasoning, and the acting. A group operates through the behavior of its 
members. However, a group’s belief is not simply the sum of individual members’ beliefs. 
Interactivity produces emergent effects”. 
MD operates at all three levels of agency, according to Bandura (1999; 2016). In 
organizations, proxy agency is the most common form, whereby individuals confer the 
responsibility of their activities to others, either the group or someone above in the chain of 
command. To this extent, Moore et al. (2012: 11) affirm that: 
 “the workplace provides ample opportunities for moral disengagement: organizations 
tend to be hierarchical, providing opportunities for the displacement of responsibility; 
work is often undertaken within teams, providing opportunities for the diffusion of 
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responsibility; organizational membership automatically defines the boundaries of an in-
group, providing opportunities for moral justification (to protect the organization) and the 
cognitive minimization of consequences of one’s action for those who are outside the 
organization (and thus in an out-group). The propensity to morally disengage might also 
be particularly damaging in organizational life because work contexts have been 
documented as triggering amoral frames of judgement”. 
 
In the quote above, Moore et al. (2012) reference displacement of responsibility, diffusion 
of responsibility, moral justification, and minimization of consequences. These refer to the 
mechanisms through which moral disengagement is activated. There are eight in total, which are 
described below (see Figure 3.5): 
 
Figure 3.5 – Moral Disengagement Mechanisms 
Source: Bandura (2002; 2016) 
 
 
1. Moral justification: the act of sanctifying harmful means by reframing them as worthy 
social and moral purposes.  
2. Advantageous (or palliative) comparison: comparing or contrasting harmful activities 
to give it the appearance of own action being benign or even altruistic.  
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3. Euphemistic labeling:  the use of sanitizing and convoluted language to disguise the 
actual content of actions.  
4. Displacement of responsibility: the act of evading personal accountability for harmful 
conduct by displacing responsibility to another in a position of authority.  
5. Diffusion of responsibility: attributing actions to group behavior thereby absolving 
both self and group for behavior.  
6. Minimization (or distortion of consequences): the act of disregarding, minimizing, 
distorting, or even disputing the harmful effects of their actions.  
7. Dehumanization: the act of divesting victims of their human qualities.  
8. Attribution of blame: the act of blaming victims for their own negative, deviant 
behavior. 
 
The eight mechanisms described above represent a way through which individuals can 
reframe their actions in more positive ways, or at the very least, downplay the gravity of such 
actions, thus evading any feelings of self-condemnation. Important to note that such changes may 
not happen instantly. In the ambience of a work environment, for example, change will most likely 
be progressive. In this regard, Bandura (2002: 110) explains that “change is achieved by 
progressive disengagement of self-censure. … The continuing interplay between moral thought, 
affect, action and its social reception is personally transformative. People may not even recognize 
the changes they may have undergone as a moral self”. As a result, the actions in which they 
engage in will seem normalized and any ill effect will be neutralized (Kish-Gephart et al. 2013). 
Moreover, as Bandura (2016: 204) explains, individuals are driven to act by social stigma. 
Warren and Smith-Crowe (2008: 2) complement this by affirming that “. . . “embarrassment”, the 
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distress we experience when we transgress in the eyes of others is a key factor in employee’s moral 
judgements about right and wrong. Embarrassment is both a “moral” emotion as well as a “social” 
one. . . but unlike other moral emotions, embarrassment occurs almost exclusively in the presence 
of others”. This notion further explains why individuals are influenced to morally disengage, as 
embarrassment causes distress but social approval brings about the feeling of satisfaction (Bandura 
1986). 
In summary, MD mechanisms allow individuals to compromise their moral standards 
whilst evading feelings of self-censure or self-condemnation, and their sense of moral integrity. In 
addition, activation and disengagement of self-sanctions are selective, which allows individuals to 
behave by different codes of conduct in different environments. For example, a person may behave 
unethically in their work environment, but be a responsible spouse, perform charitable activities 
etc. What will determine this variation will be their social environments and external influences. 
As Bandura notes (2016: 28), individuals “are especially influenced by the evaluative reactions of 
those to whom they are emotionally attached and whose views they value”. In the workplace, this 
might be a manager or an esteemed colleague.  
Moral disengagement mechanisms are directly related to unethical decision-making and 
wrongdoing (Moore et al. 2012). Identifying the existence of these mechanisms within a work 
environment and identifying in which ways it manifests itself (i.e. the types of mechanisms, in 
accordance with the eight delineated by Bandura) will (1) confirm individuals’ propensity to 
engage in corrupt behavior, and (2) aid in understanding what the impact of this is for the 
distributed cognitive system. Regarding Agency X specifically, and the unit of analysis which has 
already been identified and its role in producing information, such understanding will hopefully 
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clarify the persistence of wrongdoing and unethical decision-making in government institutions 
and in what ways this impacts information processing and propagation. 
 
3.3.1 Applying Moral Disengagement Theory to Determine Unethical Behavior  
 According to Burke and Cooper (2009), individuals are more likely to engage in unethical 
decisions when levels of moral disengagement are high. In this regard, Kish-Gephart et al. (2013: 
268) affirm that “prior research has demonstrated a relationship between morally disengaged 
thinking and unethical behavior”. Moore et al. (2012: 2) complement this notion by affirming that 
“an important additional driver of unethical behavior is an individual’s propensity to morally 
disengage”. Confirming the presence of moral disengagement mechanisms within members of an 
organization means will confirm these individuals’ propensity to engage in unethical decision-
making and wrongdoing. In order to do so, Moore et al.’s (2012) Moral Disengagement Measure 
will be applied (see Appendix III) to all participants interviewed.  
Moore et al. (2012) explain that the measure they elaborated was tested in different 
environments amongst different samples, though their focus was on empirically measuring levels 
of moral disengagement within work contexts. It can therefore “can be administered and used 
generally – that is, with any adult sample in any type of context”, making it a straightforward way 
to confirm that individuals at Agency X are in fact morally disengaged. As had already been 
presented (and will be discussed in much more detail throughout the remainder of this thesis), it 
has already been identified that acts of corruption take place at Agency X, hence why they have 
been chosen as the locus for the unit of analysis established. The question though remains whether 
such acts are constrained to a few, or whether it enjoys a much more widespread support.  
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Moreover, it is important to identify how it manifests itself. In order to do so, and to 
complement the data obtained via Moore et al.’s (2012) empirical measure, qualitative data 
obtained via interviews, observation, and documents (a full discussion on data gathering will be 
presented in Chapter 4) will be coded for MD mechanisms in accordance with Bandura’s (2006) 
Manual for Coding Modes of Moral Disengagement. As White et al. (2009: 46) explain, Bandura’s 
manual “includes formal definitions of each of the mechanisms and exemplars representing the 
different ways in which moral disengagement is manifested” (see Appendix IV). 
 The combination of both data collection methods should lead to a greater understanding of 
the cognitive processes individuals at Agency X engage in, and the effects of this on the distributed 
cognitive system. 
 
3.3.2 Discussion 
Scott (1995: xviii) affirms that “Cognitive systems control behavior by controlling our 
conception of what the world is and what kinds of action can be taken by what types of actors”. 
This process is not, however, unilateral. On the contrary, just as we construe reality through our 
own cognitive processes, we are constrained by existing sociostructural elements (Bandura 1999). 
In addition, Bandura (2016: 10) explains that socially approved conducts are a source of “self-
satisfaction”. Thus, our immediate social groups matter, which implicates in shared beliefs and 
cognitive systems. 
As established in Section 3.2.4, such is the case in work environments, whereby cognition 
is distributed between agents who actively engage in a shared space. Moral disengagement is a 
cognitive mechanism through which individuals gradually “switch off” their moral codes in order 
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to behave unethically without feeling distress or self-condemnation. According to Bandura (2002), 
there are a total of eight mechanisms which individuals may use in order to disengage. Though all 
of these types might be present within an environment, it might be the case that a few are more 
present than others depending on context. For example, if the displacement of responsibility is 
particularly prevalent, this might reveal how hierarchy is viewed and observed. Such is the case in 
the military and in organizations. In terrorism and counterterrorism, on the other hand, Bandura 
(2016) notes that dehumanization, minimization of harmful effects, and attribution of blame are 
the most present disengagement mechanisms. Examining the types of mechanisms that are most 
prevalent within an environment will thus allow for an understanding of the social forces in place.  
Moreover, it stands to reason that the presence of such mechanisms within a distributed 
cognitive system would impact the propagation of information in some way. Within a distributed 
cognitive system, the focus is on the information, and how it flows and is transformed. The output 
of the cognitive system at Agency X is information which is publicized through the Transparency 
Portal. As discussed previously, workarounds or deviations from norms which bear an impact on 
information flow constitute a “breakdown” in information. Deviant actions which implicate in the 
information being distorted in support of such actions can be considered a breakdown.  As a result 
therefore of this discussion and reflection, the following research question was proposed: 
  
R3: How do moral disengagement mechanisms facilitate the breakdown of cognition 
systems? 
 
If breakdowns do occur as a result of wrongdoing, it is probable that moral disengagement 
mechanisms facilitated that process in some way. To this extent, understanding in what ways might 
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lead to insights as to why corruption persists even in the face of transparency mechanisms which 
have been put in place.  
 
3.4 Contribution 
 This study proposes that transparency be understood as a system which touches upon a 
range of different stakeholders, both within government and outside it. It also proposes that 
transparency be conceptualized as an information flow which can be broken down into three 
distinct phases: creation, publication, and public access. Each phase raises different concerns 
regarding how to make transparency more effective: at the public access phase, the focus should 
be on enhancing citizen participation; at the publication phase, the focus is then on the web portal 
and how to make it accessible and comprehensible; at the creation phase, the focus is on those who 
are producing the information. Though the public access and publication phases have garnered a 
high level of attention from scholars, the creation aspect of information still remains under-
researched. As reviewed in the previous Chapter, most studies have focused on implementation or 
how high ranking officials perceive and operate transparency. However, lower level civil servants, 
particularly those who have no contact with citizens and whose main function is simply to serve 
as the internal cogs of government, helping the government machine run, have received almost no 
attention at all, in spite of being one of the largest group of content providers for transparency 
portals. 
 In order to study this particular group of people, two theoretical frameworks were adopted: 
distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995) and moral disengagement (Bandura 1986). Both are rooted 
in cognitive psychology and are thus compatible. Based on DCog, the work system responsible for 
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creating information has been conceived as a “cognitive system” which comprises both human 
agents and artefacts (technical systems, paper files etc.). It is therefore a “distributed” cognitive 
system since, in accordance with the socio-technical approach adopted, knowledge is not restricted 
only to the human mind, but rather expanded to artefacts as well. In other words, both human 
agents and artefacts work in tandem to produce information, each detaining a part of the process, 
and each reinforcing and restricting each other in different ways.  
As a result of this discussion, the first research question was established (see Figure 3.6), 
which concerns itself with understanding how the cognitive processes are distributed between each 
of these components. As reviewed, though cognition is distributed, that does not mean that both 
artefacts and individuals play an equal part. In this regard, understanding what role each member 
of this system plays will give us an insight as to how the system functions and how information is 
produced. No study to date has studied transparency in such a way, emphasizing the cognitive 
aspect of this socio-technical system. Moreover, few have researched the inner workings of this 
system at such a micro-level. This is thus a novel way of studying transparency, not only in how 
it is conceptualized but also in how it is researched.  
The second research question refers to “breakdowns” in the information flow. As reviewed, 
breakdowns in the DCog theory are defined as instances which impact the cognitive system, 
compromising both the flow and quality of the information produced. These may be due to 
unintentional action, but may also be due to deliberate “work-arounds”. In such an information-
intensive environment, such as governmental institutions, there is a high likelihood that 
breakdowns do occur. Hence, the second research question defined was to understand how such 
breakdowns affect the cognitive system under study. 
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In order to apply DCog to this study, it was established that the DiCoT methodological 
framework would be adopted. DiCoT consists of a semi-structured way of applying the DCog 
theoretical framework to research, drawing on DCog principles to build five different models 
(physical layout, artefact, information flow, social structure, and evolutionary) which together 
paint a picture of how the distributed cognitive system under study functions, and how information 
propagates through it. In doing so, it also aids in identifying breakdowns and the sources of it. 
 
Figure 3.6 – Research Questions 
 
 
A second line of inquiry was introduced, regarding the study of wrongdoing and unethical 
behavior. As already discussed, the overarching puzzle driving this research is understanding why 
transparency has been unable to curb corruption in Brazil (see Chapter 2 for discussion). Prior 
research has indicated a causal relationship between morally disengaged thinking and unethical 
behavior (Detert et al. 2008; Moore et al. 2012). Thus, the moral disengagement theoretical 
framework (Bandura 1986) was adopted in order to comprehend how such disengaged cognitive 
processes impact the distributed cognitive system at Agency X, the locus of the unit of analysis 
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for this thesis (as already presented and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4). As 
reviewed, it is necessary to understand what impact morally disengaged thinking has on the 
information propagation and distributed knowledge, and the role it plays in facilitating breakdowns 
within the distributed cognitive system, leading to the third research question that was proposed 
(see Figure 3.6).  
The adoption of such theoretical framework should lead to insights as to how and why 
corruption has perpetuated at Agency X. Both MD and DCog are compatible theories given their 
emphasis on cognitive processes. This will be a unique way of approaching this issue, leading to 
unique conclusions which will aid in advancing research in the e-government field, by establishing 
a new framework for studying such concepts. This approach also attends to calls from both 
information systems and social sciences scholars who argue for more studies adopting a cognitive 
approach (Rogers and Ellis 1994; Tenbrunsel and Messick 2004; Moore et al. 2012). 
In addition, this marks the first time DCog and MD have been applied to e-government and 
corruption studies, the combination of which should set a framework for future studies. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 Walsham (1995: 76) affirms that the “motivation for the use of theory in the earlier stages 
of interpretive case studies is to create an initial theoretical framework which takes account of 
previous knowledge, and which creates a sensible theoretical basis to inform the topics and 
approach of the early empirical work”. In this regard, Chapters 2 and 3 have served that precise 
purpose. 
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 In Chapter 2, literature in the areas of e-government, corruption, and anti-corruption 
strategies were reviewed. As a result, it was identified that current studies have been unable to 
provide meaningful answers as to how transparency can make governments less corrupt. In 
addition, it was identified that most research in e-government has favored a technical deterministic 
approach, determining that technological investments geared at improving governance should 
result in less corrupt governments, thus overlooking the “social” aspect of such investments, i.e. 
the people who actually manage and use these technical artefacts. This has resulted in a range of 
normative studies, suggesting what should happen in government, but non-specific as to how to 
attain such goals. 
 Seeking to address that gap in the literature – the lack of socio-technical studies geared at 
understanding the effect of transparency investments in government, Chapter 3 proposed the 
adoption of the distributed cognitive theoretical framework (Hutchins 1995). As such, the creation 
of information which is divulged in transparency portals was conceptualized here as a “cognitive 
system” comprising of both artefacts and human agents, both working in tandem to produce 
information. As will be discussed in Chapter 4 in more detail, the unit of analysis of this study is, 
therefore, the cognitive system at a governmental agency, identified here as Agency X. As an 
agency which is geared at procuring services and products for the Brazilian federal government, 
Agency X is at the forefront of creating transparency, since the output of the procurement processes 
it conducts is information that will then be published on the Brazilian Transparency Portal.  
 In addition, this Chapter also presented how the moral disengagement theoretical 
framework (Bandura 1986) will be used to comprehend how morally disengaged thinking by 
individuals who engage in wrongdoing impacts the cognitive system under study. As discussed, 
morally disengaged thinking is directly linked to unethical decision-making, thus it stands to 
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reason that it might play a role in facilitating breakdowns within the distributed cognitive system. 
This therefore leads to the need to understand in what ways it achieves this. 
 As a result of the discussion in this Chapter, three research questions were proposed (see 
Figure 3.6), the combination of which will lead to an understanding of how information is 
produced, the impact of breakdowns on the information flow and the role unethical behavior has 
in such breakdowns. It will also set the framework for future studies, as discussed previously, by 
emphasizing cognitive mechanisms, previously overlooked. The next Chapter will thus present 
the methodology adopted in order to answer such questions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, this study is anchored on a socio-technical approach, 
which serves to guide this study in determining how technical and social aspects function both 
independently and in conjunction, as a way of explaining the limited impact transparency systems 
have had on Brazilian public institutions within the federal government. Transparency is 
conceptualized here as an information system, which comprises both human agents and technical 
artefacts working in tandem to create information that will ultimately be published and viewed by 
members of civil society.  
In order to analyze how information is created and what effect wrongdoing has on the 
information system under analysis, two theories were established as frameworks for analysis: 
distributed cognition (DCog) and moral disengagement (MD). This chapter is thus aimed at 
delineating the methodological underpinnings of this research. It is structured as follows: section 
4.2 is dedicated towards discussing the underlying epistemology of this piece of research. This 
thesis made use of an interpretive case study methodology, subject of discussion and presentation 
in section 4.3. The following section (4.4) presents the case selection. Subsequent sections (4.5 
and 4.6) present the approach adopted for data collection and analysis. Sections 4.7 and 4.8 then 
present considerations regarding validity and ethics. The final section (4.9) presents concluding 
remarks.  
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4.2  Epistemology 
According to Hirschheim (1992: 10), “epistemology refers to our theory of knowledge; in 
particular, how we acquire knowledge”. Most of the research undertaken in e-government, and 
concerning transparency especially, has adopted a positivist epistemology. This is not the view 
that will be adopted here however. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, two theoretical frameworks were adopted in order to study how 
information is created and the prevalence of unethical behavior in the face of mechanisms which 
were deployed to deter such actions: distributed cognition and moral disengagement. Both trace 
its origins to cognitive psychology theories, which essentially adopt a constructivist view of the 
world and of individuals, which posits that all knowledge is constructed from interactions between 
individuals and the world (Crotty 1998: 42). As such, that becomes the focus of this research: how 
individuals construct their knowledge, beliefs and representations of reality regarding information 
systems, corruption and accountability.  
Constructivism contends that our representations of reality are not determined by the 
object, but rather are construed by the individual. It further contends that there is no neutral outlook 
on reality since all observations made are done so through the spectrum of our own personal 
hypotheses and theories regarding the world. In other words, what we construct is not an objective 
reality, but rather our own representation of it.  
That is not to say however that all meaning is subjective (Crotty 1998). Since meaning is 
not simply “discovered”, but is instead the result of an individual’s interactions with the world, it 
is not constructed upon nothing, but it is built upon a pre-existing template. These ideas are also 
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reflected in the work of Berger and Luckmann (1966), who describe reality as socially created, a 
product of social interactions. Silverman (1971: 19) adds that “meanings operate not only in the 
minds of individuals but are also objective social facts residing in social institutions”. This has a 
direct impact on how individuals make decisions and choices; these will be the result of how one 
socially constructs models and schemas (Scott 2014).  
This notion also affects how organizations and technical artifacts are studied. How 
technology is enacted is necessarily influenced by the cultural environment surrounding it. 
Technology is therefore, under this prism, socially constructed and the extent of its impact is 
“mediated by situational factors and interpretive processes” (Scott 2014: 103). In regard to 
organizations, these too are socially constructed essentially by socially constructed actors (Borum 
and Westenholz 1995). So too are the concepts of transparency and corruption. This is in stark 
contrast to positivism, which constitutes the majority of work published in the field of e-
government that base themselves on the premise that relationships are fixed a priori (Orlikowski 
and Baroudi 2002: 55) and phenomena must be investigated through the use of “structured 
instrumentation”. 
In constructivism, meanings and ideas are the result of social and historical events, and 
these are neither inevitable nor fixed. In this regard, Hacking (1999) introduces the concept of a 
“matrix”, whereby ideas exist constrained by a social order, institutions or even ideologies. The 
matrix therefore serves as a mold, leading to socially constructed ideas and perceptions of reality. 
As Bostrom and Heinen (1977: 19) contend, “these forces mold frames of reference which serve 
as perceptual filters through which one perceives the world and provides guides for action” 
Important to note that constructivism does not impose only one interpretation of reality. On 
the contrary, it accepts the notion that it is possible to construct reality in different ways (Crotty 
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1998). This means that how individuals behave in one setting, does not dictate how they will 
behave in another. Individuals can have different moral codes for different environments (work, 
family, community), which is directly dependent on how they perceive and construe such realities. 
This is congruent with the social cognitive psychology theory presented in the previous Chapter. 
As Bandura (2016: 28) affirmed:  
“even the same individuals may adhere to different moral standards in different settings 
and domains of activity. For example, they may behave morally in their social relationships 
but transgressively on their income tax returns. In short, the standards people adopt are 
not merely facsimiles of what they have been taught or prescribed or have seen modeled. 
Rather, they are constructions based on reflections on diverse sources of morally relevant 
information”. 
 
Two main streams within constructivism can be singled out. The first is universal 
constructionism, or radical constructivism, a descendant of linguistic idealism (Hacking 1999), 
which postulates that only what is discussed exists; out of the realm of discussion, nothing that is 
not talked or written about exists. In other words, all reality, including material objects, is a result 
of human construction. It also argues “for the distinctive nature of social phenomena as being 
intrinsically meaningful and not existing independently of social actors” (Mingers 2006).  
The second stream is mild constructivism, a term coined by Sismondo (1993), which 
establishes some limitations as to what and how things can be construed. This is therefore a more 
moderate approach, which admits the possibility of there being a pre-existing reality that lies 
outside the scope of our perception. Such reality consists not only of objects, but of other 
individuals and the interactions between them. This is an ideal akin to Vygotski’s social 
constructivism, from which the DCog theory (Hutchins 1995) draws its inspiration from, whereby 
emphasis is placed on the interactions between people and their environment, and how language 
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is used to mediate such interactions (Andrews 2012). As Fish observes (1990, cited in Crotty 1998: 
52), “we are already embedded” in institutions, and “it is only by inhabiting them, and being 
inhabited by them”, that we are able to comprehend the world surrounding us. 
By applying this concept to technology studies, Kallinikos (2004: 144) notes that 
“technological characteristics that embody these wider historical and institutional processes and 
which partake in the constitution of local contexts are ignored. . . The issue of ‘who’ interprets and 
locally negotiates the meaning and functionality of technology therefore needs to be addressed”. 
Moreover, Mackenzie and Wajcman (1985) observe that mild constructivism analyses can take a 
normative or political approach by analyzing the way in which particular technologies can come 
to incorporate certain political or social effects. Kallinikos (2004: 239) further affirms that, in the 
case of constructivist studies in IS, one of its main contributions refers to “the primary importance 
it attributes to contextual dynamics. . . Whether investigating the development of new 
technological innovations . . . or the forms by which existing technologies are brought to bear on 
local contexts. . . social constructivism gives a key role to the very processes by which technology 
is locally negotiated”. 
This is an approximation of the ontological proposition of critical realism, which contends 
that “while people subjectively hold multiple theories of the world, some of these theories may 
better approximate objective reality than others” (Smith 2006: 200). Lawson (1997: 8; in Dobson, 
Myles and Jackson 2007: 140) adds that “the world is composed not only of events and our 
experience or impression of them, but also of (irreducible) structures and mechanisms, powers and 
tendencies, etc. that although not directly observable, nevertheless underlie actual events that we 
experience and govern or produce them”. 
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Realism is the ontological position that supports the actual existence of objects of 
knowledge, with characteristics that do not depend on our personal theories and will. In realism, 
our representations refer to objects that exist regardless of our minds, and somehow influence our 
views of them but do not necessarily determine them. In this regard, Smith (2006: 200) affirms 
that “for science to happen there must be a reality independent of our knowledge of it. . . Thus, 
while our knowledge of the world (transitive) constitutes a part of the world (intransitive), the 
existence of the world is not dependent upon this knowledge”. Critical research assumes that social 
reality is historically constituted. Although society has the means to consciously make changes to 
their social and economic circumstances, they are limited in their ability to do so, be it because of 
social, cultural or political domination (or perhaps even a combination of all three) (Myers 1997). 
Carlsson (2006: 200) adds that “critical realism’s manifesto is to recognize the reality of the natural 
order and the events and discourses of the social world. . . These structures are not spontaneously 
apparent in the observable pattern of events; they can only be identified through the practical and 
theoretical work of the social sciences”. Further key components of critical realism refer to its 
emphasis on history and context; in other words, knowledge is the product of historical and social 
events. In addition, the real world is stratified into several layers, namely individual, group and 
institutional, resulting in a very complex structure. Kallinikos (2004: 237) states: “Such a complex 
web of relations surpass the horizon of the present, and involve the mediation of history and 
culture”. 
From an epistemological perspective, this research is therefore anchored on a constructivist 
approach, albeit in its milder form, allowing for the notion of pre-existing constructions that lie 
outside the realm of our perceptions. Methodologically, critical realism becomes useful to my line 
of research since it focuses on the “interaction of structure and agency through time” (Smith 2006: 
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202). As Smith (2006: 202) affirms, social structures “pre-exist the individuals within them. . . the 
emergent social structures have social properties that causally impact on the individuals that 
constitute them”. He further postulates that:  
“the individual’s history and position relative to society will to a large extent determine 
their individual interpretation of technology. This aspect has been well researched by those 
in the social construction of technology school. What remains under-theorized however, is 
the technological artifact itself and what aspects of technology constrain and influence 
human behavior” (Smith 2006: 205).  
 
In summary, my research will adopt a realist view of being, in the ontological domain, 
while allowing for the construction of knowledge, in the epistemological domain. 
Methodologically, my research will be interpretive case study, which I trust will suggest findings 
for future studies. This will be discussed in the next section of this Chapter.  
 
4.3 Case Study 
Merriam (2002: 3) affirms that “the key to understanding qualitative research lies with the 
idea that meaning is socially constructed by individuals in interaction with their world”. Having 
therefore established that the epistemological framework that best suits this study is a constructivist 
one, the methodology adopted will be of a qualitative nature and the specific research design used 
will be a case study. The justification for the methodology, along with a discussion pertaining to 
the research design will be discussed in this section. 
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4.3.1 Choice of Methodology 
Yin (1994: 1) states that case studies are typically “the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or 
‘why’ questions are being posed . . . and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within 
some real-life-context”. Walsham (1995: 376) adds that “Interpretive methods of research adopt 
the position that our knowledge of reality is a social construction by human actors. . . [it] contrasts 
with positivism, where it is assumed that the ‘objective’ data collected by the researcher can be 
used to test prior hypotheses or theories”.  
 Furthermore, when applied to the study of corruption, a topic this thesis touches upon, 
Palmer (2012: 39) explains that “qualitative case studies allow for the examination of how 
unethical, illegal, and socially irresponsible behavior evolves over time, in the presence of 
organizational structures and social relationships, in decision contexts that are complex”. 
The theoretical framework chosen for this thesis also indicates the need for a qualitative 
piece of research. As discussed in Chapter 3, a socio-technical view to the phenomena in question 
– transparency systems – has been adopted. More specifically, it was established that a DCog 
theoretical framework would be used and that a second line of enquiry would involve identifying 
MD mechanisms. As Lindblom and Thorvald (2017) explain, this framework is particularly 
suitable for studying information flows and cognition embedded in complex socio-technical 
domains.  
When conducting a literature review, all of the studies found that had adopted DCog were 
of a qualitative nature. What DCog claims the researcher should focus their attention on and aim 
to do, explains why this is the case: an in-depth “study of a setting, paying close attention to the 
activities of people, their communications with each other and their interactions with different 
99 
 
media” (Rogers 2006: 2). This is congruent with Merriam’s (2002: 8) view of what the purpose of 
a case study should be: “[it] is an intensive description and analysis of a phenomenon or social 
unit such as an individual, group, institution, or community. The case is a bounded, integrated 
system. By concentrating upon a single phenomenon or entity (the case), this approach seeks to 
describe the phenomenon in depth”. 
Different scholars who specialize in case study methodology adopt different approaches to 
what the unit of analysis should be, in addition to ascribing to different epistemological stances. 
Due to the nature of this study, I have defined, as already discussed, that the epistemological 
approach is a constructivist one. In addition, the unit of analysis established is not a person or an 
event. In my study, the unit of analysis is less tangible, as per what is established by the DCog 
approach (Hutchins 1995; Halverson 2002; Furniss and Blandford 2006). In this regard, from a 
DCog perspective, the “unit of analysis defined in relation to the complex phenomena being 
observed” (Halverson 2002: 249).  
Zhang and Patel (2006: 340) add that “from the distributed cognition perspective, the unit 
of analysis is the interaction between the components of the system, not the components 
themselves”. Hence, following what is established by theoretical framework, the unit of analysis 
in this case study is the information system which is composed of cognitive processes distributed 
amongst human agents and artefacts. The focus is therefore the activity between individuals and 
artefacts in the process of producing and creating information. 
Both Walsham (1995) and Yazan (2015) affirm that Yin (2002), though one of the most 
referenced scholars regarding the case study approach, ascribes to a more positivist 
epistemological stance. Merriam (1998; 2002), on the other hand, makes it clear that she considers 
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the case study approach to be a constructivist endeavor. Moreover, she is more flexible as to what 
constitutes a case, describing it as a phenomenon or a “bounded system”. Thus, it is the guidelines 
established by her that will be followed. 
Merriam (1998; 2002) delineates five steps that must be met towards designing qualitative 
research: 
1. Conduct a thorough literature review: according to Merriam (1998; 2002) this is the 
only way of identifying a theoretical framework. Moreover, it grants the researcher the 
opportunity to evaluate the state of the field he/she wishes to study, ensure that there is 
no prior research that accomplishes the exact same thing he/she aims to do and aid in 
formulating the research questions. 
2. Establish a theoretical framework: Merriam (1998) defines the theoretical framework 
as the “scaffolding” for one’s research.  The same issue can be approached in different 
ways, and a sound framework will aid the researcher in providing the lens through 
which to study it. 
3. Identify the research problem: this can come from the literature, from a theory, or even 
be based on an interest. 
4. Establish what the research questions are: based on the research problem, more specific 
questions should be asked which will guide the inquiry and determine data collection. 
5. Sample selection: involves identifying the unit of analysis and data gathering strategy 
(who to interview, how many interviews, what to observe). 
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In accordance with these guidelines, Table 4.1 summarizes how these were approached and 
addressed. Discussion regarding literature review (step 2 above), theoretical frameworks adopted 
(step 3), and research problem and questions (steps 4 and 5) formed the basis for Chapters 2 and 
3.  Hence, the next section of this chapter will discuss the unit of analysis and selection.  
 
Table 4.1 – Research Strategy 
Literature Review 
Conducted extensively by researching both 
academic journals and books, in addition to 
practitioner guides, recommendations, surveys, 
opinion pieces. Research was conducted both 
online and in academic library. Discussion 
presented in Chapter 2. 
Theoretical Framework 
Theoretical frameworks established are 
Distributed Cognition (Hutchins 1995) and Moral 
Disengagement (Bandura (1986). These were 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
Research Problem 
The overarching question that drives this 
research is why transparency has failed to curb 
corruption. The research problem has been 
defined as: How information is produced, shaped 
and transformed at Agency X. 
Research Questions 
Unit of Analysis 
Three research questions have been established 
(as presented in Chapter 3): 
1. How are cognitive processes distributed 
between agents (human and artefact) at Agency 
X? 
2. How do breakdowns impact the information 
system at Agency X? 
3. How do moral disengagement mechanisms 
facilitate the breakdown of information systems? 
Unit of Analysis 
The cognitive system at Agency X (presented 
more extensively in Chapter 4, section 4.4). 
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4.4 Case Selection 
 As the main theoretical approach adopted, DCog establishes what the unit of analysis 
should be quite clearly: the cognitive system or, in this case, the information system which 
produces (or creates) transparency. To this extent, Liu et al. (2007: 2) affirm that “the unit of 
analysis should not be a human individual, but a cognitive system composed of individuals and 
the artifacts they use to accomplish a task”. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, transparency was conceptualized as an information flow which 
comprises three distinct phases: creation of information, publication and public access of 
information. As such, government portals, on which information is published, are the last phase of 
that information flow. It was my contention that the “creation” phase of transparency has been 
understudied and that the dynamics of how information is produced at that stage bear a significant 
impact on whether transparency has the ability to curb corruption or not. 
In order to study this phenomenon, a work system of people and artefacts where corruption 
was present had to be identified. Observing corruption implicates on what Greve et al. (2010: 94) 
allude to as a “frequent dilemma in research on misconduct”. It involves having to choose whether 
to analyze data that becomes available post-investigation, after acts of corruption and misdeed 
have been uncoverd, or researching acts of misconduct as they occur.  
The main body of research on corruption has favored incidences of corruption post-
discovery, primarily because it is easier to study something that has already been uncovered. This 
implicates however on having to reply on participants’ recollection after events have taken place 
which may or may not represent an accurate account. For this reason, Greve et al. (2010) call for 
alternative forms of analyzing corruption incidences (as they occur, for instance), claiming that 
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this could result in valuable insights. Regarding this piece of research specifically, it was my 
contention that studying people who are in the midst of commiting wrongdoing would grant a 
greater insight into how these individuals think and behave as part of a distributed cognitve system. 
This is a novel and less explored manner of researching the topic of corruption.  
Due to the fact that corruption occurs in a covert manner, finding cases whereby corruption 
is systematically taking place at present proves to be a difficult task. There is little documented 
evidence of its practice and, due to the large amounts of data the federal government manages, nor 
are they easily discoverable. Finding such a case therefore required some investigation and a 
significant amount of time was dedicated towards investigating where possible acts of wrongdoing 
were being undertaken. This was achieved by establishing valuable contacts within the Brazilian 
federal government and learning enough about government processes in order to be able to identify 
acts of misconduct. A key learning point therefore is that a deep understanding of government 
institutions, processes, and people, is of utmost importance for the selection of cases. In addition, 
establishing trust was fundamental in conducting research of this sort, in order to convince public 
officials to reveal acts of misconduct, which they have either witnessed or taken part of, and to 
allow access to them. Access to the actual organization picked as the locus of the unit of analysis 
was granted as a result of networking, establishing trust and rapport.  
In summary, case-selection had to obey the following criteria: 
1. The locus of this information system had to be situated within the Brazilian federal 
government, since I am interested not in any information, but information that is created 
specifically for the Brazilian federal government’s Transparency Portal.  
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2. Since I am interested in finding out why corruption persists even in the face of 
transparency mechanisms in place, the information system selected had to have as part 
of it, people who behaved unethically. In other words, traces of acts of corruption had 
to be ongoing and present within the work system selected.  
3. Access to the organization had to be granted. Not only permission to go to the 
organization, but also to access and interview its members, observe their process, 
access documents, understand their technical systems.  
 
An overview of the case, its settings and the agents that compose the distributed cognitive 
system – artefacts and humans – will be described in the next section. 
 
4.4.1 Unit of Analysis: Setting 
Research was conducted at an agency situated within the structure of the Brazilian federal 
government. Agreement to take part in this study was granted by the Director of this agency. They 
declined however to be identified, and will therefore be referred to throughout this thesis as Agency 
X.  
The Brazilian federal government currently has 29 Ministries, employing over 770,000, 
spread across agencies located in the entire country. Agency X is situated below Ministry X. 
Budget execution data is centralized for the entire federal government via a technical system called 
SIAFI (Integrated System of Federal Government Financial Administration), which is reflected on 
the Transparency Portal (managed by the Comptroller General of the Union – CGU) and available 
for consultation by anyone.  
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Agency X is a small organization whose main function is to execute and manage 
procurement processes not only for itself, but also for several other agencies across Ministry X; it 
is therefore responsible for budget execution and its activities are recorded on SIAFI (a technical 
system owned and managed by the National Treasury), and consequently on the Transparency 
Portal (which holds all budget-related information and through which spending is communicated 
to civil society). As such, it is at the forefront of information creation, and thus an integral part of 
the transparency mechanism deployed by the Brazilian federal government. Despite this, it has 
been identified that civil servants at Agency X do not always adhere to processes and often engage 
in acts of misconduct and corruption (as will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). For this reason, it 
makes for the perfect setting for researching this conundrum: why the implementation of 
transparency has failed to yield the results which had been expected, i.e. less corruption. 
Important to highlight that the information created by Agency X relates to budget 
execution. Thus, the information system under analysis refers to procurement (or purchasing2) 
processes at Agency X. The result of such processes is what forms the basis for the information 
that is published on the Transparency Portal.  
 
4.4.2 Agents 
 As established by the DCog theoretical framework, of interest here is the interplay between 
human agents and artefacts. The activity and exchange between both is what comprises a 
distributed cognitive system. Each one will be reviewed here. 
                                                          
2 Both terms will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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4.4.2.1 Actors (Participants) 
 As will be reviewed in more detail in subsequent chapters, the Ministry under which 
Agency X is situated deployed an internal system (hereby referred to as IntSys), through which 
procurement processes are managed. Procurement processes are triggered once a need is identified 
and a purchase request is placed on the IntSys by “Z”. Figure 4.1 depicts the main chain of events 
and those involved in the process. As can be observed, the process is touched upon by six groups 
of people (each stage in fact represents a team, and not necessarily a specific person). “D”, which 
represents the financial department is involved twice. In addition to Agency X’s internal personnel, 
suppliers are also involved in the process, being consulted at various stages: to have quotes sent 
(by “B”), once purchase order is made (“C”), and then once again by “E” in case an invoice is not 
received or further instructions regarding delivery need to be given. 
 If a process strictly follows procedures and no issues arise along the way, then these will 
be the only groups of people involved and it should be completed within eight phases, which are 
broken down into thirty-nine steps (this will be reviewed extensively in Chapter 6). In addition, 
“Z” would probably not be consulted more than twice throughout the entire process: once to 
confirm budget has been allocated, and then once more to ensure that purchase has been delivered. 
If a process is not adhered to either intentionally or not, then other groups of people might get 
involved, such as upper management and “middlemen” (i.e. external consultants). These are the 
instances that are of particular interest since these will be the opportunities when acts of 
wrongdoing have been observed to be committed. How that is accomplished through the system 
will be an area this thesis will focus on. 
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Figure 4.1 – Overview of Actors at Agency X 
 
  
4.4.2.2 Artefacts 
 Participants at Agency X rely on several computer and paper-based information sources 
(i.e. artefacts) to manage information and see the purchase process through to completion. Select 
artefacts that are relevant to this process and form an integral part of the distributed cognition 
system are summarized in Table 4.2. An understanding into the functionality of these was derived 
based on interviews, a demonstration, observation, in addition to documents (such as manuals and 
procedural documents). 
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Both artefacts and actors constitute a cognitively distributed system that work in tandem to 
produce information (‘transparency’). This interplay becomes the focus of this study so as to 
identify the features which will lead to addressing the research questions proposed.  
The next section will review how data has been collected. 
 
Table 4.2 – List of Artefacts 
Type  Artefacts 
Technical 
Artefacts 
Internal System (IntSys) 
SIAFI 
MS Word 
E-mail 
Telephone 
Printer 
Paper-Based 
Artefacts 
Paper files 
Paper notes 
Invoice 
 
 
4.5 Data Collection  
According to Merriam (2002: 12), “there are three major sources of data for a qualitative 
study – interviews, observations, and documents”. Moreover, the data collection strategy is 
determined by the research questions asked and what type of data will be most helpful in 
addressing and answering them. 
In this case study, the data collection methods used were semi-structured interviews, 
participant observation and document analysis. In addition, one further data collection technique 
was used and consisted of applying a survey, Moore et al.’s (2012) Moral Disengagement Measure. 
This will be reviewed in the next sections. 
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4.5.1 Interviews 
Patton (1990: 278) affirms that researchers should conduct interviews when “we cannot 
directly observe. . . We cannot directly observe feelings, thoughts, and intentions. We cannot 
observe behaviors that took place at some previous point in time. We cannot observe situations 
that preclude the presence of an observer”. The purpose of an interview is therefore to comprehend 
these unobservable events and perceptions. As such, Merriam (2002) affirms that interviews 
should constitute the main form of gathering data in a qualitative study.  
Interviews can vary from a highly structured format, to an unstructured format. In the case 
of my study, semi-structured interviews constituted one of the main sources of data collection. 
Such format ensures that specific desired information is gathered from the participant, whilst also 
allowing for topics to emerge.  
The interviews conducted took place over the course of two rounds:  
(1) 28 participants were interviewed between February and April of 2015. These consisted 
of civil servants at Agency X, aged between 28 and 51, 20 women and 8 men (refer to Appendix 
I for a detailed overview the category of interviewees). The majority of those interviewed worked 
directly with the information system, as part of the procurement process; others were indirectly 
involved (upper management and technical support). 
(2) In February 2016, a follow up of 17 interviews were conducted. These 17 people had 
previously been interviewed in the first phase and the aim was two-fold. Firstly, to fill gaps that 
had been left and were only identified once coding the first round of interviews. Secondly, to 
identify whether there were any additional events that I should be made aware of (especially since 
it was the beginning of a new fiscal year).  
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All interviews were conducted in Portuguese and only quotes cited throughout this thesis 
were translated. They were recorded with the use of a Livescribe Echo Smartpen, which allowed 
notes to be taken simultaneously and then re-played. All voice recordings were later transcribed 
and coded. Recordings of these interviews were kept in the hard drive of my computer, with a 
backup maintained on an external HD, which was stored at my home office at a safe location. 
To ensure that anonymity was maintained, a numeric code was assigned to each interview 
(Int1 to Int28 in the first round, Int1v2 to Int17v2 in the second round) detailing only the dates 
these took place; no names were stored with the recordings. Each interview lasted between an hour 
and an hour and a half. No monetary payment was made and participation in the study was purely 
voluntary. All interviewees were informed ahead of time about the purposes of the research and 
given the opportunity to withdraw consent to participate. Prior to initiating interviews, the Director 
of Agency X, who had consented to my presence there, introduced me to everyone to make them 
aware I would be approaching them.  
Interviewees were selected on the basis of the roles they played in terms of taking part in 
the procurement process or not. In addition, “snowball sampling” (Merriam 1998) took place. In 
other words, some interviewees aided in pointing out to me who else I should speak with in order 
to gain a full understanding of both the procurement process, the roles each one played, and the 
dynamics both between people, and people and artefacts. 
In addition to the interviews conducted at Agency X, in order to gain an understanding of 
the context in which Agency X is situated and further comprehend the dynamics behind the 
deployment of transparency throughout the federal government, and more specifically at Agency 
X, I conducted 6 semi-structured interviews with participants who held positions at the 
Comptroller General of the Union, Ministry X, and the Ministry of Planning between the periods 
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of August 2015 and February 2016. These provided an insight into the decision-making and 
process of transparency deployment and complemented the documental analysis and literature 
review.  
An additional interview with a public prosecutor directly involved with the Car-Wash 
investigations was later held in April 2018. This opportunity led to a greater insight and 
understanding of the anti-corruption legal framework and efforts in Brazil, complementing the 
data that had already been gathered thus far via document analysis and literature review. As Stake 
(2010: 52) affirms, “qualitative research differs from much quantitative research by giving careful 
study to contexts”. As such, understanding the context is important towards understanding the unit 
of analysis, especially since much of the context will bear an impact on it. In the case of the 
cognitive system that is under study, it is subject to technical changes that were implemented by 
the Ministry, an event which took place due to the enacted legislation (see Chapter 5 for detailed 
discussion). 
All interviews were conducted in Portuguese and lasted between an hour and an hour and 
a half. These were recorded with the aid of a Livescribe Echo Smartpen and then later transcribed. 
As with the interviews conducted with participants at Agency X, recordings of these interviews 
were kept in the hard drive of my computer, with a backup maintained on an external HD, which 
was stored at my home office at a safe location. A numeric code was assigned to each interview 
(ExtInt1 to ExtInt7) detailing only the dates these took place; no names were stored with the 
recordings. No monetary payment was made and participation in the study was purely voluntary. 
All interviewees were informed ahead of time about the purposes of the research. 
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4.5.2 Observation 
Merriam (2002) indicates that observations can be just as important as interviews in 
qualitative studies. Stake (1995: 60) complements this by affirming that “observations work the 
researcher toward greater understanding of the case”. 
Thus, in addition to interviews, I was allowed to spend time on-site at Agency X for four 
afternoons during the period between February and April of 2016. This opportunity allowed me to 
not only observe the interactions between those working in that environment, but also have access 
to the system and directly observe how they operate. Some of these sessions, the ones where I was 
specifically shown the technical systems, were voice recorded using a Livescribe Echo Smartpen 
(two of them). For the other sessions, only notes were kept and then later coded. Dates were 
assigned to each set of notes. 
 These sessions provided a very rich dataset and were key towards developing insights using 
the DCog theoretical framework. Part of the data that informed the analysis (in Chapter 6) could 
only have been obtained by means of observation. 
 
4.5.3 Documents 
Documents analyzed consisted of internal manuals and guidelines, Power Point (.ppt) 
presentations, screenshots of technical systems, and information reproduced from both their 
external website and intranet. Some of the manuals and screenshots were kindly given to me. 
Permission was not granted to have either screenshots of the Internal System or internal documents 
reproduced here, as this would have compromised the anonymity of Agency X. The screenshot of 
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SIAFI reproduced here is one that is available on the implementation manual for SIAFI, available 
on STN’s website (in other words, widely available to anyone for consultation). 
Documents served mostly the purpose of clarifying how procedures should work and 
clarify where formal procedures diverged from the ones taking place in reality. 
 
4.5.4 Questionnaire: Moral Disengagement Measure (Moore et al. 2012) 
In addition to the interviews, at the end of each session participants at Agency X were 
asked to fill out Moore et al.’s (2012) Moral Disengagement Measure (see Appendix IV). In total, 
twenty-eight questionnaires were completed. The Moral Disengagement Measure was not applied 
to those interviewees who were external to Agency X, only to the civil servants who worked there, 
during the first round of inverviews (as detailed in the previous section of this Chapter). 
The aim of administering this questionnaire was to confirm the existence of moral 
disengagement mechanisms amongst those interviewed. The purpose of such measurement is to 
ascertain individuals’ propensity to morally disengage and thus engage in unethical decision-
making. The Measure elaborated by Moore et a. (2012) therefore aided in identifying the existence 
of moral disengagement mechanics present amongst individuals at Agency X. The results obtained 
here were then contrasted with the information collected qualitatively. Thus, utilizing a 
quantitative measure served to reinforce the validity of the data gathered. 
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4.6 Data Analysis 
 Three research questions were proposed in Chapter 3. As per Merriam’s (1998) guidelines, 
these were established after selecting the theoretical framework to be used in this study: 
R1: How are cognitive processes distributed between agents (human and artefact) at 
Agency X? 
 
R2: How do breakdowns impact the information system at Agency X? 
 
R3: How do moral disengagement mechanisms facilitate the breakdown of cognitive 
systems? 
 
 The first two research questions were established as a result of adopting distributed 
cognition as a theoretical framework. The first one (R1) seeks to understand the dynamics of this 
complex interplay of human agents and artefacts. The aim is to gain an insight as to how 
information moves and transforms throughout this system, which constitutes the unit of analysis, 
and what role each one – human agent and artefact – play in this.  
To aid in this, Hutchins (1995) advises that an “Activity Score” should be elaborated. As 
he explains, an activity score is necessary to identify the relation between the different components 
of the distributed cognitive system and how information propagates through the system in the 
sequence of tasks. In establishing his distributed cognitive theory by applying it to navigation 
teams, Hutchins (1995: 186) explains that “in order to examine the properties of the performance 
of the navigation team, it is useful to have a representation of the activity that makes clear the 
relations among the activities of the various members of the team”. This is achieved by analytically 
breaking down processes and is, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, the first step towards analyzing 
data since it is completed prior to coding of data.  
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The second question (R2) refers to breakdowns, which are understood in DCog 
terminology to be “potential failures in communication or information flows that will impair the 
system’s performance or prevent the system from achieving its goals” (Sharp and Robinson 2006: 
4). In order to identify if any breakdowns take place, it is necessary to first understand how the 
system should work and compare it to how it actually works.  
The third question (R3) was established in order to identify whether moral disengagement 
mechanisms have a role in facilitating breakdowns in any way. The intention in establishing such 
a question was to identify if unethical-decision making bears any reflection on how information is 
produced. Both theoretical frameworks, in conjunction, would then provide a clear picture of how 
this information system works, the role each agent plays, and how (if at all) wrongdoing impacts 
the quality of the information produced (and if so, in what ways). 
In order to analyze data through these theoretical frameworks, the following strategies were 
established: (1) coding data for DCog principles using the DiCoT (Distributed Cognition for 
Teamwork) methodological framework (Furniss and Blandford 2006); (2) coding data for MD 
mechanisms as delineated by Bandura (2006); (3) a third round of inductive coding, in order to 
ensure no significant theme had been missed and not captured. This will be discussed in subsequent 
sections of this Chapter. 
 
4.6.1 DiCoT  
As briefly introduced in Chapter 3, in order to facilitate the analysis through a DCog lens, 
the DiCoT (Distributed Cognition for Teamwork) methodological framework elaborated by 
Furniss and Blandford (2006) was used.  
116 
 
The advantage of using this framework is the possibility to code and analyze data in a 
structured way. One of the issues in the DCog theoretical framework approach for analyzing data 
is the lack of structure, which may render a researcher lost due to the sheer amount of data and 
DCog-associated principles. In that regard, Furniss and Blandford (2006) elaborated this model in 
order to facilitate the analysis. As Furniss and Blandford (2010: 1) affirm, “DiCoT can provide a 
focus to start [with]”. 
DiCoT outlines 22 principles which are organized into five different models: physical 
layout, artefacts, information flow, social structures, and evolutionary (see Table 4.3). The 
principles are drawn from DCog literature and, once formed, the five models give a clear insight 
into how the cognition is distributed and how information moves through the system. In addition, 
it aids in identifying issues and breakdowns.  
Utilizing this model, the data was coded for each of the DCog principles to establish their 
presence or not. Once the data had been coded, diagrammatical and narrative representations were 
established for each of the five models. The analyses combined then generated a complete picture 
of the system. 
 
Table 4.3 – DiCoT Models 
Model Principle Brief Explanation 
Physical 
Space and cognition 
How physical layouts supports (or fails to 
support) cognition. 
Perceptual principle 
Mapping between spatial layout and cognitive 
structures. 
Naturalness principle 
Refers to the "stimulus-response" 
compatibility. 
Subtle bodily supports 
The use of body to support cognitive 
processes (e.g. pointing or gesticulating). 
Situation awareness 
Refers to how accessible work of the team is, 
including proximity of others around them. 
Horizon of observation 
Refers to what can be seen or heard by a 
person. 
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Arrangement of equipment Physical layout of equipment. 
Artefact 
Representation - goal parity 
Representation of the relationship between 
current state and goal state of artefact. 
Mediating artefacts 
Include artefact that are introduced in order 
to complete task. 
Creating scaffolding 
External artefacts and environmental cues 
introduced to simplify cognitive tasks. 
Coordination of resources 
Resources can be internally and externally 
coordinated to aid action and cognition. 
Information Flow 
Information movement 
How information moves around the system, 
e.g. artifacts, text, verbal, telephone, etc. 
Information transformation 
Transformation takes place when 
representation of information changes. 
Information hubs 
Where different information channels meet 
and different sources are processed together. 
Buffering 
Refers to the arrival of new information that 
may interfere with ongoing activity. 
Communication bandwidth Face-to-face communication that takes place. 
Informal communication 
Informal communication which represent an 
important function. 
Behavioral trigger factors Trigger mechanisms that elicit behavior. 
Social 
Social and goal structures 
How goals are distributed amongst social 
structures in order to complete task. 
Socially distributed 
properties of cognition 
Mitigating instances when performance of 
cognitive tasks exceed individual abilities. 
Evolutionary 
Cultural heritage 
How processes established through time 
shape current behavior. 
Expert coupling 
Degree to which user and system work in 
tandem and are coupled. 
 
 
4.6.2 Moral Disengagement  
  In addition to applying Moore’s et al. (2012) Moral Disengagement Measure to all 
participants interviewed, I also used Bandura’s (2006) Manual for Coding Moral Disengagement 
(which he, along with White et al. (2009) had applied to the study of MD in organizations) to 
qualitatively code the data gathered.  
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The use of Moore’s quantitative scale was to identify the presence of moral disengagement 
mechanisms amongst participants at Agency X who actively engaged in creating information there. 
Once identified, it was necessary to understand in which ways moral disengagement mechanisms 
manifested themselves, so as to then analyze whether this impacted the information system in any 
way. Data was coded for each of the eight mechanisms outlined by Bandura: moral justification, 
advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, euphemistic 
labeling, minimizing or distorting harmful effects, attribution of blame, and dehumanization (see 
Appendix III).  
 
4.6.3 Inductive Coding  
 In addition to deductive coding for theory-driven principles, a third round of coding in an 
inductive way took place. The intent was to ascertain that no significant piece of theme had been 
left unaccounted for. As a result, additional DCog principles not delineated by Furniss and 
Blandford (2006)  in their DiCoT framework were in fact identified. These results will be discussed 
in Chapter 6. 
 In summary, data analysis involved many rounds of coding. Mostly deductive, it involved 
identifying theory-related principles. A third round of inductive coding resulted in additional DCog 
principles emerging. Important to note that coding was done manually, not using any software. 
This was a conscious decision. Oates (2006) though not opposed to using software for data coding, 
mentions that some researchers might feel distanced from their raw data if using such tools. He 
also affirms that opting to choose a software or not is a personal decision. In my case, I felt that 
coding it manually gave me a better grasp of the data. To accomplish this, I built models on Excel 
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spreadsheets, one for each source of data. Then, having printed them off, I started looking for the 
commonalities and points of convergence so as to, in the end, consolidate everything in one single 
spreadsheet. Notes were also made of illustrative quotes, which were then put together in the same 
final spreadsheet. 
 Table 4.4 summarizes the last two sections of this chapter, listing all the data points and 
how they pertained to each of the theory-related principles that were being investigated. 
 
Table 4.4 – Data Points 
Data Point Method of Collection 
Contextual Information 
- Literature review. 
- Document review. 
- Interviews with those at Agency X. 
- Interviews with people across the federal 
government involved with transparency. 
- Interviews with people across the federal 
government involved with accountability and anti-
corruption efforts. 
D
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Social structures 
- Interviews with people across Agency X. 
- Interviews with those directly involved with the 
information system. 
- Observation of the interactions amongst those 
working at Agency X. 
- Documents on organizational structure. 
- Personal notes. 
Information Flows 
- Interviews with those involved with the 
information system. 
- Interviews with those involved in the deployment 
of technical systems (directly or indirectly). 
- Interviews with those responsible for managing 
systems. 
Physical layout 
- Observation of the physical layout. 
- Notes. 
Artefact 
- Interviews with developers. 
- Interviews with the users. 
- Documentation review (i.e. manuals). 
Evolutionary 
- Interviews with developers. 
- Interviews with users. 
- Interviews with the agents at Ministry X and CGU. 
Moral Disengagement/ Perceptions 
- Interviews with those at Agency X. 
- Questionnaire: Moral Deception Measure (Moore 
et al. 2012). 
120 
 
4.7 Validity and Triangulation 
 Yazan (2015) affirms that validity is more closely aligned with a positivist epistemological 
stance. Nevertheless, regardless of epistemology, it is still possible to strengthen rigor and quality. 
To that extent, Merriam (1998: 201) affirms that “all research is concerned with producing valid 
and reliable knowledge in an ethical manner”. For her, validity is guaranteed in the way that data 
is reported: “the qualitative study provides the reader with a depiction in enough detail to show 
that the author’s conclusion ‘makes sense’” (Merriam 1998: 199). 
 Stake (2010) complements this view by presenting a discussion on triangulation. He lists 
four strategies for triangulation, amongst which are mixed methods triangulation and progressive 
focusing. In this regard, I have attempted to ensure validity and triangulation by observing both 
Merriam’s (1998) and Stake’s (2010) recommendations. The DiCoT methodological framework 
aids greatly in this endeavor. As will be presented in Chapter 6, the DiCoT model forces the 
researcher to give a detailed account of events by breaking the data into five different models. 
These have resulted in a rich data-set. 
 In regards to triangulation, this was ensured via mixed methods. That is, three qualitative 
data collection forms were used, in addition to the use of a quantitative one (a questionnaire). The 
use of the Moral Disengagement Measure by Moore et al. (2012) no doubt ensures the validity of 
the data set concerning moral disengagement, since one set of results confirms the other. 
 In summary, I have attempted to follow recommendations on validity and triangulation, in 
addition to being as transparent as possible with how data was collected and analyzed. 
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4.8 Ethics 
 Oates (2006) affirms that it is the obligation of the researcher to behave as ethically as 
possible, both towards the people involved in the research (i.e. the participants interviewed), and 
the academic community who will later read and review this piece of research. 
 In regards to behaving ethically towards participants, the research ethics policy and 
procedures that the London School of Economics establishes were observed. In addition to this, 
Oates (2006) states a list of rights that every participant should be entitled to: to refuse to 
participate, to withdraw, to give informed consent, and the right to anonymity and confidentiality. 
 All participants were informed ahead of time of the nature of the research. They were all 
informed that they could withdraw at anytime (and in fact, not all agreed to be interviewed a second 
time due to personal reasons). In addition, all interviewees were made aware as to their rights 
regarding anonymity and confidentiality. To preserve this aspect, all interview recordings have 
been safely stored, with no reference as to who shared what. Agency X itself also had to consent 
to have its members and space researched. In this regard, the Director of Agency X gave his 
approval and provided me with a signed letter proving that consent was given. As part of the 
agreement for conset, it was established that their anonymity – both agency and participants – 
would be preserved. And indeed I have, as best as possible, omitted in this research any 
information that could be directly linked to them in any way, including not referencing the Ministry 
whose authority they are under. 
 Regarding the ethical commitment towards the academic community, I have attempted to 
be as transparent as possible regarding data collection and analysis. I can confirm that data was 
recorded accurately and fully. This has been guaranteed through triangulation and validity. 
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4.9 Conclusion 
This Chapter aimed to delineate the methodological underpinnings adopted in this thesis. 
As established, the theoretical framework along with the research questions proposed, led to a 
qualitative type of research. A case study approach was adopted and a unit of analysis designated, 
based on considerations by Merriam (2002), i.e. after an exhaustive literature review, a theoretical 
framework established, and both research problem and questions identified.  
Methods of data are diversified, as recommended by Stake (2010), which ensures 
triangulation (through mixed methods). In addition, the use of DiCoT and MD to code and analyze 
data was also extensively discussed. The structure of DiCoT, along with its focus on exhaustively 
coding data for DCog principles, no doubt also ensures the validity of this research.  
To be clear, DCog is the theory, DiCoT is the methodological framework, providing a 
structure for analyzing data. Adopting DiCoT as a framework for analysis does not substitute 
familiarity and understanding of the theory it draws its principles from (as discussed in Chapter 
3). 
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CHAPTER 5 
CASE STUDY: CONTEXT 
 
5.1. Introduction  
As established in the previous chapter, this study relies on the premise that transparency 
systems are socio-technical structures. The unit of analysis for this study is the cognitive system 
upon which the stage of transparency creation is embedded and operates in. In the distributed 
cognition (DCog) theoretical framework, the cognitive system comprises of both human agents 
and technical artefacts. Zhang et al. (2002: 42) ponder that “human activities in concrete situations 
are guided, constrained, and even determined by the psychical and social context in which they 
operate. . . the properties of a distributed cognitive system consisting of a group of human agents 
interacting with complex systems”. Thus, information systems may vary depending on the context 
in which they operate.  
Walsham (2009: 53) further contends that in information systems, “it is important to see 
organizational change as linked to both intraorganizational and broader contexts, and not to try to 
understand projects as episodes divorced from the historical, organizational or economic 
circumstances from which they emerge”. To this extent Stake (2010) adds that in order to infer 
interpretations of data, it is necessary to gain a good level of understanding of the context. He 
further posits that “context is background” (Stake 2010: 51) and that a unit of analysis may be 
inserted in several different contexts. In the case of information systems, Walsham (2009) suggests 
that a contextual analysis include the immediate department, the organization, national setting, in 
addition to the various social structures present. To this extent, Hollan et al. (2000: 178) affirm 
124 
 
that to study distributed cognition, is to study cognitive processes socially distributed amongst 
members of a social group and artefacts, all of whom are embedded in “complex cultural 
environments”. 
As such, this chapter is aimed towards reviewing the context in which Agency X, and more 
specifically, the unit of analysis under study – the cognitive system – is situated. In order to achieve 
such aim, section 5.2 will present an overview of the Brazilian national context which influences 
how Agency X and has shaped the technical system which is in place supporting how information 
on the Transparency Portal is produced, such as the political and economic landscapes, the anti-
corruption legislation which has been enacted over the years, and culture. Section 5.3 reviews how 
the structure of the Brazilian government and how Agency X is situated in this context. Section 
5.4, on the other hand, will look into the transparency framework, detailing the technical 
components which support it, and how Agency X relates to this. Section 5.5 will consist of 
describing how Agency X functions and attempting to understand some of the social groups and 
dynamics in place. Studying the context upon which the information system under analysis is 
embedded allows the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics that may constrain 
or encourage the cognitively distributed processes present.  
 
5.2. National Context  
 Agency X is situated within the structure of the Brazilian federal government which has 
undergone critical changes over the course of the last thirty-five years. Events, which include 
political, economic, in addition to legistative changes, have helped shape Agency X and, more 
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specifically, the information system under analysis. This next section will therefore review such 
context.  
 
5.2.1. Brazilian Political Landscape and Economy 
Brazil has experienced significant political turmoil over the last few years. Under a military 
dictatorship rule from 1964 to 1985, Brazilian democracy is relatively new but, until 2013 all signs 
indicated that it had been fully consolidated. It had seen the successful transition between 
presidents and the economy was booming. In addition, Brazil had closed the gap on inequality 
through its cash transfer program, the “Bolsa Família”, become the sixth largest economy in the 
world (Cebr 2011), and elected its first female President, Dilma Rouseff. Approval rates for 
President Rouseff reached an all-time high in 2011 (Confederação Nacional da Indústria 2011) 
and all indicators pointed to a promising future. 
Then, towards the end of 2014, this all seemed to change and Brazil was yet again facing 
economic turmoil and political instability. Inflation rates grew to levels that had not been seen 
since the early 1990s, social programs were slashed left and right due to a serious budgetary deficit 
(Martello 2015), and then, in August 2016, President Dilma Rousseff was impeached, accused of 
manipulating the government budget and making use of creative accounting prohibited by law – 
the same law that was used as basis for the creation of its Transparency Portal in 2004, the Fiscal 
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Responsibility Law promulgated in 2000 (BBC 2016)3, making her the second president to be 
ousted in less than 30 years of democratic rule. 
Popular dissatisfaction with President Dilma’s government began in mid-2013 with a series 
of protests across the country. Initially a student protest against an increase in bus tariffs in the city 
of São Paulo, the protests multiplied across the country to reflect a deep dissatisfaction over the 
perceived corruption on construction sites for the World Cup and the Olympic Games (held in 
2014 and 2016, respectively), violence levels which had reached an all-time high4, and the low 
level quality of public services such as health and education (Gripp, 2013). As a result, approval 
rates for President Dilma decreased from 55% to 31% (Oliveira and Passarinho 2013).  
Parallel to these events, the Brazilian economy, which had experienced extreme growth in 
the previous decade under the leadership of President Lula, had begun to stagnate. The year of 
2013 marked the year inflation began to rise (Figure 5.1) and the GDP growth rate began to drop 
(Figure 5.2). Thus, 2014 resulted in a hotly-contested presidential election which resulted in the 
re-election of President Dilma by a margin of less than 3% over the runner-up (TSE 2014). It 
would later transpire however that, in order to guarantee her re-election, President Dilma had not 
only concealed the true state of the economy (by refusing to release reports and economic indices 
during the electoral period), but had also made use of creative accounting maneuvers (in 
Portuguese, referenced as “pedaladas”). These pedaladas consisted of taking unauthorized loans 
from state-run banks to pay for social programs (a total of nearly US$58 billion), giving national 
                                                          
3 President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) was the second president to be impeached since Brazil reestablished 
its democracy in 1985. Prior to her, President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990 -1992) had been impeached 
due to allegations of corruption. Former President Collor now holds a seat in the Senate. 
4 In 2013, over 56.000 homicides were recorded. Since then, that number has increased to 59,080 in 2017 
making Brazil the 14th most violent country in the world (Atlas da Violencia, 2017). 
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accounts the appearance of being in credit, when in fact they were not5 (Leahy 2016). Such 
mishandling of the budget resulted in a sharp increase in inflation rates in 2015 and a negative 
GDP growth. In order to tackle this budget crisis, President Dilma announced significant budget 
cuts in the order of approximately US$17 billion (equivalent to R$65 billion; Rapozza 2015). This 
macroeconomic action resulted in a further drop of President Dilma’s approval rates, to 9% at the 
end of 2015. Less than a year later, in August 2016, the Brazilian Congress would vote to have her 
impeached over her illegal fiscal maneuvers. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 – Inflation Rates (1997 – 2017) 
Source: IBGE (2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Important to note that these fiscal maneuvers are illegal in accordance with the Fiscal Responsibility Law 
enacted in 2000. 
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Figure 5.2 – GDP Growth Rates (2010 – 2017) 
Source: IBGE (2017) 
 
 
 
President Dilma’s negative approval rates went beyond her mishandling of the economy. 
In 2014, during the electoral period, one of the biggest corruption scandals, Operation “Car-
Wash”6 was revealed. The scheme unveiled deep-rooted practices of corruption at Petrobrás, 
Brazil’s largest state-owned oil company, operated by members of President Dilma’s political 
party, the Workers’ Party and would eventually lead to her predecessor, President Lula, also a 
member of her party, eventually being tried and convicted (in 2018).  
In the next section, an overview of corruption in Brazil will be discussed.  
 
 
                                                          
6 Investigators named it so, since initially this was an investigation into the dealings of a man named Alberto 
Yousseff who owned a car wash which was used for a money-laundering schem. This investigation of this 
scheme led to the discovery of the involvement of several prominent figures, amongst which, key people 
connected to Petrobrás. 
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5.2.2. Tracing the Historical Roots of Corruption in Brazil 
The first records of illegal practices in Brazil date back to the period of Portuguese 
colonization. The most frequent case was of public officials, in charge of policing the smuggling 
and other transgressions against the Portuguese Crown, and instead of fulfilling their duties, ended 
up practicing the illegal trade of Brazilian products, such as spices, tobacco, and gold (Faoro 1987; 
Buarque de Holanda 2015). It is worth noting that such products could be marketed only with 
special permission from the Portuguese monarchy but ended up in the hands of smugglers.  
Later, when the Republic of Brazil was declared in 1889, other forms of corruption, such 
as electoral frauds and the concession of public constructions, would emerge. The latter involved 
winning bids for contracts from Government to carry out public constructions. Regarding electoral 
frauds, a common occurrence were patronage practices, especially in the countryside and in poorer 
regions of Brazil. In exchange for votes, powerful landowners would extend benefits to these 
people. In fact, it is interesting to note that this is still a commonplace practice in Northern regions 
of Brazil. 
Corrupt practices can therefore be traced a very long way back. In the political domain, 
one of the first registers of fraud dates back to 1929 during presidential elections held that year. 
Two candidates, Júlio Prestes and Getúlio Vargas were disputing elections. The former won 
elections by a considerable margin. But, due to the greater political support the latter had, election 
results were changed in order to favor him, who then became president in 1930 but refused to leave 
office at the end of his term, inaugurating a dictatorship period until 1945, which ended with his 
suicide.  
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Corruption had become so widespread in the political sphere, that in the early 1960s, 
presidential candidate Jânio Quadros used a broomstick as his campaign motto, alluding to the fact 
that he would “sweep corruption” from governmental institutions (see Figure 6.3). He went on to 
win that election and took office in January 1961. He remained in office however only 8 months, 
resigning in August 1961. His vice-president, João Goulart, would then take over, only to be 
deposed via military coup in 1964 under the auspices of being friendly towards communist 
regimes.  
 
Figure 5.3 – Campaign Slogan for Janio Quadros in 1960 
 
 
The military dictatorship (1964-1985), was also not a corrupt-free period. Though 
censorship prevented such news from reaching the general population, there were accusations 
against the military. One such instance involved accusations of trading items that had been illegally 
smuggled into Brazil and then apprehended by the military. A certain group, led by Captain Ailton 
Guimarães Jorge, then commercialized these items. Captain Guimarães Jorge would later leave 
the Armed Forces and become a prominent figure in gambling schemes (which is illegal in Brazil) 
(Rodrigues 2015).  
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More recently, documents released in 2014 and 2015 by the Obama administration 
indicated that the United States government was aware of ongoing acts of corruption during the 
military dictatorship. Several telegrams sent from the American Embassy in Brazil to Washington 
at the time reveal exchange of favors and nepotism, in addition to a US$10 million corruption 
scheme led by the Minister of Planning, Delfim Netto (Sayuri 2018). Research by Martins Filho 
(2017) indicated that the British government also had evidence of corruption in Brazil during the 
military dictatorship. Martins Filho uncovered documents that suggest that members of the 
Brazilian Navy had profited from the purchase of a fleet of ships from British company, Volper, 
in 1970. 
Moreover, it was during the military dictatorship that construction companies first formed 
a cartel and, with the political heads’ consent, split construction projects between them in exchange 
for kickbacks. Campos (2012) found concrete evidence to support claims that two of Brazil’s 
largest construction companies, Odebrecht and Camargo Corrêa, both led corruption schemes at 
Petrobrás during that time. These schemes would then later expand and consolidate, only to be 
uncovered in 2014 during Operation Car-Wash.  
This brief history reveals that corruption is not a new phenomenon in Brazilian political 
spheres. However, as the next section will demonstrate, such schemes seem to have evolved and 
become more elaborate.  
 
5.2.3. Corruption in Brazil Today  
The return to democracy in 1985 unfortunately did little in terms of curbing corruption. 
Since the onset of democracy, every single administration has been plagued by accusations of 
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corruption, starting with President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990 – 1992), the first directly 
elected president after the end of the military dictatorship, who was impeached under accusations 
of illegally appropriating public funds. Former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003 – 2010) 
was jailed in 2018 due to corruption charges brought against him in 2016. 
Brazil was considered the 96th least corrupt country in the world in 2017 (Transparency 
International 2017), up from 54th in 2003 (Transparency International 2003) when the Workers’ 
Party first came to power and immediately prior to the implementation of the Transparency Portal. 
Moreover, in a report by FIESP (2010), it was estimated that the cost of corruption in Brazil was 
in the order of 2.3% of the Brazilian GDP annually between 2005 and 2009. By their estimate 
therefore, corruption in Brazil had cost public coffers R$69.1 billion in 2008.  In a previous report, 
released in 2006 (FIESP 2006), the cost of corruption had been estimated as the equivalent to 
1.35% of the GDP in 2005 (the equivalent to R$25.6 billion that year). Thus, according to their 
analysis, the level of corruption in Brazil had increased significantly. 
According to CNI – National Federation of Industry (2016, Confederação Nacional da 
Indústria), 65% of Brazilians consider corruption to be an extremely serious problem. In the 2013 
Global Corruption Barometer (Transparency International 2013), 70% of Brazilians surveyed also 
reported it as a very serious problem, whereas 55% of respondents affirmed that the actions 
undertaken by government to combat corruption had been ineffective. Another interesting piece 
of data from this same survey concerns where citizens believe are the biggest sources of corruption; 
81% believed it was the political parties, followed by the 72% affirming it was the legislature (see 
Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1 - Biggest Sources of Corruption in Government 
Source: Global Corruption Barometer (2013) 
Political parties 81% 
Legislature 72% 
Police 70% 
Medical and health services 55% 
Judiciary 50% 
Public officials/ civil servants 45% 
Media 38% 
Business/ private sector 35% 
NGOs 33% 
Religious bodies 31% 
Military 30% 
 
Table 5.2 demonstrates an overview of the main corruption schemes uncovered since the 
1990s. The review of such cases gives an insight into how corruption schemes operate in Brazil 
and supports the perception that political parties and the legislature are the main sources of 
corruption.  
The overview demonstrates that schemes became more elaborate and widespread as time 
progressed. Unlike the schemes detailed during the military dictatorship in the previous section, 
the schemes detailed in Table 5.2 involve a range of different groups of interest from several areas 
of government (the legislature, different Ministries and agencies). In addition, most of the schemes 
outlined follow the same pattern of cheating bidding processes and engaging in kickback schemes. 
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 Table 5.2 – Overview of Main Corruption Scandals in Brazil 
Corruption 
Scheme 
Details Convictions Year 
Revealed 
Amount
7 
PC Farias Scheme involving former President 
Fernando Collor embezzling money 
from government, along with close 
allies. President Collor was impeached 
in 1992 but never convicted. He 
currently holds a seat in the Senate, 
having been first elected in 2006. 
0 1992 US$1 
billion 
Budget Dwarves 
(Anões do 
Orçamento) 
37 congressmen were involved in a 
scheme that meant exchanging budget 
amendments for future projects for 
kickbacks.  In 2016, it was revealed 
through Operation Car-Wash that this 
scandal led Brazil’s largest construction 
company to refrain from dealing with 
congressmen and instead deal directly 
with the President (from 2004 onwards). 
0 1994 US$100 
millions 
Marka Bank Luiz Bragança, acquainted with Central 
Bank’s chief, Francisco Lopes, illegally 
traded US dollars at a rate that was 36% 
lower than market rates, costing public 
coffers several millions. 
3 1999 US$760 
millions 
Health Vampires 
(Vampiros da 
Saúde) 
Scheme consisted of a kickback scheme 
in the Ministry of Health. Contracts were 
allocated to preferred suppliers in 
exchange for bribes. 42 people were 
charged with corruption charges, 
amongst whom, the Ministry of Health at 
the time, Humberto Costa. 
0 2004 US$900 
millions 
Mensalão A payment scheme spearheaded by the 
ruling Workers’ Party, who paid 
Congress members R$30,000 a month in 
exchange for voting favorably for 
legislation supported by them. Funds 
came from state-owned companies’ 
advertising budgets.  
24 2005 US$55 
million 
Razor Operation 
(Operação 
Navalha) 
Kickback scheme involving a 
construction company, Gautama, to 
obtain contract advantages involving the 
Minister of Mines and Energy at the 
time, Silas Rondeau. Bribes were paid to 
10 2007 US$15 
million 
                                                          
7 Amounts are an estimate based on investigation files and news reports. They have been converted to US 
dollars based on the exchange rate at the time. 
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public officials. In total 47 people were 
involved. 
Sand Castle 
(Castelo de Areia) 
Bribes, kickbacks, licitation fraud, and 
money laundering scheme involving 
construction company Camargo Correa 
and several high-level politicians, 
including President Michel Temer 
(2016-2016). The investigation would 
later be buried by the Supreme Justice 
Court on the basis that the evidence was 
inadmissible in court. 
0 2009 N/A 
Car-Wash (Lava 
Jato) 
Corruption scheme involving several 
political parties and construction 
companies, in addition to Brazil’s largest 
state-owned company, Petrobras. 
180 2014 US$12 
billion8 
Zealots (Zelotes) Corruption scheme at Brazil's 
Administrative Council of Tax Appeals 
(CARF), an agency within Brazil's 
Finance Ministry. CARF rulings 
fraudulently reduced or cancelled tax 
fines imposed on certain companies in 
exchange for bribes. 
9 2015 US$240 
million 
 
Two corruption scandals in the Table above deserve more detailed attention: Mensalão and 
Operation Car-Wash. In the case of Mensalão, the scandal broke immediately after the ruling 
Workers’ Party implemented two important strategies in their effort to curb corruption:  the 
creation of the Comptroller General of the Union (CGU) via Law No. 10.683 in 2003, and the 
deployment of the Transparency Portal in 2004 as a platform for making government spending 
more transparent. This case also marked the first time high-level politicians were so widely 
convicted. This was largely due to the great deal of attention it received by both media and civil 
society, a fact that would serve as a lesson for Operation Car-Wash investigations. 
Operation Car-Wash is also worth noting due to the fact that, quite unlike previous 
investigations, though uncovered in 2014, at the time of finalizing this thesis, it still showed no 
                                                          
8 Investigation is still ongoing, so this amount is expected to increase. 
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signs of slowing down. It is certainly the biggest corruption case to date in Brazil due to the 
amounts and number of people involved. It was also deemed the second biggest corruption case in 
the world by Transparency International (2017).  
The investigation has already seen nearly two hundred convictions, amongst whom high-
profile executives and politicians, and former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010). As 
a result of this investigation, over R$40 billion9 are due to be returned to public coffers in the form 
of restitutions and fines (MPF 2017).  The richness of the information obtained as a result of the 
investigation material reveal the extent of the scheme, going beyond Petrobrás and spanning at 
least a decade. In a statement to the courts, Emilio Odebrecht, who presided over the largest 
construction company in Brazil until 2001, revealed: 
“What we have in Brazil is not something that has been going on for 5, 10 years. It is a 30-
year-old system. Everything that is taking place is institutionalized. It was something 
normal, due to the number of political parties which were fighting for political 
appointments? No, everyone knew that it wasn’t […]. There, the political parties 
designated people in order to capture funds for the parties, for the politicians. And that is 
something that has been going on for 30 years.”10 
 
In the same statement, he went on to declare:  
“Effectively, things have gotten much worse […]. There was nothing [in the past] like 
today in politics, generally speaking.” 
 
 Emilio Odebrecht’s statement confirms the notion that although corruption has always 
existed, the mechanisms for it got progressively more sophisticated and institutionalized, despite 
                                                          
9 The equivalent to approximately US$12 billion. 
10 Statement made in September 2017. Translated from Portuguese by author. Recordings for all statements 
as part of this investigation are available at: https://www.youtube.com/user/MultiEstadao/videos  
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the extensive anti-corruption legal framework established during the course of the Workers’ Party 
government11. The cases outlined in Table 5.2 also largely indicate a history of impunity. With the 
exception of the Car-Wash Operation, conviction rates have remained significantly low. This will 
be reviewed in the next section of this chapter.  
 
5.2.4. Anti-Corruption Legal Framework 
As discussed in Chapter 3, corruption can take several forms, amongst which offering and 
accepting bribes. In Brazil, such acts are illegal, in accordance with the Penal Code established in 
1940. According to Leite (2016), articles 317 and 333, specifically deal with the issue of passive 
and active corruption. The current Brazilian Constitution also deals with the subject under Article 
37, stating that those involved in misconduct will have their political rights suspended (Leite 
2016). Since then, existing legislation has considerably expanded resulting in an extensive legal 
framework. This section of the chapter will thus review some of the important advances in this 
regard. 
Praça and Taylor (2014) state that the first significant advancement in consolidating an 
anti-corruption legislation came in 1998, with the enactment of the Money Laundering Law (Law 
N. 9.613/1998). This followed a period of economic and monetary stability during the presidency 
of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) which led to reform of the state and more emphasis 
on performance (Bresser-Pereira 1996). Such reforms, coupled with technological innovations at 
the time, i.e. the Internet, led to a shift towards a more transparent environment. 
                                                          
11 Worker’s Party government lasted fourteen years: President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva ruled from 2003 to 
2010, and President Dilma Rouseff ruled from 2011 to 2016, when she was impeached, as previously 
reviewed. 
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The late 1990s saw several local spheres of government (state and municipalities), such as 
the richest state in Brazil, São Paulo, heavily indebted due to both mismanagement and corruption. 
Over 55% of municipalities were in deficit by 1998 (Alves and Heller 2013). This resulted in the 
enactment of Law N. 101 in 2000, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL), which “limits state debt 
levels, sets rigid limits on spending, and requires the provision of transparent fiscal information to 
the public” (Praça and Taylor 2014: 10). Though devised as a form of fiscal policy, the 
“transparency” requirement of it, also served as a form of restraining corrupt practices (Khair et 
al. 2006; Leite 2016). To this extent, Alves and Heller (2013: 89) affirm that “for the first time 
in Brazilian history, LRF made executives (mayors and governors) personally liable for 
noncompliance”. 
Praça and Taylor (2014: 11) add that the enactment of the FRL can be considered a 
landmark in terms of anti-corruption efforts since it resulted in changes across entire government 
institutions: “with the enactment of the FRL, the TCU12 (and its state-level counterparts) has been 
forced to reorganize internally, both creating new institutional structures, such as ombudsman’s 
offices and training academies, and establishing new routines, such as permitting more civil society 
participation and providing better access to information”. They further state that the FRL would 
later act as the basis for the creation of the Transparency Portal in 2004 during the Lula 
administration (2003-2011). 
Following the intense media scrutiny after the Mensalão scandal, civil society became 
more involved and local NGOs that had been founded in the 1990s, such as Transparência Brasil, 
the Brazilian chapter of Transparency International, gained prominence. Such strong popular 
                                                          
12 Federal Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Contas da Uniao), an extension of the legislative branch, responsible 
for auditing accounts of the executive branch.  
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pressure resulted in the enactment of the Transparency Law (LC 131/2009) in 2009. Following a 
series of political and corruption scandals in both the Lower House of Chambers and the Senate, 
popular dissatisfaction grew with the legislative branch of government. A bill, the Transparency 
Law (LC131/2009), which had been in limbo for over five years, was quickly brought to the floor 
for voting and was quickly enacted (Alves and Heller 2013). This law expanded the transparency 
framework and resulted in the requirement that budgetary information be made available on a real-
time basis. This framework would later be consolidated in 2011 when the Access to Information 
Law was enacted (L. 12.527/2011). It established the basis for expanding the transparency 
framework in Brazil, topic of section 5.4 in this chapter, bearing a direct effect on the information 
system at Agency X.  
Popular pressure would also result in the enactment of a very important piece of legislation 
in 2010, the Clean Slate Law (LC 135/2010), which banned politicians who had been convicted of 
a crime in the appeals court to run for office. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this law is that 
it was the result of direct popular initiative, via a petition signed by 1.3 million citizens. This again 
would be the case in 2013, as popular uprisings resulted in the expansion of the anti-corruption 
legislation.  
That year, as reviewed previously, a series of protests took place across the country. 
Citizens were dissatisfied with growing expenditure on infrastructure in preparation for the World 
Cup (to be held in 2014) and the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro (to be held in 2016). The 
perception was that such investments not only meant neglect of basic public services, such as 
health and education, but also that illegalities were taking place and funds were being diverted (a 
fact that would later be confirmed via the Car-Wash investigation).  As a way of placating the 
population and protests and to give government the auspices that it was combatting corruption, the 
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Anti-Corruption Law (L. 12.846/2013) was enacted, followed by the Criminal Organizations Law 
(L. 12.850/2013). A very important step in advancing anti-corruption charges, the former 
established punitive damages to those involved in corruption (such as fines to the tune of 20% of 
profits of companies).   
The latter, on the other hand, set out a framework for plea bargaining and leniency in 
exchange for collaborating with investigations. Although a measure that had been amply used 
internationally, this was a novel strategy in Brazil and would later prove to be key in advancing 
the Car-Wash Operation investigation13. In the words of a public prosecutor interviewed: 
 
“A combination of factors allowed the Car-Wash to proceed and not die as previous 
investigations had. The first is the the level of attention these investigations have received. 
When the media follows [the case], things flow better. The second was the use of plea 
bargaining [in exchange for leniency]. It establishes a “contract” between the State and 
the accused. It allowed us to gather information quickly, and move forward much faster. 
And as investigations progressed, others involved came forward wanting to make a deal to 
avoid jail time, giving us an insight into the operation that we would not have gained 
otherwise”. 
 
 In summary, Brazilian legislation has advanced significantly in terms of establishing an 
anti-corruption framework (see Figure 5.4) and, as the brief history presented above shows, 
mobilization by the civil society has played an important role in consolidating such advances. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Data obtained as the result of an interview that was conducted with a public prosecutor directly involved in 
the Car-Wash investigations in April 2018. 
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Figure 5.4 – Overview of the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Legislation 
 
 
5.2.5. A Culture of Corruption 
Matta (1986) explains that Brazilians are known for their “jeitinho brasileiro” (loosely 
translated as “little Brazilian way”). This expression characterizes a Brazilian trait, which means 
finding creative ways to dodge the bureaucracy and excessive regulation. Habib (1994) adds that 
“jeitinho brasileiro” is a form of circumventing the law and an institutionalized practice in Brazil, 
leading to the claim that Brazilian corruption is a culturally embedded phenomenon. 
This is exemplified by research that reveals that 35% of Brazilians affirm they have already 
bribed a police officer to get themselves out of being fined (Nóbrega 2016). This prevalent 
perception that Brazilians are predominantly corrupt is exemplified by a survey in Brazil by 
Transparency International (2012), which “indicated that while respondents do not report high 
incidence of personal engagement in corruption, they do indicate a suspicion that others are less 
honorable”. Thus, Brazilians hold themselves in higher regard than they do others. Yet research 
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shows that practices of little acts of wrongdoing are quite widespread. For example, Nóbrega 
(2016) cites a Vox Populi survey whereby 23% of respondents affirmed that avoiding a fine is “not 
a big deal”. Another survey revealed that 35% of respondents believed that there are practices that 
are “a little wrong”, such as the act of avoiding to pay taxes when they are too high, but that is not 
corruption (Della Barba 2012). This form of rationalizing about acts of wrongdoing can be 
explained through the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3 of moral disengagement (MD) 
(Bandura 2016). It is not however constrained to society. They can also be observed in public 
institutions. Research by UNB (2008, in Nóbrega 2016) reveals that 22.5% of civil servants have 
already admitted to committing an illegal act. 
Analyzing testimonies given to investigators and public prosecutors in relation to the 
Operation Car-Wash14, it was possible to identify an ongoing pattern of MD mechanisms as part 
of their discourse. As previously presented, Operation Car-Wash has resulted in a very rich dataset, 
consisting of hundreds of documents and videotaped testimonies, which allowed for a unique 
insight into the minds of corrupt individuals and how he or she justifies and rationalizes the act of 
corruption. By going through this dataset, it was possible to observe an extensive array of examples 
of how individuals made use of cognitive mechanisms in order to reframe their actions. Some of 
the examples can be observed in Table 5.3.  
An interesting observation is that out of Bandura’s (2016) eight cognitive mechanisms for 
moral disengagement, three were not observed: distortion of consequences, dehumanization, and 
attribution of blame. At the victim locus, these involve dehumanizing victims, which, in the 
context of corruption, could be categorized as public coffers or perhaps even civil society, which 
                                                          
14 These documents can be consulted on the Public Prosecutors’ website: www.lavajato.mpf.mp.br. Videos of 
the testimonies can be visualized at https://www.youtube.com/user/MultiEstadao/videos. 
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are “invisible” or “unseen” entities. This therefore might explain why such mechanisms were not 
observed. 
The fact that MD mechanisms were observed in the context of this widespread corruption 
scheme, which has proven to expand across several political spheres and institutions, suggests that 
such mechanisms will be found in the context of Agency X, hence why I have taken the time to 
detail this finding here.  
 The next section of this chapter will review the institutional design of the Brazilian 
government so as to further gain an understanding of the context in which Agency X is inserted. 
 
Table 5.3 – Examples of Moral Disengagement in the Context of Operation Car-Wash 
Categories Definition Examples 
Moral 
Justification 
Moral, social and economic justifications 
are used to sanctify injurious practices and 
decisions, and to challenge regulations. 
Harmful actions are regarded as serving 
worthy purposes and actors reward 
themselves for performance. 
"I did it in the spirit of democracy!"; "[My job] is not the reason 
behind electoral corruption"; "I never gave up on my dreams. I 
embraced all my opportunities"; "I knew that in order to advance 
[in my career] compromises would need to be made"; "It has 
always existed, since my father's time"; "I am a family man" 
Advantageous 
Comparison 
Comparing or constrasting harmful 
activities to actions that appear benign, of 
little consequence, or of lesser negative 
effect. 
"We are not corrupt or money launderers [in comparison to other 
types of corruption]" 
Euphemistic 
Labeling 
The use of sanitizing, convoluted, and 
innocuous language to make harmful 
decisions personally and socially 
acceptable. 
"I received a remuneration. . . I received "x" as a salary [in 
reference to bribes received]"; "It's 'extra-legal' ways"; "I didn't 
receive a bribe. I was paid for my work"; "Yes, a mistake was 
made. But it was a contained mistake"; "They're problems of a 
political nature" 
Displacement 
of 
Responsibility 
Evasion of personal accountability for 
harmful conduct and decisions by 
displacing responsility on others (e.g. 
manager or authority). As such, they are 
not the actual agent of their actions. May 
intentionally keep themselves uninformed. 
"A request from the Minister, what do you do?"; "I resisted, I 
didn't want to do it [suggesting he was forced]"; "The president 
told was that this was the way it was going to be" 
Diffusion of 
Responsibility 
Personal responsibility is diffused through 
group decision-making, division of labor, 
or by attributing own behavior to the 
behavior of others (behavior mimic). 
Attention is shifted from the morality of 
action to operational details and efficiency 
of a specific job. 
"Is it wrong? Yes. Is it deplorable? Yes. But it's [kickbacks] 
generalized in the world"; "Everyone knew what was happening" 
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5.3. The Organizational Context: The Brazilian Federal Government 
The Brazilian government, as established by the 1988 Constitution15, is composed of the 
Union, States, Federal District, and municipalities, and power is divided between three branches: 
executive, legislative, and the judiciary.  
The federal government sphere comprises 29 Ministries16 and employs over 770,000 
people (see Appendix V). Each Ministry serves as an umbrella for a complex structure composed 
of agencies, secretaries, councils etc., dispersed across the country and overseas (see Figure 5.5 
for an example). 
Adding to these institutions are also a series of state-owned companies, such as Petrobrás 
and the Bank of Brazil. The Brazilian government owns and operates a total of 418 state-owned 
companies which employ over 500,000 people (Prado 2017). All of this makes for a very complex 
structure which often translates into government agencies’ inability to converse with one another 
and turning integration between them into a challenge. This has reflected on how transparency has 
been deployed throughout the federal government, which aimed at integrating this complex 
structure. Despite this, the transparency agenda in Brazil aims to achieve precisely that, as will be 
reviewed in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
Such a large governmental structure also presents a challenge to oversight institutions, 
responsible for ensuring that all those operating under all three branches of government – civil 
servants, ministers, members of congress and the judiciary – adhere to the legal framework in 
                                                          
15 The current Brazilian Constitution was established in 1988 after the end of the military dictatorship (1964-
1985). It is the seventh constitution in Brazilian history since declaring independence from Portugal in 1822. 
16 In May 2006, when Dilma Rousseff was initially removed from office, then interim President, Michel Temer, 
cut the number of Ministries from a historical record of 32, to 29. 
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place. It has also resulted in a very complex web of oversight institutions. This will be reviewed 
in the next section. 
 
Figure 5.5 – How a Ministry is Structured 
Source: Ministry of Planning, Development and Management (2018) 
 
 
5.3.1. Accountability and Oversight Institutions 
The 1988 Brazilian Constitution established Brazil’s modern web of accountability 
institutions and the basis for Brazil’s anti-corruption legislation. Currently, Brazil has four 
oversight institutions responsible for investigating acts of misconduct and applying sanctions:  
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(1) Ministério Público Federal (Federal Public Prosecutors’ Office - MPF):  considered 
the “fourth branch of government”, the Public Prosecutor is the main enforcer of 
political law, “which granted it enhanced authority to act against corruption and misuse 
of public funds” (Carson and Prado 2016: 20). Aranha (2018: 8) adds that this 
institution “is the most unusual accountability institution in Brazil and assumes the 
main role when it comes to fighting corruption in the judicial arena. It is a prosecutorial 
body, formally independent of the other three branches of government, with guaranteed 
budget and career incentives set with almost no outside interference”.  
(2) Tribunal de Contas da União (Federal Audit Court - TCU): As part of its oversight and 
monitoring activities, the TCU is responsible for assisting Congress “in the preparation 
and execution of the federal budget, inspects annual financial reports from all offices 
of the public administration, and approves the hiring, retirement, and pension policies 
for all civil servants” (Speck 2011). 
(3) Polícia Federal (Federal Police Department - DPF): responsible for criminal 
investigations under federal jurisdiction.  Carson and Prado (2016: 30) affirm that “it 
is subordinated to the Ministry of Justice” and has, in the past twenty years, taken on 
the role of investigating corruption. 
(4) Controladoria-Geral da União (Office of the Comptroller General - CGU). Officially 
renamed in May 2016 to Ministry of Transparency, Fiscalization and Control (though 
it is still referred to as CGU), it is part of the executive branch and, as such, retains a 
degree of independence. It is responsible for “tasks of internal oversight, inspections, 
ombudsman units, and preventing corruption. In addition to overseeing the use of 
public funds and initiating audits” (Carson and Prado 2016: 28), CGU is also 
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responsible for managing the Transparency Portal, as will be covered in the next section 
of this Chapter. 
 
Leite (2016) adds three more organizations responsible for ensuring adherence to the legal 
framework: the Judiciary branch, COAF (Control for Financial Activities Council17), and 
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiries (CPI). In the case of COAF, it is situated under the 
Ministry of Finance and is responsible for investigating money laundering operations. CPIs, on 
the other hand, are investigations led by members of Congress. Once formed, its powers are akin 
to that of the judiciary branch, meaning they can conduct testimonies, apprehend documents and 
properties, and even sentence those investigated temporarily to jail.  
Although Brazil retains such an impressive number of institutions dedicated towards 
combatting corruption and the fact that the number of investigations has grown throughout the 
course of the years (see Table 5.4), corruption levels are still considerably high in Brazil, as 
reviewed in previous sections of this chapter. One of the reasons appointed for this, is the slowness 
of its judiciary system (Speck 2011). Data released by the Federal Justice System in 2010 revealed 
that there were over 10,000 lawsuits that year against public servants and politicians for corruption 
(Martinez 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 In Portuguese: Conselho de de Controle de Atividades Financeiras 
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Table 5.4 - Overview of Operations by the Federal Police Department 
Source: Carson and Prado (2016) 
 
 
 
 
Another issue that negatively impacts the legal process is that all politicians holding office 
are entitled to a “special standing” in courts (called “foro especial”), which means that their cases 
can only be heard by the Supreme Federal Court, a very slow legal instance due to the number of 
cases it handles (see Table 5.5). The result is that often, by the time verdicts are finally reached, 
sentences will have already run out of the statute of limitations and no penalty can be applied 
(Speck 2011). In Brazil, 45,300 people are entitled to this privileged standing in court. Comparing 
this number to 2,987 people in China and a single person in Germany who can have a “special 
standing” gives a dimension of how the rule of law can be distorted in Brazil. 
 
 
Table 5.5 – Number of Cases Accumulated at the Supreme Federal Tribunal 
Source: CNJ (2012) 
 
YEAR 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of 
Cases 
 128,823   102,869   109,683   102,412  
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Operations 
carried out
67 167 188 235 288 270 256
Public servants 
imprisoned
219 385 310 396 183 124 260
Police officers 
imprisoned
9 11 15 7 4 5 4
Total persons 
imprisoned
1,407 2,673 2,878 2,475 2,663 2,734 2,085
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 In summary, Brazil presents a complex a web of accountability institutions (which can be 
best visualized in Figure 5.6). As Power and Taylor (2011: 14) affirm, “Accountability institutions 
operate within each of the three branches of government, with further support from autonomous 
institutions such as the Ministério Público [the MPF] and the media”. This, coupled with the 
extensive anti-corruption legal framework and pressures from civil society have, however, been 
unable to deter corruption.  
 
Figure 5.6 – The Web of Accountability Institutions in Brazil 
Source: Power and Taylor (2011) 
 
5.4. The Transparency Framework in Brazil 
As previously discussed, Brazil’s transparency framework started to take shape in 2000 
with the enactment of the “Fiscal Responsibility Law” (LC 101/2000) which stated that, amongst 
other things, all spheres of government should abide by certain spending limits or face sanctions. 
This framework would later expand with the enactments of the Transparency Law (Lei da 
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Transparência), in 2009 and the Access to Public Information Law (Lei de Acesso a Informações 
Públicas) in 2011.  
The current framework consists of both passive and active transparency components (Fox 
2007; see Figure 5.7). In other words, the federal government, out of its own initiative, makes 
information available and actively publishes data through its Transparency Portal18. The federal 
government has also established a platform through which citizens can request information 
(passive transparency). This refers to information that is not actively available, but only on request. 
The platform through which this is achieved is the e-SIC19 (Sistema Eletrônico do Serviço de 
Informações ao Cidadão, or Electronic System for Citizen Information Service). Government 
agencies typically must respond within 30 days to requests.  
The official mission of this framework is to combat corruption: 
“The Brazilian Government believes that transparency is the best antidote against 
corruption, since it is one more method to induce public managers to act with 
responsibility; and it allows society, with access to information, to collaborate in the 
control of rulers’ actions, with the aim of checking whether public resources are being 
spent in the way that they should” (Transparency Portal). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Available at: www.portaltransparencia.gov.br (in Portuguese). 
19 Available at: https://esic.cgu.gov.br (in Portuguese). 
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Figure 5.7 - The Brazilian Transparency Framework 
Sources: Portal da Transparência and e-SIC websites 
 
 
Regarding the Transparency Portal specifically, this was established in 2004 and is 
managed by CGU. The aim of the Portal is to record:  
“all funds transferred by the federal government to states, municipalities and the Federal 
District; funds directly transferred to citizens; direct spending of the federal government 
with procurement or contracts for projects and services, including the spending of each 
agency with per diems, office supplies, equipment, projects and services; as well as 
spending through payment cards of the federal government” (CGU website). 
 
 As new laws expanded requirements (reviewed in section 5.2.5), so did the amount of 
information contained in the Portal (see Figures 5.8 and 5.9). As of 2011, in compliance with the 
“Access to Public Information Law”, in addition to data pertaining to the transfer of funds 
generally, as mentioned above, it publicizes information specifically regarding salaries/benefits 
paid to all public servants, at all spheres and levels. In the words of Jorge Hage, former Minister 
of CGU: 
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“since May 2010 data on budget executution and revenue collection of the central 
government is updated on a daily basis. In other words: every transaction completed every 
day is published and available for constultation on every following morning on the Portal.”
  
 
Currently, approximately two billion pieces of information are registered on the Portal. 
Information from all 29 Ministries is fed into the Transparency Portal for the Federal. The 
information is updated on a real-time basis, as mandated by the Access to Transparency Law. As 
a result of these efforts, Brazil has consistently ranked high in open government and open budget 
indices; currently Brazil ranks 7th on the Open Budget Index (2017), ahead of countries like the 
United Kingdom and Germany (see Figure 5.10). 
 
Figure 5.8 – Evolution of the Transparency Framework in Brazil 
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Figure 5.9 - Evolution of Information Available in the Portal 
Source: Felix (2011) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 - Brazil’s Open Budget Index Ranking Evolution 
Source: International Budget Partnership (2017) 
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Though the number of unique users to the portal has considerably grown throughout the 
course of the years, from 32,163 in 2004 to 1,361,591 in 2015, this is still the equivalent to just 
over 1% of Brazil’s internet users. It is, however, on par with access numbers to government 
budget websites in other countries20. Data by Felix (2015) show that the second most accessed 
type of information by citizens is the “public expenses” section of the Transparency Portal, 
precisely the information that is produced by Agency X (see Table 5.6), demonstrating that though 
the interest is low on the Portal overall, the budget execution is one of the sections that most attracts 
attention.  
 
 
 
Table 5.6 – Transparency Portal Information Accesses (Non-Unique Users) 
Source: Felix (2015) 
 
 
                                                          
20 In the United Kingdom, the average number of unique users to its government budget website in 2016 
equated to approximately 0.002% of its Internet users (source: data.gov.uk). In the United States, during that 
same period, the average number of unique users equated to 0.019% of its Internet users (information 
obtained via the Freedom of Information Act). 
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Research by Freire and Batista (2016) reveals that 64% of users who accessed the 
Transparency Portal, did so for personal reasons, whilst 26% were professionals (journalists, 
NGOs, public officials). Their research also revealed that 82% of citizens believe that the 
Transparency Portal is an effective tool for combatting corruption. This high-level of expectation 
makes this thesis even more relevant, since, as discussed both in previous chapters and throughout 
this present one, transparency has had a limited effect on curbing corruption. In defense of the 
Transparency Portal as an anti-corruption mechanism, Correa (2015) cites a specific instance when 
the misuse of government credit cards came to light precisely because that information was 
available for consultation by a group of journalists who publicized this fact. As a result, public 
officials refrained from using the credit cards and expenses decreased by nearly half, from just 
over R$80 million in 2010 to approximately R$43 million in 2017 (Viapiana 2018). Such 
conclusion, that transparency acted as a deterrence mechanism is superficial since it fails to 
consider why officials stopped using the credit cards, i.e. they simply migrated to other forms of 
paying for personal expenses, such as via contracting and invoicing. And, as will be discussed via 
the example of Agency X, invoices can be manipulated to reflect other forms of expenses.     
In summary, the transparency framework in Brazil comprises both active (the 
Transparency Portal) and passive transparency (e-SIC) components. Though Agency X is subject 
to having to respond to requests that originate via the e-SIC system (the passive aspect), there are 
no records of it ever having done so. In addition, the focus of this thesis is the “active” component 
of transparency and how the information is produced. As such, this will be the focus of subsequent 
sections of this chapter. The next section will detail further how the Transparency Portal functions. 
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5.4.1. Sources of Information 
 The Transparency Portal pulls its information from two main systems: SIAFI – Integrated 
System of Financial Administration (Sistema Integrado de Administração Financeira), and SIAPE 
– Integrated System of Administration of Human Resources” (Sistema Integrado de Administração 
de Recursos Humanos) (see Figure 5.11). 
SIAPE is a human resources management tool. Managed by the Ministry of Planning, 
Budget and Management, it holds information regarding wages and pay slips for all the civil 
servants working in the federal government sphere. The system was created in 1989, and all of its 
information is supplied to the Transparency Portal. Agency X does not utilize this system, hence 
why it will not be reviewed in greater detail here.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 - The Transparency Portal’s Data Sources 
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SIAFI, on the other hand, is managed by National Treasury Secretary (STN) and constitutes 
the main source of information for the Transparency Portal (see Figure 5.12). It was created in 
1987 and holds budgetary and financial information for the federal sphere of government. Since 
2015, it has been rolled out to several government agencies so that financial information can be 
inputted directly on it by various agencies and immediately reflected on the Portal, attending to 
the current legislation that establishes that information be made available in real-time. To this 
extent, the system was implemented at Agency X in January 2015, as will be reviewed in Chapter 
6.  
Araújo (2008) states that the official mission statement for SIAFI is to provide 
organizations across the federal government with adequate mechanisms for controlling their 
budgetary execution and consolidate financial information for all agencies within one single 
system. According to official documentation obtained regarding this system: 
“SIAFI is the main management instrument used by the Secretary of National Treasury 
(STN), organization that is responsible for the management of the Treasury’s financial 
resources . . . SIAFI is used by all agencies within the Ministries as a financial management 
instrument to process in an integrated way, and on-line, its budgetary, financial, and 
patrimonial execution” (Internal Manual for SIAFI). 
 
He also states that SIAFI, as a unified and centralized system, mitigates the risk of 
corruption. However, he also recognizes that there have been challenges in migrating the entire 
federal government sphere onto SIAFI. The major one that Araújo (2008) alludes to is the existence 
of many different technical systems in use across different agencies, each with its own language 
and codes. This heterogeneity poses a major challenge in attempting to unify systems. Agency X 
itself utilizes a separate internal system (IntSys), which is exclusive to the Ministry under which 
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Agency X is situated. Both systems, IntSys and SIAFI, constitute the technical artefact elements 
of the information system which is one of the focal points of this research. The other element of 
the information system are Agency X’s people. An overview of the agency and its people will be 
reviewed in the next section of this chapter. 
 
Figure 5.12 -  Screenshot of SIAFI Login Page 
Source: STN 
 
 
5.5. The Organizational Context: Agency X 
 The agency at which transparency was observed (hereby referred to as Agency X) was 
structured in the 1960s. It is situated within one of 29 Ministries in the federal government. Its 
official mission is to aid in the procurement of services and supplies, fielding purchase requests 
from various other agencies within the particular Ministry which they support. As such, its main 
responsibilities include: the management of activities related to procurement (i.e. placing orders 
and supply chain management), managing its budget execution and payments, and managing its 
staff and personnel.  
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 This particular agency is a relatively small organization, comprising of under 100 civil 
servants. Everyone who works there was admitted via a “concurso público”, that is through an 
examination process whereby the highest ranked ones will be hired, in accordance with internal 
need and demand. There is a presence therefore of both employees who have been working there 
for over ten years, in addition to ones who have been there for less than one. It is usually up to the 
more experienced workers to teach the new hires.  
As can be observed in Table 5.7, though the distribution between men and women is close 
to 50/50, as we look up the hierarchical chain of command, it is possible to observe that the number 
of women occupying these spaces is gradually reduced. At a supervisory role, for example, only 
22% of these are women. At a management role and at a director role, none are women. This is 
reflective of the general trend in federal administration where, though women comprise 46% of 
the total workforce, only 22% occupy top management roles, versus 45% at the bottom of the chain 
(Valente and Pereira 2015).  
 
 
Table 5.7 – Number of Civil Servants at Agency X by Hierarchical Level and Gender 
 MALE FEMALE 
DIRECTOR 3% 0% 
MANAGER 10% 0% 
SUPERVISOR 23% 6% 
EMPLOYEE 64% 94% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 
 
 Approximately 50% of those employed in this organization work within the procurement 
process of this organization, a fact which reflects the mission of this office (i.e. procurement). 
Another 20% work in the Financial Department which, as will be detailed in Chapter 6, also 
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supports the procurement process. The remaining employees work in supporting roles, such as HR 
and technical support. Moreover, as was inferred from the interviews conducted and from the 
agency’s organizational culture, hierarchy is strictly observed and, as a result, employees will 
usually refer to their direct supervisors, rarely reaching out to managers and the director. This is 
exemplied in the quote below, obtained as a result of the interviews conducted. 
 
Int21: I can argue, show my point of view, why it’s better. But ultimately it’s their decision. 
It’s their name on the line. Our agency is our director. That has to be respected. When I 
do something... I’m the one who’s doing it, ok. But in the end, it’s my manager who has to 
approve it. The name isn’t mine, who is really dictating rules? It’s the director, it’s the 
manager, not the buyer.  
 
Contact with outside organizations comes in the form of purchase requests made from other 
agencies within this particular Ministry, in addition to several suppliers who attend to purchase 
requests (more details regarding the procurement process will be given in subsequent sections). 
They also occasionally must deal with consultants who sometimes act as intermediaries between 
suppliers and Agency X.  
Employees at the lower level of the chain, when dealing with other government agencies, 
will typically only deal with employees who are in the same hierarchical level as them. Strategic 
decisions, such as the implementation of new systems or procedures, ordered by higher-level 
organizations (see Figure 5.13), will only be communicated at the director level, on whom the 
responsibility of communicating and strategizing with the rest of the agency will fall. As 
mentioned, however, the observation of hierarchical positions is a strong cultural feature within 
this agency. As such, the director will only liaise with his management team, who will then have 
the obligation of communicating decisions down the chain of command. 
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Figure 5.13 – The Chain of Communication from Ministry to End-User 
 
 
This strong hierarchical structure also reflects how new hires are trained. They will usually 
be trained by others who are positioned at the same level as the position they were hired to occupy.  
Procedures and norms will be relayed to new hires by people in similar positions as theirs. There 
is, however, no formal training or a formal “onboarding” week, typical of so many private 
organizations. There is also no formal training on ethics. Formal documents detailing norms, 
procedures, rules, and legislation, do exist and can be found on the intranet, but only to be 
consulted as needed. In interviews, most employees, however, stated that they rarely consulted 
these guides, and typically relied on the expertise of others when in doubt. It is interesting to note 
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that guides specific to ethics and code of conduct were not found on the intranet. They are available 
however for consultation to anyone – employees and citizens – on the Ministry’s external website. 
Thus, it was possible to observe a work system that was strongly hierarchical whilst, at the 
same time, very informal in terms of how procedures are communicated. As reported in interviews: 
 
Int11: There was no training. Everything off the record.  
 
INTERVIEWER: When you first started, what sort of training did you undergo? 
Int15: They gave me a few guides to read through, and then I sat with [CO-WORKER] 
and that’s really where I learned everything. She’s the one who taught me the 
procedures, the systems. She’s been there for 20 years, so she knows everything. 
 
The lack of training was also reported regarding technical systems, which were 
implemented in support of the legislative changes that had taken place expanding transparency 
requirements (as reviewed in previous sections). This will be discussed in the following section of 
this chapter. 
 
5.5.1 Organizational Change: The Implementation of Technical Systems 
Agency X makes use of two main systems to document procurement processes: SIAFI and 
an internal system (IntSys). This section therefore serves to give an overview of these systems and 
how they came to be deployed at Agency X. 
 The IntSys which Agency X currently uses has been in place since 2011. This system is 
not exclusive to the agency in question, but was in fact deployed to various agencies across the 
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specific Ministry in which they are inserted. Prior to that, since its creation, the agency had had 
several different systems. 
 The first computerized system that Agency X deployed was in the early 1990s, when they 
decided to modernize its procedures. It would only be a few years later when this, then considered 
a more modern system, would be linked to the Internet. At the time, this first information system 
was developed in-house, by staff hired directly by the agency to work on it.  
 In 2008, this system would suffer some major changes with the intent of updating it. As 
with the previous system, it was internally developed and was exclusive to the agency in question. 
This new updated system would however be quickly replaced, due to legislation enacted not long 
afterwards. 
 As previously reviewed, in 2009, the Brazilian Congress approved Complementary Law 
No. 131, dubbed the “Transparency Law”, which determined, among other things, the release of 
financial information on a real-time basis, to be published via several types of media, among which 
the Transparency Portal. The timeline, established by this legislation for federal entities to adjust 
to the new requirements, was of one year. In addition, as a means of supporting these new changes, 
the National Treasury released a decree which delineated accounting and financial reporting 
guidelines (Decree No. 548). Furthermore, pushing for further transparency, Law No. 12.527 was 
enacted in 2011 (dubbed the “Access to Information” law), which further expanded the amount of 
information to be published. 
 As a result, the newly-implemented system became outdated, due to not being able to 
attend to the new requirements. Furthermore, there was a need for the various entities within this 
Ministry to became more tightly integrated and for all systems to communicate with SIAFI (as 
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previously reviewed, it is the information on SIAFI which feeds into the Transparency Portal). As 
such, in 2011, a new system was deployed. This one, unlike the previous ones, was not developed 
in-house. Instead, it had been commissioned at a Ministerial level and then later deployed 
throughout various agencies across this organization, amongst which was Agency X. 
 The general consensus, from those working there, seemed to reflect a certain level of 
dissatisfaction with the system. Terms such as “inefficient” were used several times by several of 
those interviewed. One of the most common complaints referred to the fact that the technical 
support was no longer local and, therefore, any issues that arose, took much longer to be resolved. 
As reported: 
 
Int19: With the new system, we lost autonomy. We weren’t a part of the decision-making. 
And the organizations are culturally different. The new system doesn’t capture that.  
 
Int7: The guys who developed [the internal system]… they don’t know what they’re doing. 
It’s just a bunch of interns. 
 
Int17v2: The support for [internal system] is off-site. And it can take a very long time for 
them to fix anything. We can request it, but if they don’t understand it, they’ll just ignore 
it. Sometimes they do [update the system]. But everytime they do, you’ll even get excited 
about it. We go “woo hoo, it’s working”. It feels like a celebration. But then you click on 
it and there’s a new issue. And it’s like, celebration is over. And everyone feels that way. 
We often talk about how they fix problems to create new ones. 
 
Surprisingly, it was also claimed that this new system, though created to support 
transparency initiatives undertaken by the federal government, was in fact less transparent than the 
previous one. The argument in this sense was that the new system did not support as many data 
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entries as the previous ones. Thus, as a result, there was less information being formally registered 
and inputted into the system. 
 
Int3: It was more transparent before because in the other system we had to insert details 
of everything, we had to write in lots of details on the purchase order. The new system 
doesn’t allow that. 
 
 The other main system used to support the procurement process is SIAFI. As previously 
discussed, this was created by the Treasury, who then gradually pushed for all agencies across the 
entire federal government to deploy it. Initially, the agency’s internal system was linked to SIAFI, 
meaning that information would be inputted to the agency’s system first, then fed into SIAFI, and 
in turn reflected on the Transparency Portal.  
This all changed in January 2015 when SIAFI was deployed at Agency X. At that point, 
information from the financial department was inputted directly into it, and immediately reflected 
on the Transparency Portal. As such, the link between the internal system and SIAFI ceased to 
exist (see Figure 5.14). In terms of transparency, this formalized the fact that only certain instances 
of information are reflected on the Portal, but not the entire process. 
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Figure 5.14 – Systems Overview: How Information is Processed 
 
 
 
An important aspect to be highlighted regarding the deployment of both systems was how 
it was communicated to the staff at Agency X. Though the new systems reflected the federal 
government’s efforts to increase transparency, this was not at any point discussed with those 
affected by these changes. On the contrary, not only was the new government strategy not 
communicated to those who are actively responsible for generating information which will feed 
into the Transparency Portal, but no formal training was given to employees as to how to manage 
the new system. Instead, employees were informed of the new systems through brief meetings and 
a short workshop but were mostly left to figure it out for themselves.  
 
Int4: We didn’t have any training… You know, they came and set it up and then gave us a 
brief introduction, like three days, but there wasn’t any training. 
 
Int1v2: Until today, we don’t really understand it properly, we didn’t have any training. If 
I don’t understand, then I call some guy (in Portuguese: “fulano”), and then he’ll pass me 
what he knows. And then something else happens, and I call some other “fulano”. And 
167 
 
then somebody who knows a little less than I do comes along, so I’ll help him. And that’s 
how we pass around what we know.  
 
 
 
In the case of the SIAFI deployment, only staff within the financial department were 
involved. According to those interviewed, changes were communicated via a meeting. It was also 
at this point that they received guidelines for how to use it. The staff at this meeting did receive 
the information that SIAFI fed into the Transparency Portal. Those interviewed reported that, at 
the time, they believed that the information they produced would be reflecting on the Transparency 
Portal for the first time. This was not the case. Information produced at this agency had been 
feeding into the portal on a daily basis since at least 2010, albeit not directly (as previously 
discussed).  
Due to the brevity of how it was communicated, however, transparency was yet again not 
treated as a priority and once again the change of systems was perceived as a procedural change. 
Furthermore, since the SIAFI meeting was only open to those in the financial department, the 
remainder of staff never even became aware of the links between it and the transparency portal. 
As a result, a large portion of the staff at Agency X are not aware of the existence of the 
Transparency Portal (25%) and 66% of the staff had never accessed the Portal. 
This level of informality seems to have allowed certain corrupt practices to flourish (in 
addition to other mechanisms in place, as will be discussed in the analysis of the data collected, 
Chapter 6). Some of the corrupt practices in place here are  nepotism, fraudulent bidding processes, 
kickbacks for “middlemen” acting as consultants and intermediating contact between Agency X 
and suppliers, contracting of services provided by civil servants who work at Agency X (a practice 
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prohibited by law so as to avoid a conflict of interest), and skipping stages in the procurement 
process as established by law and formal procedure, leading to negative financial planning and 
overspending (see Figure 5.15).  
 
Figure 5.15  – Incidences of Corruption at Agency X 
 
  
The procurement process, from start to finish, is what constitutes the information system 
which is the unit of analysis of this case study and constitutes the “creation” step in the 
transparency system. Each step in the procurement process is recorded into the IntSys or SIAFI 
(or both) and will result in the information that is displayed in the Transparency Portal as an entry 
for budget execution. The next section will therefore present a brief overview of this process. 
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5.5.2. Procurement Process Overview 
The procurement process is comprised of several stages, rules for which have been 
established based on the Constitution, current legislation enacted by the Brazilian Congress, rules 
set forth by the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, and procedures established by the 
Ministry under which Agency X is inserted (in accordance with active legislation). 
The Brazilian Constitution states in its Article 37, sub-paragraph XXI, that: 
“with the exception of the cases specified in law, public works, services, purchases 
and disposals shall be contracted by public bidding proceedings that ensure equal 
conditions to all bidders, with clauses that establish payment obligations, 
maintaining the effective conditions of the bid, as the law provides, which shall only 
allow the requirements of technical and economic qualifications indispensable to 
guarantee the fulfilling of the obligations”. 
 
The law which regulates the bidding process is Law No. 8.666, enacted in 1993, which 
would be later complemented in 2010 by Law No. 12.232. In its Article 2, Law No. 8.666 
establishes that all purchases, services, rental and leasing agreements, etc. must go through a 
bidding process. In other words, all procurement instances are subject to licitation. This same piece 
of legislation does state, however, exceptions in its Articles 24 and 25 (see Appendix VI for 
specific legislation). Some of the instances which are considered exceptions include the purchase 
of perishables, goods which are only available to be procured by a specific supplier, or in case of 
war or state of emergency. 
As can be observed in Figure 5.16, when purchases fall under these exception categories, 
this information must be formally registered and will reflect on the Transparency Portal. What was 
observed from analyzing various instances of expenses on the Portal, however, is that, unlike the 
example given below, the reason for why a bidding process was bypassed is not always given. 
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Some of the labels used to justify the absence of this procedure were “inapplicable” and 
“ineligible”. These vague labels unfortunately do allow for abuse. As was observed (and will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6), the reasons for not complying with the bidding process 
extend beyond the formal application of the law and enter into realms of illegality. Moreover, the 
formal technical systems can also aid in this process, allowing for erroneous pieces of information 
to be entered into it. 
Other forms of circumventing the integrity of the licitation process, as observed by 
investigations into the “Car-Wash” corruption scandal, involve entering into a kickback agreement 
whereby suppliers enter into an agreement with public officers prior to the bidding process to 
ensure they are awarded that specific contract.  In summary, though mandated by law and subject 
to scrutiny via the Transparency Portal, the bidding process is liable of corruption.  
 
Figure 5.16 – Screenshot of Entry on Transparency Portal Depicting Licitation Exception 
Source: Transparency Portal 
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Every single piece of legislation to which any civil servant, who manages purchases in the 
public federal sphere, is subject to, is currently listed in a government portal entitled “Government 
Purchases21”, managed by the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management. These are available 
for consultation by anyone, citizens and civil servants alike. However, in the case of Agency X, 
these are not listed on their intranet; neither the relevant pieces of legislation nor the link to the 
Ministry of Planning’s portal are present. Moreover, none of those interviewed were aware of their 
existence, contributing to a loose application of the legislation on practices. 
The procurement process, as observed by Agency X, involves two different departments: 
the Purchasing Department and the Financial Department. The purchasing department is broken 
down into five sub-units, four of which, at varying stages, will directly deal with the procurement 
process. In other words, when a purchase is requested, the process it ensues will be touched upon 
by many different people at different stages of the process. 
The entire procurement process, depicted in Figure 5.17, comprises of eight stages: 
purchase request, re-routing to person responsible for relevant product category, licitation, supplier 
selection, supplier communication, reserve of cash, liquidation, and payment. This constitutes the 
basis for the information system under analysis and will therefore be reviewed in greater detail in 
Chapter 6, by means of a DCog theoretical framework. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 www.comprasgovernamentais.gov.br 
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Figure 5.17 – Procurement Process at Agency X 
 
 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
Though this is mostly a descriptive chapter, it demonstrates all the external forces which 
either directly or indirectly impact the unit of analysis in question, i.e. the cognitive system at 
Agency X. Failing to understand this complex structure would undoubtedly result in a lack of 
understanding of the forces shaping and constraining this system. Moreover, it is in line with the 
DCog approach. As Hollan et al. (2000: 178) affirm, “cognition is no longer isolated from culture 
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or separate from it. Where cognitive science traditionally views culture as a body of content on 
which cognitive processes of individual persons operate, in the distributed cognitive perspective, 
culture shapes the cognitive processes of systems that trancend the boundaries of the individuals”. 
As demonstraded in Figure 5.18, many are the forces which constrain and impact this system: legal 
and political landscapes, culture, history, the economy, and organizational structures and 
dynamics. It is the legal and political landscape which determine the rules under which 
transparency will be created; it is the culture which determines how that information is divulged; 
and it is the organizational structures and dynamics that will shape how the information is 
propagated through the system and how it will be presented in its stage of publication. 
This chapter aimed at outlining in some detail several of these forces, demonstrating the 
very complex web of factors exerting a certain degree of influence on the information system that 
produces transparency. The next chapter will analyze this system in greater detail utilizing DCog 
as the theoretical framework. 
 
Figure 5.18 – Contextual Overview 
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CHAPTER 6 
CASE STUDY: ANALYSIS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter described in some detail the context in which the unit of analysis in 
this research – the cognitive system at Agency X – is embedded. Government institutions are 
complex organizations, subject to the external influence of many different mechanisms, as 
reviewed in Chapter 5. Hence why, Agency X, the locus where transparency is produced, could 
not be considered in isolation. Rather, as per Walsham (2009) and Stake (2010), a thorough 
understanding of the contextual environment was required, a requirement supported by Hutchins 
(1995) who idealized the theoretical approach utilized here, distributed cognition (DCog).  
As discussed in Chapter 3, transparency is not an isolated concept, but is in fact a socio-
technical system. Moreover, it can be conceptualized as an information system that is cognitively 
distributed between human and technical agents and divided in three phases: creation, publication, 
and access (refer to Chapter 2 for full discussion). Whilst previous research has heavily 
emphasized the “technical” component of transparency, whilst overlooking the “social” aspect of 
it, in addition to focusing on the publication and access phases of it, this thesis instead opts to focus 
on the “creation” phase. In addition, it contends that both aspects, the technical and the social, 
work in tandem re-inforcing and shaping each other in a cognitively distributed way. In this regard, 
Rogers and Ellis (1994: 122) explain that “cognitive activities [are] embodied and situated within 
the work settings in which they occur. By explicitly adopting this broad focus, the distributed 
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cognition approach provides a theoretical and methodological framework for analyzing complex, 
socially distributed work activities of which a diversity of technological artifacts and other tools 
are an indispensable part”.  
As explained in Chapter 3, in order to apply DCog to the data gathered, a DiCoT 
(distributed cognition for teamwork) methodology was adopted. Developed by Furniss and 
Blandford (2006), DiCoT allows the researcher to analyze data through a DCog lens in a structured 
way. Data is iteratively coded for DCog principles which are used to create diagrammatical and 
narrative representations of the five models proposed by Furniss and Blandford (2006): physical 
layout, artefacts, information flows, social structures, and evolution of systems (see Appendix II 
for full description of the principles associated with each model). As a result of constructing such 
models, the DiCoT framework aids the researcher in identifying how cognitive processes are 
distributed amongst the agents (technical and human) of this system, in addition to determining 
issues, errors, and breakdowns in the information flow and the reasons why.  
In summary, DCog is the theoretical framework, whilst DiCoT is the methodological 
approach. As a result of this line of discussion, two research questions were proposed: 
 
R1: How are cognitive processes distributed between agents (human and artefact) at 
Agency X? 
 
R2: How do breakdowns impact the cognition system at Agency X? 
 
 A second line of inquiry regarded the issue of ongoing practices of wrongdoing and 
unethical decision-making at Agency X. These practices, as already established, have persisted 
even in the face of transparency deployment. As discussed in Chapter 2, the dominant line of 
thinking in the field proposes that transparency should in fact result in lower levels of corruption. 
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That, however, has not been the case in Brazil, and indeed at Agency X. As theorized in Chapter 
3, this may be due to the presence of collective moral disengagement. Proposed by Bandura (1986, 
1999, 2016), and rooted in social cognitive theory, moral disengagement is used to understand why 
people engage in deviant behavior.  
Prior research has indicated a causal relationship between morally disengaged thinking and 
unethical behavior (Detert et al. 2008; Moore et al. 2012). Moreover, as Herath et al. (2017: 1143) 
explain, moral disengagement mechanisms allow for individuals to be “freed from the self-
sanctions and the accompanying guilt that ensues when behavior violates moral standards, and the 
individuals are thus more likely to engage in deviant behavior”. Bandura (1986) establishes that 
there are eight moral disengagement techniques that may be used by individuals: moral 
justification, advantageous comparison, euphemistic labeling, displacement of responsibility, 
diffusion of responsibility, minimizing or distorting harmful effects, dehumanization, and 
attribution of blame.  
Based on the findings presented in Chapter 5, in which moral disengagement was identified 
in individuals who had committed acts of corruption at Petrobrás, it is plausible to assume that this 
dynamic would be present at Agency X as well.  Thus, based on this discussion, a third research 
question was proposed:  
 
R3: How do moral disengagement mechanisms facilitate the breakdown of cognition 
systems? 
 
In order to answer that question, two techniques were employed: first, the Moral 
Disengagement Measure by Moore et al. (2012) was applied to participants interviewed in order 
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to confirm the presence of moral disengagement mechanisms at Agency X. Then, secondly, the 
data gathered was coded for moral disengagement mechanisms, in accordance with Bandura’s 
(2006) Manual for Coding Modes of Moral Disengagement.  
 This Chapter is structured in the following manner: in section 6.2, the procurement process 
is broken down and analytically decomposed (what Hutchins (1995) refers to as an “activity 
score”) in order to gain an understanding of it. Section 6.3 will then present the analysis of data by 
utilizing the DiCoT framework. Section 6.4 presents the analysis of data through the lens of the 
moral disengagement theory and, finally, section 6.5 presents some concluding remarks. 
  
6.2 Distributed Cognition: Decomposition of the Procurement Process 
Prior to delving into the details of the cognitive system under study and the various 
different parts that operate in relation to each other, it is necessary to first of all analytically 
decompose the process. This is what Hutchins referred to as an “activity score” (refer to Chapter 
4 for discussion on it).  
A high-level overview of the sequence of tasks was initially presented in Chapter 4 (see 
Figure 4.1). Here, this broad overview is is described in more detail (refer to Figure 6.1 for a visual 
map of the process and Appendix VII for a full step-by-step). In summary, the procurement process 
can be broken down into eight different stages, and will be touched upon by six different groups 
of people, distributed amongst two departments: the purchasing and the financial departments. As 
can be viewed in Figure 6.1, the process is kick-started when a requester (“Z”) has an identified a 
need and places a request through the internal system (IntSys; Stage 1). This requester will be 
located at either Agency X, or one of the agencies interlinked through the IntSys within Ministry 
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X. Stage II will then consist of team member “A” fielding this request and redirecting it to “B”, a 
team member who will be responsible for that specific product category. 
Team member “B” will then select suppliers whom to contact and request quotes from 
(Stage III). Up to ten suppliers may be contacted, and the process will be moved along to team 
member “C” once at least three quotes have been received (the bidding process – part 1). Stage IV 
then consists of “C” choosing the winning bid (bidding process – part 2) and handing this process 
to the financial department (“D”) so that they may ensure that budget has been allocated and 
reserve that amount for that particular purchase (“Reserve of Cash”, Stage V). Team member “D” 
will then hand the process back to “C” so that they may inform the supplier who has provided the 
winning bid and obtain their acknowledgement (Stage VI). Once that has been received, the 
process will then move along to team member “E” who will ensure that suppliers are delivered 
and will process the invoice (Stage VII) so that the financial department can once again take over 
the process in order to remit payment (Stage VIII). 
 The process will be handled via several artefacts. Though most of it will be recorded on 
the IntSys, some of it will be handled via e-mail and telephone. In addition, a physical file (PF) is 
created for each process containing copies of documents and exchanges. This PF will move along 
across teams as the procurement process progresses. Finally, SIAFI will be used by the financial 
department to record the Reserve of Cash (RoC) and payment instances and relevant information 
pertaining to it. As will be discussed in further detail throughout this Chapter, it is SIAFI that 
communicates with the Transparency Portal. 
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 Having given an overview of the tasks that compose the procurement process and, 
subsequently, the cognitive system that is under analysis, the next step is to analyze this process 
through the lenses of the theoretical framework, distributed cognition (DCog). As discussed, in 
order to do so, the distributed cognition for teamwork (DiCoT) methodological framework 
developed by Furniss and Blandford (2006) will be utilized. This is the focus of the next section 
of this Chapter. 
 
  
6.3 DiCoT (Distributed Cognition for Teamwork) Analysis 
 According to Furniss and Blandford (2006), in order to analyze data utilizing DiCoT, five 
models must be constructed: information flow, artifacts, physical, social, and evolutionary. Berndt 
et al. (2014: 433) affirm that “each model is associated with a set of DCog concepts and principles, 
which serve as a checklist for analyzing the model in terms of DCog theory”. Thus, by following 
this checklist, the researcher is able to identify points of vulnerability and/or error imbued within 
the system. Keeping in mind that the unit of analysis for this thesis is the cognitive system, this 
section of the Chapter is dedicated towards addressing each of the principles and providing rich 
accounts of information.  
 Before continuing with the analysis, a high level input-output model is presented below 
(Figure 6.2). According to Rajkomar and Blandford (2012: 583), such a model “simply 
summarizes the overall function of the system in terms of input, system factors influencing 
processing, and output”. Further insight into how this process takes place, in terms of the agents, 
technical and human, communication, and resources, will be discussed and analyzed under the 
prism of the various DiCoT models in subsequent sections of this Chapter. 
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Figure 6.2 – High Level Input-Output Model 
 
 
 
6.3.1 Physical Layout Model 
 
Furniss and Blandford (2006) affirm that the physical layout model refers to the physical 
organization of the work setting and the physical principles that will influence the performance of 
the system. Blandford and Furniss (2005: 4) add that “the physical model describes those factors 
that influence the performance of the system, and of components of the system, at a physical level. 
This description is important from a distributed cognition perspective as those things that can be 
physically heard, seen and accessed by individuals have a direct impact on their cognitive space 
and hence will shape, empower and limit the calculations that individuals perform”. As such, 
focusing on the physical layout of Agency X aids in obtaining a view of their working space and 
how that will support information production.  
Seven principles were identified by Furniss and Blandford (2006) from the DCog theory 
as relating to the physical model (see Appendix II for more detailed list): space and cognition, 
perceptual, naturalness, subtle bodily supports, situation awareness, horizon of observation, and 
arrangement of equipment. Of these, three – perceptual, naturalness, and subtle bodily supports – 
did not emerge as part of the findings in the data analysis. The other four will be discussed below. 
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6.3.1.1 Space and Cognition 
 As part of the procurement process, teams will handle a large load of paperwork. As will 
be discussed in more detail in the artefact model section, paper-based information takes a central 
role in communicating and triggering stages in the procurement process. Worktop space therefore 
is partly taken up by this extensive amount of paper load, which is distributed in physical file 
folders. The display of these folders within clear vision serves as a reminder of the processes that 
still need to be dealt with and are still pending.  
 
6.3.1.2 Situation Awareness and Horizon of Observation 
This is an open-office environment. There are no divisions. Desks are in close proximity, 
often with no space between them, much like the depiction in Figure 6.3 (a reproduction of the 
architectural layout, not an actual picture of Agency X or exact reproduction, due to anonymity 
which must be maintained). Members of the same team will be placed close to one another. The 
only physical barrier between one team and another is a wider gap between desks. Same team 
members’ desks will be closer to one another. This facilitates communication between team 
members which is not always related to work matters. Thus, the layout of the office space 
contributes to both how work matters are communicated and to the informality of the environment:
  
 
Int9: We often joke around, play with one another.  
INTERVIEWER: Would you say you talk mostly about work-related things or personal 
things? 
Int9: We mostly talk about things that are not work. It breaks the routine. Makes work 
more fun. 
INTERVIEWER: And do people get along well? 
Int9: For the most part, yes. 
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Figure 6.3 – Representation of the Physical Layout at Agency X 
 
 
 
 
This characteristic allows for any discussions that need to be had regarding the procurement 
process to be communicated directly, in a face-to-face manner. No formal register of these 
conversations will therefore be made. This feature contributes to the informal environment of the 
work place. It promotes an “informal” channel of communication, even across teams. Participants 
will stand up and walk over to whom they want to communicate with, as opposed to calling or e-
mailing. This not only transpired in what was reported in interviews, but also by what was 
observed:  
 
Sitting next to [Participant G] and [Participant R] interrupts us and asks about a 
process. Claims that [Requester Z] has called asking about it. Asks for a status. 
[Participant G] responds that he will get back to [Requester Z]. [Participant R] makes a 
joke, apologizes for interrupting us. Walks away. (Notes from February 2016) 
 
 
Just as the depiction in Figure 6.3, there are a few closed offices. These belong to the 
members of upper management (please refer to Figure 5.14 in Chapter 5; every team will have a 
manager). Generally, the door to these offices remains open and is only closed when there is a 
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meeting. However, as observed and reported through interviews, walls to these offices are thin and 
conversations held in there can be overheard outside, therefore adding no layer of privacy. Office 
space is thus mostly to demonstrate the hierarchic distance between those out “on the floor” and 
management. Moreover, the open door policy allows managers to remain aware of all activities 
that are taking place outside (horizon of observation). 
The level of awareness of everything that takes place by all individuals is high due to this 
setup. An example that reflects this is a situation that was observed once when there: a certain 
employee received a call from a requester who was upset at the delay in dealing with his request. 
She felt that he was rude to her over the phone and broke down in tears. As a result, everyone else 
rallied around her to support her, including her manager who witnessed the commotion from his 
office. This incident exemplifies the high level of awareness everyone in that environment has.  
Teams involved in the procurement process are located within the same office space. The 
exception to this is the financial department team which is located on a different floor, away from 
the procurement teams (refer to Figure 6.1 and Appendix VII for an overview of the tasks and 
division of teams). Thus, the financial team is contained in a separate environment and only 
becomes aware of processes when directly communicated. Separation of the financial team means 
they are not directly involved in conversations pertaining to the procurement process. Their 
awareness will either come from what is communicated and stored on systems or the information 
contained on documents that are relayed to them (or both).  They will not however be privy to the 
informal exchanges of communication that take place regarding processes due to this physical 
impediment. Hence, their horizon of observation is low. Moreover, any additional information that 
needs to be relayed regarding processes, such as special requests or the need to circumvent rules, 
will be done at a managerial level. 
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 Important to note that the level of informality in the exchanges cannot only be attributed to 
the physical layout of this work environment. Brazilians are culturally known for being sociable 
and loud in their exchanges, and that feature transpires to all settings, including work 
environments. Thus, this would partly explain the high level of informality at Agency X and cannot 
be disregarded. However, the physical layout certainly encourages the constant exchanges as 
opposed to curbing it, making it a feature that cannot be dismissed.  
 
6.3.1.3 Arrangement of Equipment 
 Apart from the desks, office equipment includes file cabinets and printer/fax hubs. File 
cabinets are all located against walls or in the storage area of the building. They therefore do not 
create barriers between people. Printer/fax hubs on the other hand are located in the center of the 
office floor, within easy access of everyone, adding to the dynamism of the office space, with 
people often moving around. 
 
6.3.2 Artefact Model 
 Furniss and Blandford (2010: 2) state that “the artefact model concerns itself with the 
artefacts, representations, and tools that are used to store, transform and communicate 
information”. In the case of Agency X the main artefacts used which make up the DCog and aid 
in the process of information creation are technical artefacts and paper-based ones (see Table 6.1 
for an overview). Furniss and Blandford (2006) identify four principles that relate to the artefact 
model: mediating artefacts, creating scaffolding, representation-goal parity, and coordination of 
resources. These will be reviewed in this section of the Chapter. 
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Table 6.1 – Summary of Artefacts 
  Artefacts Description 
Technical 
Artefacts 
Internal 
System 
(IntSys) 
IntSys constitutes the main technical system used by those 
involved in the procurement process. It registers several instances 
of information that are pertinent to this process. At each 
completion stage of the procurement process, this is recorded on 
IntSys. This serves two purposes: ensuring the process is moving 
forward and recording who owns the process at each particular 
stage.  
SIAFI 
SIAFI is the main interface between the procurement process and 
the Transparency Portal. It serves the purpose of centralizing all 
budgetary execution information for the entire federal 
government. It is managed solely by the financial department. 
MS Word 
Used to record supporting documentation, such as the 'Reserve of 
Cash' form. 
E-mail 
Used to communicate with suppliers and, occasionally, with "Z" 
(purchase requester). 
Telephone Used to communicate with suppliers and "Z" (purchase requester). 
Printer 
Used to print documentation that needs to be inserted into paper 
files.  
Paper-Based 
Artefacts 
Paper files 
Paper files should reflect the process that is recorded on the 
system. Also serves the purpose of triggering the next stage in the 
procurement process, once it is delivered to the next person in 
line. 
Paper notes 
Used to set reminders or any relevant notes that should be added 
to paper file. 
Invoice 
Invoice is required in order to finalize the procurement process on 
IntSys. It will then be used by the financial department to make 
payment and record information on SIAFI. 
 
 
6.3.2.1 Mediating Artefacts 
 Hutchins (1995: 290) defines mediating artefacts as “structural elements that are brought 
into coordination in the performance of the task”. Furniss and Blandford (2006: 6) add that 
examples of these include “language, writing, counting, maps, signposts, computer programs, 
mental models and diaries”. By that definition, all of the artefacts in Table 6.1 could be considered 
mediating artefacts since they serve the purpose, at different stages of the process and to a greater 
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or lesser degree, of supporting cognitive processes. In this section, the main ones will be described 
in greater detail. 
The main mediating artefact is the internal system (IntSys), used by Agency X to process 
the purchase request. The initial request placed by “Z” (refer to Figure 6.1 and Appendix VII for 
a summary of the activities that make up the procurement process) is inserted on the IntSys, which 
is the trigger for the entire process (which will be discussed in more details when discussing the 
information flow model, in section 6.3). The actual interface of the system cannot be displayed 
here in order to protect the anonymity of Agency X, so suffice to say that it has a very clean and 
simple interface, which was described by interviewees as “pretty” and “attractive” (Int17; Int21). 
It allows for all of the stages in the procurement process to be stored there. It was however referred 
to in several of the interviews as not “user friendly”, and is criticized in many aspects:  
 
INTERVIEWER: What don’t you like about the system? 
Int27: I can’t even fully explain why I don’t like it. It’s hard to describe. It’s just s***. It’s 
not straightforward, not user-friendly. There are so many things that could be improved.  
 
 
Int21: It’s not efficient. It has all these different tabs when really it should just have one, 
with all of the information there. And it’s just not very smart. Like, if you know the exact 
order number, then ok, it’s easy to find what you’re looking for. If not, it can take a very 
long time. Because if you type in a lower case letter instead of a capital, you’ll get an error. 
Or sometimes, you’re trying to find the supplier in the system, but it’s stored a certain way. 
And if you only type in part of that name, then it won’t find it. For example, imagine you’re 
trying to find the name “Coca-Cola”, so you type “Cola”, and it won’t find it. Or you only 
type “Coca-Cola”, but it’s actually been registered as “Coca-Cola of Brazil”. And it can 
take a very long time to find it.  
 
 
Int4: There are manual things that we have to do here and there. And when you add all of 
these up, it’s a lot. We work for the system, not the other way around. The system is a 
register, not a tool. 
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 The themes that therefore emerge regarding the IntSys were: not user-friendly, inefficient, 
convoluted, and difficult. In DCog terminology, the degree of disparity between the goal of the 
user and their cognitive needs is high. This lack of parity between goal and representation will 
later become the source of moral disengagement (as will be discussed in section 6.4 of this 
Chapter) as users’ frustration with the system will be used to justify circumventing rules.  
 The other main technical system, SIAFI, is only used at two stages of the procurement 
process: Reserve of Cash (Procurement Stage V in Figure 6.1) and Payment (Procurement Stage 
VIII). Users in the procurement process do not have access to this system since it is only used by 
financial department personnel. SIAFI has been described as straightforward by those who use it, 
in spite of its appearance which resembles a DOS-system (see Figure 6.4). This DOS-like feel 
extends to the navigation of the system which acts on commands. This way of navigating it was 
described as confusing for those who are starting out: 
 
Int3: Sometimes you go to a screen but then you can’t go back and the only way of doing 
that is by re-starting the entire program. So it can be a little confusing to get it right, and 
you have to try a few times. 
 
SIAFI is the only system which communicates with the Transparency Portal; that is, the 
information stored on SIAFI will reflect on the Transparency Portal. SIAFI therefore cannot be 
considered a mediating artefact between all of the users who partake in the procurement process, 
since it is not accessible to all. It can however be considered the mediating artefact between 
Agency X and civil society, since it is through SIAFI that the procurement processes handled by 
Agency X will be communicated to the outside world, by means of the Transparency Portal (the 
intermediary stage in the information system, which is publication, and will then lead to the final 
stage of public access).  
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Figure 6.4 – SIAFI Interface 
Source: STN 
 
 
 
 Other technical artefacts that are used in this process include e-mail and telephone. These 
are the main forms of communication with those outside Agency X, i.e. suppliers. They are not 
used however as an internal means of communication due to the layout of the office space, as was 
discussed in more detail in the physical layout model section of this Chapter. MS Word will also 
be used at certain stage in the procurement process (see step XX in Figure 6.1 and in Appendix 
VII) to complement it. The document that is then printed will be used as a mediating artefact 
between procurement teams and the financial department. In this regard, paper becomes one of 
main forms of communication in this entire DCog system, and one of the most important mediating 
artefacts. 
As described in Appendix VII, in step IX of the procurement process the agent will put 
together a folder (or physical file – PF), and this will serve the purpose of aiding communication 
and coordinating tasks. It also serves as a behavioral trigger since when the process is ready to 
move to the next stage, this PF will move to the next person and is what will prompt that person 
to act. As explained:  
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Int19: For us, it starts with the technology. The request comes via the IntSys. But the IntSys 
works more like a register. The process actually… we realize the process is “walking” 
when the folder moves. IntSys is more of a register. It doesn’t lead the process. It’s the 
folder that tells us that we have to do something about it. It’s obvious, if someone wants to 
check processes on the IntSys, they can. But we only ever do anything about it when we 
receive the paper. 
 
 The folder (PF) acts like a mediating artefact, in the sense that it is the act of it being 
passed around that informs the next participant of a process and triggers him/her to act. Thus, its 
role in propagating information, aiding in communication, and coordination of tasks is significant. 
To a degree, it reflects the information that is stored in the system, therefore also acting as a back-
up source of information, and what Hutchins (1995) would refer to as the principle of distributed 
memory, that is, an artefact that serves the purpose of redundancy. This particular principle is not 
on the list of principles considered by Furniss and Blandford (2006) when they originally 
established the DiCoT framework. Considering that they built this framework to analyze DCog 
within a medical setting, perhaps it is not one which needed to be highlighted. But here, in this 
organizational setting, based on the analysis of the data obtained as part of the interviewing 
process, this is a theme that emerged and is significant to the cognitive system and the coordination 
of cognitive processes. 
Regarding the PF, it should be noted that it in fact goes beyond what is contained on the 
IntSys. For example, all e-mails exchanged in reference to the procurement process should be 
stored in this folder; the IntSys on the other hand will not have this level of detailed information 
since there is nowhere on the system to attach or store this kind of information. In addition, as 
mentioned, it is what allows the process to move forward. And, as the folder moves along, since it 
has to be physically taken to the next stage, it creates the opportunity for extra communication 
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amongst different individuals in the organization. The PF is therefore the main mediating artefact, 
a surprising fact when considering that transparency is usually thought of as technical-based. As 
described: 
 
Int17: Yeah, it’s the process going from hand to hand which makes it move forward. But I 
can see who has the process if someone asks me. I can see where it’s at and the status [on 
IntSys]. The system helps. It can help a lot.  
 
In addition, to a certain extent, the paper-medium is considered more reliable than IntSys: 
 
Int19: Before moving the process forward, we have to indicate on the system that we have. 
And if I forget to do that, the system won’t know. It should be able to already track the 
progress, everytime I accomplish a step. But no. I have to keep going back in the system to 
do that. 
 
 Indeed, it is the definitive mark that a process is progressing, gaining more importance in 
that regard than the IntSys: 
 
Int21: I have already forgotten to do that. Because we have too many things to do. And it 
happens. We’re human. And then we take the folder to the next person but in the system it 
shows it’s still with me, not with [REDACTED].  But it’s been with him for a long time. 
But nobody saw it. And it’s a small mistake. But then the requester wants to know the status 
and checks the system and starts insisting ‘it’s with [REDACTED], but it’s not with him. 
It already moved. But no one saw. 
 
 One final consideration regarding the artefacts is that they do not communicate between 
each other (see Figure 6.5). Thus, it is the participants who act as the integration medium between 
them. It can be affirmed therefore that it is the human component of this DCog system that takes 
on the role of coordinating resources.  
192 
 
 
Figure 6.5 – Communication Between Artefacts 
 
 
6.3.2.2 Creating Scaffolding 
 Both the IntSys and the PF provide scaffolding to support teams. Both contain within them 
clear information regarding the work progress and the stage of the procurement process which is 
currently being worked on, in addition to who has worked on a particular process, and what stages 
have yet to be completed.  
The PF specifically serves as scaffolding internally to those who are working on the 
process. IntSys, on the other hand, will serve as scaffolding to anyone who is not directly working 
on this process, but has access to the system, such as a manager, or requester “Z”. It is, as described 
in the dialogues provided in the previous section, a “register” of the process (provided that the 
information there has been inputted correctly and no stages of the process have been circumvented 
or skipped). 
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6.3.2.3 Representation Goal-Parity 
 Furniss and Blandford (2006: 6) explain that this principle refers to the way “in which 
external artifacts can aid cognition [in] providing an explicit representation of the relationship 
between the current state and a goal state”. In that regard, the desired state for PFs is to be filed 
away. This is the definitive mark that the procurement process has been completed: 
 
Int21: When it’s done, we file the folder. There’s a box. We put it there. And then when 
the box has filled up, it goes into storage. 
  
 For the financial team, the goal state is to have the invoice filed (step XXXIX in Appendix 
VII), which formally marks the end of the procurement process if no steps have been circumvented 
and no rules have been broken. Furniss and Blandford (2006: 6) explain that “the closer the 
representation can be to the cognitive need or goal of the user the more powerful that representation 
will be”. Hence, when steps are skipped and processes are ended without the proper artefacts to 
support that goal, that representation loses its power. And, as will be reviewed in subsequent 
sections of this Chapter, this is often the case. Thus, it is possible to affirm that parity between 
goal and representation is often low: 
 
Int17: It’s possible to carry out the process completely outside the system. There are 
several like that. In several I mean, there’s a considerable amount of processes like that. 
You know… sometimes there’s not enough time to go through the process. So we just go 
ahead and purchase. And then later, we go back and register everything when the process 
is done. The process will already be finished. 
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6.3.2.4 Coordination of Resources  
 Rajkomar et al. (2015: 190) posit that “coordination of resources implies, for example, 
coordinating the plan with the current state to determine the next goal to be achieved”. In the case 
of the cognitive system under analysis at Agency X, the PF and IntSys represent the key 
coordination resources. Both  capture the planned work and the history of the procurement process, 
thus informing participants what yet needs to be completed. The PF in particular, as already 
discussed, will reflect the greatest source of history of the process since it will contain even more 
information than that which is on the IntSys, such as e-mail records.  It thus forms an integral part 
towards the completion of the process (provided it follows procedures). 
 The IntSys on the other hand is integral to coordinating resources between the procurement 
team and the financial team. The financial team does not have access to the PF and will instead 
rely on the information therein contained on the IntSys when completing the reserve of cash (steps 
XXII and XXIII on Figure 6.1, Appendix VII) and payment stages (steps XXXVII and XXXVIII). 
The paper documents received at each of the stages (RoC form and invoice) are also representative 
of this, playing a meaningful role in coordinating resources. These resources – paper documents 
and IntSys – are also integral towards coordinating the information between the procurement 
process internally at Agency X and the information that is published on the Transparency Portal. 
This is due to the fact that it is the information contained on these artefacts that will form the basis 
for the information inputted on SIAFI, which is then fed into the Portal. 
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6.3.2.5 Additional Principles 
 There are two additional principles not considered by Furniss and Blandford (2006) in their 
artefact model for DiCoT, which should be highlighted here, since they emerged through the 
analysis of the data collected. The first one, alluded to in a previous section, is distributed memory, 
which refers to information that is redundantly collected and stored. In this regard, the PF serves 
as the back-up memory for what is stored in the IntSys. However, distributed memory is not 
confined to artefacts. Individuals can also act as redundant points of records and information. In 
the case of Agency X, where some degree of informality is high, this is certainly the case. Much 
of the information regarding procedures and processes is stored within individuals and 
communicated only between them, meaning no formal record remains. This is a point that will be 
further developed in the social structures model section of this Chapter. 
Another principle that is not considered by Furniss and Blandford (2006) in their 
framework is the principle of modularity22. Hutchins (1995: 167) refers to this principle when 
referring the “precomputational activities” imbued within systems which “remove from local 
computations any aspects that are invariant across the spatial and temporal extent of the 
computation”. In other words, systems come imbued with information and properties which can 
constrain and/or support activities and the distribution of cognitive processes. In the case of 
procurement processes studied at Agency X, technical artefacts, the IntSys and SIAFI, have 
imbued within them a series of processing rules and norms, which constrain and shape the 
                                                          
22 In Information Systems, modularity often refers to modules of a complex system. As Reijers and Mendling 
(2011: 881) explain, “modularity is the design principle of having a complex system composed from smaller 
subsystems that can be managed independently yet function together as a whole”. This is not to be confused 
with Hutchins’ (1995) understanding of modularity. For him, the principle of modularity in fact refers to the 
innate properties of an artefact (pre-established in its design) which can shape cognitive processes. 
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information and data inputted into them. Regarding the IntSys specifically, participants 
complained about these innate properties, claiming their activities were limited by it: 
 
Int21: It’s basic, the information we input in the system. Amount, name. Not necessarily 
what is on the paper. Actually, the amount, the system will only already know. But it’s 
still very basic. The screen is simple. It’s simple. 
 
These innate systems’ properties shape the cognitive system, the data that is produced, and 
how it is recorded. Recall from Chapter 5 that processing rules were pre-determined by external 
factors: legislation, political landscape, and the systems’ designs (the IntSys was designed and 
implemented by Ministry X, and SIAFI by CGU). 
 
6.3.3 Information Flow Model 
Berndt et al. (2014: 433) affirm that the information flow model concerns itself with “how 
information moves and is transformed in the system (and any obstacles to effective information 
flow) – both formally and informally; whether any agent acts as an information hub . . . and how 
interruptions are managed”. In other words, it describes the information flows between the agents 
of a system, the different communication channels utilized by them, and key flow properties. 
Following the model established by Furniss and Blandford (2006), data should be iteratively coded 
for the principles established by them: information movement, information transformation, 
information hubs, buffering, communication bandwidth, informal and formal communication, and 
behavioral trigger factors (see Appendix II for a detailed overview). Furthermore, they determine 
in their framework three distinct viewpoints for the information flow: a high level input-output 
view (depicted in section 6.2.1), an agent-based view, and a third view, based on the agentic 
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perspective, highlighting how information is buffered, filtered, transformed, and communicated in 
the system. Though they fail to consider the interactions between human agents and their technical 
counterparts in their original framework, this will not be the case here. In opting to leave out such 
interactions, Furniss and Blandford (2006) justify their decision due to the little computer-
mediated interaction that took place in their study (applied to an emergency medical dispatch 
environment). This is not the case in the information process analyzed at Agency X. In fact, two 
very key moments in this process involve the communication between technical artefacts only, 
first at the reserve of cash stage (steps XXIII in Appendix VII) in which SIAFI communicates this 
to the Transparency Portal, and then again at the payment stage (step XXXVIII), when once again 
SIAFI feeds information to the Portal. Thus, such interactions also merit attention and will be 
discussed in this section. 
 
6.3.3.1 Agent-Based View 
 According to Rajkomar et al. (2015: 185), the agent-based view “focuses on the principal 
agents within the system and the flows between them”. As such, the main communication channels 
should be identified and discussed. Table 6.2 presents an overview of the different agents involved 
in the procurement process and what their roles are. 
Communication between these different agents will be through different means, either via 
the IntSys, via e-mail or telephone, or face-to-face. How communication flows between agents is 
depicted in Figure 6.6. As can be observed, communication between agents takes place via the 
IntSys in points 1, 2, and 3 only. From that moment onwards, communication then takes place via 
either e-mail/telephone or face-to-face [communication bandwidth principle in DCog 
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terminology]. Though the procurement process will be registered on IntSys throughout each of the 
procurement stages, the actual communication and coordination between the different participants 
takes place via other means and, internally, between teams B, C, D, and E, it will be face-to-face. 
Table 6.2 – Summary of Agents Involved in the Cognitive System 
Agent Role 
"Z" 
Responsible for placing request on IntSys. Will be the agent responsible for 
triggering the entire procurement process.  
"A" 
Responsible for checking requests on IntSys and redirecting it to the person/team 
in charge for that particular product category ("B") through IntSys. 
"B" 
Responsible for identifying suppliers who can meet Z's requirement. Will make 
contact with suppliers and request quotes. "B" will also be the one to start a 
physical file (PF) which will move across agents of the process. 
"C" 
Will select the winning bid either by using IntSys to appoint winner or manually 
doing so. Will also be the one to handle the first point of contact with the 
financial team ("Reserve of Cash"). 
"D" 
Financial Team who will be involved twice in the procurement process: (1) in the 
Reserve of Cash stage, which will allow the purchase to be confirmed; (2) in the 
payment stage, when process has been finalized. Responsible for entering 
information on SIAFI, the system which communicates with the Transparency 
Portal. 
"E" 
Responsible for finalizing the procurement process. Will confirm delivery and 
process invoice, before handing off process to the Financial team for payment. 
Managers 
Every team (Z, A, B, C, D, E) has a member of upper management overseeing 
their activities. They may intervene in the process at any time. 
Suppliers 
Suppliers are initially contacted at Stage III of the procurement process (see Table 
6.1). One supplier will be selected at Stage IV when they will be expected to 
acknowledge the request and supply demand. They will later be in contact with 
"E" during Stage VII when they will be expected to invoice Agency X for their 
services. 
 
 
This reflects, as discussed in previous sections of this Chapter, the fact that the process is 
led by the human components of this system. It also reflects the fact that many of the interactions 
inherent to this process will not be formally registered. Many of the exchanges and coordination 
amongst teams occur in the pockets of informality, an action that is encouraged by the physical 
layout of this organization, as discussed in a previous section of this Chapter.  
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Figure 6.6 – Communication Flows 
 
 
From an agentic perspective therefore, information moves both through the technical 
artefacts, but also in a face-to-face manner. Each communication process and the main channels 
involved in each of these is presented in Table 6.3, accounting both for the communication that 
indeed takes place during the procurement process and possible points of interference. As can be 
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observed, there are stages in time that communication may occur, but not necessarily does, such 
as between team members and their respective managers.  
 
Table 6.3 – Communication Channels 
Process Summary 
Between "Z" and "A" 
Communication between "Z" and "A" takes place exclusively via the 
IntSys. 
Between "A" and "B" 
Communication between "A" and "B" takes place exclusively via the 
IntSys. 
Between "B" and suppliers 
Communication between "B" and suppliers will take place via the 
IntSys/e-mail (when requesting quotes) and then back again via e-
mail (when receiving quotes requested). 
Between "B" and "C" 
Communication will take place face-to-face when "B" delivers the PF 
to "C", prompting him/her to act. 
Between "B" and team 
manager 
If B's manager decides to intervene, then this will take place in a 
face-to-face manner. Will not necessarily happen. 
Between "C" and financial 
department ("D") 
Communication will take place face-to-face when "C" delivers the 
RoC form to them. The response will be via e-mail, when RoC has 
been confirmed and approved. 
Between "C" and team 
manager 
Communication between "C" and his/her manager will take place via 
the IntSys, when manager’s approval is required for request (step XIX 
in Table 6.1). Any other communication that may eventually take 
place between both parties will be done face-to-face. 
Between "C" and suppliers "C" will communicate with supplier who has won bid via e-mail. 
Between "C" and "E" 
Communication will take place face-to-face when "B" delivers the PF 
to "C", prompting him/her to act. 
Between "E" and supplier 
Communication will take place via e-mail and, if further action is 
needed, via telephone. In addition, supplier is required to send a 
copy of the invoice via post. 
Between "E" and financial 
department 
Communication will take place face-to-face when "E" delivers a copy 
of the invoice to the financial department team. 
Between "E" and "Z" 
Communication takes place via e-mail to confirm delivery 
instructions. It can also take place via telephone if further 
instructions are needed. 
Between "E" and team 
manager 
If E's manager decides to intervene, then this will take place in a 
face-to-face manner. Will not necessarily happen. 
Between "D" (financial 
department) and team 
manager 
If D's manager decides to intervene, then this will take place in a 
face-to-face manner. Will not necessarily happen. 
Between SIAFI and 
Transparency Portal 
Data inputted into SIAFI will be fed into the Transparency Portal. This 
will take place at the RoC and Payment stages. 
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 As gathered from the data collected, managers typically only get involved when they deem 
it necessary or believe an intervention is required. This will be discussed in further detail in the 
social structures model (section 6.3.4). The next section of this Chapter, section 6.3.3.2, will 
discuss in further detail how information moves and is transformed throughout the system. 
   
6.3.3.2 Information Movement and Transformation 
How information moves and transforms is of particular interest in a DCog theoretical 
framework. As Hollan et al. (2000: 177) explain, “cognitive processes involve trajectories of 
information (transmission and transformation), so the patterns of these information trajectories . . 
.  reflect some underlying cognitive architecture”. Furniss and Blandford (2006) add that 
information can move and transform in different ways, through different mechanisms. In the case 
of Agency X and its cognitive system, information moves through both artefacts and between 
participants (steps XXIII and XXXVIII, when information moves from SIAFI to the Transparency 
Portal).  
Figure 6.7 (details of the activities in each of the steps can be found in Appendix VII), 
illustrates the way information flows through the entire system. As can be observed, only in a few 
instances does information move or is transformed exclusively due to the action of technical 
artefacts. In fact, quite the opposite, what allows the information to keep moving and transforming 
through the system is the action of human agents, who act as triggers.  
The key mechanisms used to move information around the cognitive system are the 
technical systems (the IntSys and SIAFI), in addition to e-mail/telephone, and face-to-face. As 
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information moves through the system, it is also constantly transformed, as each step means more 
information that is being aggregated and added, until it reaches its conclusion. 
   
Figure 6.7 – Overview of Information Flow 
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Another important takeaway from Figure 6.7 is the fact that it clearly illustrates that only 
two instances of the process are in fact registered on the Transparency Portal. Important to 
remember that this is a study about transparency and how it has failed to curb corruption. The 
Transparency Portal has been hailed as a mechanism towards achieving that. Moreover, as 
discussed in the previous Chapter, the Brazilian Transparency Portal has been highly commended 
as one of the best examples of transparency amongst the initiatives by various different countries 
often topping rankings in this regard. Yet, it is possible to observe that the process of procurement 
and budget execution is a long one, comprising 39 different steps (grouped into eight different 
stages), which touches upon several different groups of people. However, only two of these steps 
are recorded on the Portal, by people who are physically removed from most of the process, as 
discussed in the physical layout model section of this Chapter (section 6.3.1). 
 
6.3.3.3 Information Hubs, Buffers, and Behavioral Trigger Factors 
 Figure 6.8 indicates four information hubs, defined as “points where information channels 
meet and different information sources are processed together” (Rajkomar et al. 2015: 187). In the 
case of the procurement process at Agency X, two of these hubs refer to points where decisions 
are made: selection of suppliers to select quotes from (B), and selection of winning bid (C), both 
key moments in the procurement process, since this is where the decision of how much to spend 
is made. These also happen to be the moments most susceptible to external influences and unethical 
decision-making, especially since the selection of suppliers to contact does not follow established 
criteria or set of norms/rules to follow. As explained: 
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Int18: The IntSys suggests a few suppliers based on purchase history or something in the 
system. That particular item is linked to certain suppliers. So we can contact them. But 
obviously we can check for other suppliers too. And each buyer researches the way they 
want to. It could be on the internet […] Then it’s based on each person’s criteria and what 
she23’s feeling, her perception. 
 
INTERVIEWER: So there’s no specific rule? For selecting a supplier? 
 
Int18: No. The rule is the IntSys makes a few suggestions. The rest is up to each person, 
her way of working, what she finds on the Internet. We have to ask quotes to up to 10 
suppliers. We then send it to the next stage when we have received at least 3 quotes back. 
So really, in fact, it’s up to each one’s criteria. So that person will do their research, their 
way. Obviously, if somebody asks you to do it a specific way, or via a certain supplier, you 
do it. You follow orders.  
 
 
Figure 6.8 – Overview of Information Hubs and Behavioral Triggers 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Int18 says “she” in reference to the female pronoun in Portuguese “pessoa” (person). This is therefore due 
to translation from Portuguese to English, not an admission that the person in question is a woman since 
Int18 was not in fact singling out a specific person, but rather speaking in general terms. 
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 All of the points in Figure 6.8, with the exception of Z, can be considered a potential buffer, 
since these are points which are subject to receiving new information which may or may not aid 
in the procurement process, and may in fact result in different decisions being made, or certain 
processes being held up in lieu of others. This will depend on level of urgency or shifting priorities, 
and may be due to how the individual prefers to work or what his/her manager wants him/her to 
do.  
Int18: It’s too many things. Too many processes. So I’ll just take care of what I have to, 
and then when I can I’ll go into the system to check what’s pending. And then I’ll check 
what’s needed. Either contact the supplier again, or forward it to the next stage. But it’s 
hard. And sometimes you’ll get someone who then calls your manager and says it’s your 
number one priority. So you drop everything else and only focus on that.  
 
As can be inferred from the quote above, the system itself, IntSys, acts as a buffer since it 
will not automatically notify the individuals (or trigger reminders) of pending processes, thus 
holding the information until the participant is ready to act on it (though the participant will already 
have an awareness of the process due to having received the PF).  
 As illustrated in Figure 6.8, behavioral triggers are also found in every single one of the 
points highlighted, starting with Z who will be triggered to act and place a request through IntSys 
when a need is identified. Team member A will then be triggered to act and redirect a request once 
it is received through the IntSys. Team member B will be triggered to act both when it receives 
the request through the IntSys and when quotes are received via e-mail from suppliers. Team 
member C, on the other hand, will be triggered to act when the PF is handed to him/her by B and 
when he/she receives the RoC from D. Team member D, will be triggered to act when he/she 
receives RoC documents from C, and invoices from E. For their part, team member E, will act 
when receiving the PF from C, and the invoice from the supplier. Thus, triggers are spread out 
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through the entire system. However, what triggers the behavior will vary: it may be an identified 
need, a request through the IntSys, an e-mail, a document, or the individual who delivers the PF. 
Different artefacts or individuals will trigger responses. 
 
6.3.3.4 Communication Bandwidth and Informal/Formal Communication 
Communication bandwidth, which refers to face-to-face communications (Furniss and 
Blandford 2006) is an extremely important aspect to highlight since it constitutes the main form 
of communication between those internally involved in the procurement process within Agency X 
(please refer to Figure 6.6). This is due to how the process is moved along within Agency X (the 
PF acts as the behavioral trigger as reviewed in previous sections), and the physical layout of the 
work space at Agency X. This set up also allows for a high level of informal communication, with 
participants being able to overhear each other’s conversations and often engaging in an informal 
way with one another, in discussions that have little to do with the work processes in question. 
Informal communication serves a myriad of different purposes: to transmit procedures, status, 
issues. It can both have a positive role by facilitating processes, but also a perverse effect, by 
allowing procedures to be corrupted. The high prevalence of informality at Agency X is one of the 
factors that support unethical decision making and collective moral disengagement, as will be 
reviewed in subsequent sections of this Chapter. 
 
6.3.4 Social Structure Model 
 Although Furniss and Blandford (2006) state the importance of the social structure model 
in their DiCoT framework, this is one of the least developed models (Sharp et al. 2006) and in 
many studies, skipped over altogether (Berndt et al. 2014; Furniss et al. 2015). The social structure 
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model is defined as a “model focuses on the social relationships, responsibilities, knowledge, and 
goal sharing between the individuals, and how this influences the computation of the system” 
(Berndt et al. 2014: 433). In their framework, Furniss and Blandford (2006) cite two principles: 
social structure and goal structure, and socially distributed properties of cognition.  
 In regard to the cognitive system at Agency X under analysis, it seems appropriate to 
further expand this model due to the emergence of themes that arose as a result of the data gathered 
and coded. In Hutchins’ (1995) seminal book, Cognition in the Wild, in which he elaborated the 
DCog theoretical framework, several social structure-related principles are cited. The “social 
structure and goal structure” principle in fact serves as an umbrella for several others, amongst 
which, goal tree and parity, hierarchy and high-level coordination, division of labor. On the other 
hand, “socially distributed properties of cognition’ serves as an umbrella for a series of principles: 
distribution of knowledge, sequential control of action, and mediating structure. All of these 
principles emerged upon analysis of the data. Since the “social” component at Agency X and how 
it drives the information flow through the system is significant, each of these principles will be 
reviewed individually. 
 
6.3.4.1 Goal Tree and Parity   
Hutchins (1995: 202) establishes that the principle of goal tree refers to when “we give 
each member of the team responsibility for a main goal and for the sub-goals required to achieve 
the mail goal” and uses the term “parity” to refer to goals that are clear. In the case of the cognitive 
system under analysis, it became apparent that goals are well established and that individual 
participants are clear on what their roles are in achieving that. As discussed throughout this 
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Chapter, individual roles and attributions are well defined. The goal of the system, from the 
perspective of the agents involved, is to meet the supply needs of “Z”. In order to achieve this goal, 
each team has a well-defined goal, and will move the process along once their individual goal has 
been met. For example, “B” will only move the process along to “C” once he/she has compiled a 
list of three quotes from three different suppliers. “C” on the other hand, will only hand off the 
process to “D” once a winning bid has been selected and he/she has received approval from his/her 
manager to move forward with Z’s request (please refer to Figure 6.1 and Appendix VII for a full 
description of tasks).  In other words, every single member of this system has a clear view of what 
needs to be done in order to complete this process. The interaction with artefacts and how these 
will aid in completing tasks is also well defined. 
Sometimes, however, goals can diverge from what the objective of the process is. And 
when this occurred, information breakdown and opportunities for wrongdoing arose.  
 
6.3.4.2 Hierarchy and High Level Coordination 
Hutchins (1995: 256) affirms that “a common solution to the problem of reaching a 
decision is to grant a particular individual the authority to declare the nature of reality”. He further 
adds that “The authority thus becomes a special kind of cognitive apparatus; one that tracks the 
center of gravity of the entire community in conceptual space at each point in time” (Hutchins 
1995: 257). In the case of Agency X, displacement of responsibility in lieu of a higher authority is 
a theme that recurrently emerged in the interviews conducted. Quite often individuals interviewed 
reported delegating their power of decision to their managers, and making it clear that they were 
following orders: 
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Int21: Obviously, if somebody asks you do it a specific way, or via a certain supplier, you 
do it. You follow orders.  
 
Int13v2: It doesn’t matter. You have to do what they tell you to do. And if they’re telling 
you to do something before the other [processes] then you do. Sometimes, they’re 
colleagues, and it’s a special favor. And it’s not nice. There are other people also expecting 
their orders and other priorities too. But you do it. 
 
Int3: He [the manager] is very nice, as long as everything goes through him. He is very 
controlling. He dictates what has to be done. And you do it.  
 
Hutchins (1995: 201) affirms that when goals and decision-making are delegated to those 
in a position of authority “the cognitive load is not only distributed; it is also lessened by the 
distribution”. This certainly seemed to be the case at Agency X, as the data gathered and analyzed 
revealed. Moreover, when it came to unethical decision-making, this power structure was often 
used as a source of moral disengagement, as will be discussed further in section 6.4, corroborating 
Hutchins’s assertion that the cognitive load is lessened. 
 
6.3.4.3 Division of Labor  
Hutchins (1995: 176) establishes that “all divisions of labor, whether the labor is physical 
or cognitive in nature, require distributed cognition in order to coordinate activities of the 
participants”. This distributed cognition involves, according to him, cognition of the task, and 
cognition of coordination between members.  
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As discussed in previous sections, participants had well established goals, which they were 
very much aware of. This was facilitated by the cognition of coordination, in addition to cognition 
of their own task. In other words, participants were aware of what their role was, but also what the 
roles of others were, which supported the distribution of cognition. Artefacts also played a role in 
that. The IntSys for example, kept a register of who had accomplished what in terms of advancing 
processes. In addition, the PF, acting as a redundant source of information, also served that 
purpose. 
However, this was subject to breakdowns. As Hutchins (1995: 219) explained in regards 
to his own study of navigation teams: “One important aspect of the social distribution of this task 
is that the knowledge required to carry out the coordinating actions is not discreetly contained 
inside the various individuals”. If an individual failed to register information on the IntSys or in 
the PF, this division of labor and distribution of knowledge could become compromised. And this 
in fact did happen.  
 
Int11v2: Before moving the process forward, we have to indicate on the system that we 
have. And if I forget to do that, the system won’t know. It should be able to already track 
the progress, everytime I accomplish a step. But no. I have to keep going back in the system 
to do that.  
 
Moreover, as the data gathered suggests, this could be either intentional or unintentional. 
Individuals could withhold information from the artefacts due to being instructed to circumvent 
procedures, or unintentionally forget to include information on the PF or signal change of status 
on the IntSys. 
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6.3.4.4 Distribution of Knowledge  
 Distribution of knowledge refers to how knowledge is shared amongst individuals 
regarding the nature of tasks (Hutchins 1995). Knowledge regarding attributions and tasks can be 
shared either by observation, explanation or by sharing of documents (e.g. manuals). In the case 
of Agency X, knowledge sharing regarding tasks, job roles, and systems occurred mostly 
informally. In other words, one team member passing along their knowledge to the next in an 
informal way. Manuals are made available on the intranet at Agency X meaning that there is some 
redundancy regarding the knowledge load. However, the main source of information is the 
individual: 
 
Int21: No, there was no training. They came, they sat with us and they told us what to do. 
And then they left. 
 
Int23: I learned everything from [CO-WORKER]. I don’t think we had any training, not 
that I remember. It was [CO-WORKER] who mostly taught me what I know. 
 
  
As a result, rules and norms tend to be lax. For the most part, the knowledge that is imparted 
by an individual is worth more than the knowledge that is formally registered in a manual.  
  
Int28: I remember than when I started I downloaded all the guidelines from the intranet. 
And I saw that there were things there that we weren’t doing. So I told my manager. And 
he said, “you’re right, we should do those things”. But we never did. I tried a few times. 
But my co-worker told me “no, it’s not how things are done”. And I noticed that my 
manager didn’t really mean for the guidelines to be followed.  
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6.3.4.5 Sequential Control of Action 
Hutchins (1995: 198) posits that “A procedure is sequentially constrained if the execution 
of any enabled operation will disable any other enabled but as yet un-executed operation”. He goes 
to state however that it is possible to change this feature by manipulating “the enablement 
conditions of various operations” (Hutchins 1995: 199).  
Regarding the procurement process at Agency X, in order to move to the next stage in the 
procurement process it is necessary to have completed the previous stage first. For example, in the 
sequence of events, in order for team member “B” to hand off the process to “C”, he/she will have 
had to gather a minimum of three quotes from three different suppliers. “C” would then technically 
only be able to request that the financial department reserve the cash for this purchase after 
verifying quotes and selecting a winning bid based on the best offer conditions (i.e. lowest price). 
As this process moves forward, team members are required to register this information both in the 
IntSys and in the PF. However, as Hutchins wisely observes, it is possible to manipulate the 
sequence if certain mechanisms are enabled (or disabled, in this instance). As quoted in section 
6.3.2.3, it is possible for steps in the process to be circumvented and skipped altogether, something 
that is not uncommon. Though formally, the sequential order of tasks would need to be observed 
(according to norms and legislation), these can be sidestepped in the name of speediness or buyer 
preference: 
Int19v2: “It does happen that we pay in advance. Without the invoice. There are some 
companies that demand it. Not many, but there are a few. And then we do. We print the 
cover sheet off the IntSys and we take it to the finance department. And then later we’ll go 
back and register everything when everything does get delivered. Then it’s like… my 
manager will call up the finance manager. And they’ll sort it out between them. I’ll just fill 
out the details and take the paper to them. 
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Int13v2: […] this happens a lot, when it’s the end of the year especially, the number of 
requests increase exponentially. Everyone is rushing to spend the budget. So we had this 
huge pile of requests. And my manager gave the go ahead to proceed without the proper 
documentation. But the document should have arrived later. But nobody remembered. So 
we closed these processes. And then the auditor came. And none of them had it. But they 
worked things out. They figured it out. Yeah… it’s not right, I know. 
 
Note that though steps in the procurement process were not observed, this was later 
registered as if it had been. 
 
 
6.3.4.6 Mediating Structure 
 According to Hutchins (1995: 316), “The thinker in this world is a very special medium 
that can provide coordination among many structured media – some internal, some external, some 
embodied in artifacts, some in ideas, and some in social relationships. . . From this perspective, 
what we learn and what we know, and what our culture knows for us in the form of artifact and 
social organizations, are these hunks of mediating structure”. Thus, this principle refers to how 
communication and social interaction takes place, which can be either through artefacts or 
language. As reviewed in the artefacts model section, communication between human agents can 
take place through artefacts. But, as later discussed in the information flow model section of this 
Chapter, most of the communication that takes place between members of this organization is 
verbal, often informal.  
Thus, spoken language becomes a more important mediating structure than written form. 
In terms of formally registering processes, this means that much of what is communicated is not 
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formally registered. This characteristic of the system will obviously play a role in supporting 
wrongdoing and unethical decision-making. 
 
6.3.5 Evolutionary Model 
The final model in Furniss and Blandford’s (2006) DiCoT framework is the evolutionary 
model. Berndt et al. (2014: 433) explain that “the evolutionary model shows how the system has 
changed over time”. The objective is to demonstrate why tasks are arranged the way they are. Two 
principles are included here by Furniss and Blandford (2006): cultural heritage and expert 
coupling.  
Regarding the development of technical artefacts – the IntSys and SIAFI – and how they 
came to be deployed at Agency X and structured the way they are, recall that in Chapter 5, this 
topic was discussed at length. In summary, systems evolved and changed in accordance with 
legislative changes which required that agencies within Ministry X be integrated and information 
be made available on the Transparency Portal on a real-time basis. Regarding the social structures 
and cultural heritage, allusions to “it’s always been like this” and “it’s the way things are done” 
were referenced quite often by those interviewed. The data gathered indicates that certain cultural 
elements, i.e. hierarchy, informality, distribution of knowledge etc, are long-held traditions and 
values, indicating that they are resistant to change. 
The principle of expert coupling refers to the level of interaction a participant has with the 
system and thus, how tightly coupled he/she will become with it. As demonstrated throughout the 
other models, the level of interaction is high. New participants will quickly be brought up to speed 
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and introduced into the system so as to absorb and replicate the way things have traditionally been 
done. Once again, this reflects how resistant to change the entire system is. This mindset of the 
system is reflected in the way transparency was deployed at Agency X. Though the objective of 
these systems was formally to create a more accountable and transparent system, old practices 
have persisted. The goal of this system is to meet procurement needs and execute budget and that 
remained unchanged. 
In summary, this section of the present Chapter analyzed data through a distributed 
cognitive lens (Hutchins 1995), by utilizing the DiCoT methodological framework delineated by 
Furniss and Blandford (2006). It did so by coding data for principles outlined in their model (see 
Appendix II). Themes that emerged from the data could not only be constricted to those principles. 
Referring back to the DCog theory by Hutchins, evidence for additional principles were found and 
outlined in this section, such as the extension of the Artefact and Social structure models. 
The next section will review data in accordance with the moral disengagement theory by 
Bandura (1986). 
 
6.4 Moral Disengagement at Agency X 
 The second line of inquiry of this thesis refers to the ongoing events of wrongdoing and 
corruption that take place at Agency X. As discussed at length previously, these practices have 
continued to take place in spite of the deployment of systems that were meant to curb them.  
This section of this Chapter will thus review in more detail the practices of wrongdoing 
that continue to occur at Agency X. Data will then be analyzed through the lens of Bandura’s 
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(1986) moral disengagement theory (MD) in order to determine its influence on the cognitive 
system, more specifically, the breakdowns of cognitive processes. The objective of this section is 
therefore two-fold: (1) determine whether moral disengagement mechanisms are indeed present 
through the application of Moore et al.’s (2012) Moral Disengagement Measure, and (2) determine 
in what way MD is present by utilizing Bandura’s (2006) Manual for Coding Modes of Moral 
Disengagement as a guide for coding procedure.  
 
6.4.1 Wrongdoing and Unethical Decision-Making 
As previously introduced in Chapter 5, several instances of ongoing corruption were 
identified at Agency X. It must be recalled that, for the purposes of this research, the definition 
adopted for corruption is the one introduced by Palmer (2008: 108): 
“Organizational wrongdoing consists of behavior perpetrated by organizational officials 
(i.e. directors, managers, and/or employees) in the course of fulfilling their organizational 
roles that is judged by social control agents (i.e. prosecutors, regulatory agency officials, 
judges, journalists etc.) to be illegal, unethical, or socially irresponsible. Collective 
organizational wrongdoing involves the sustained coordination of multiple organizational 
participants”. 
 
Corrupt practices at Agency X were identified at the “investigative” stage of this research 
(as reported in Chapter 4). Then, through the course of the interviews conducted, this information 
was checked and re-checked several times, with more details of the illegal practices emerging. 
This process of uncovering common practices adopted at this Agency was an interesting one, since 
it often required questioning participants in different ways during the course of the interview. For 
example, when initially asked if corruption occurred there, nearly everyone was emphatic in 
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denying that such practices took place (90% of responses). However, throughout the course of the 
interview, either the interviewee would voluntarily offer information regarding actions that they 
deemed “wrong” or “illicit”, or the interviewer would probe certain topics of conversation further 
making use of alternative labels (e.g. wrong, incorrect, non-conforming, deviating from procedures 
etc.). This then resulted in the description of practices that could be classified as corrupt, since 
they, as defined above, deviated from laws, norms, procedures or could be classified as unethical. 
For example, towards the beginning of one of the interviews conducted, when discussing the 
deployment of systems, this individual affirmed: 
Int5: They told us at the Financial Department when they were implementing it 
[Transparency]. Not because we would do anything wrong, because we don’t. We do things 
extremely correctly, but just so we would take extra extra care. But we already did before. 
 
Later in the conversation, when we had begun to talk about procedures, Int5 volunteered 
the following information: 
Int5: We closed a contract, but it’s an unusual contract and not foreseen by the system. So 
now we have to put an attachment to the contract to conform it to the system. So we have 
to somehow make it work. It’s crazy. But it’s already signed, […]. We’ve had this contract 
since 2008 and it’s valid until 201824. Now they signed a new contract with the same 
company. It’s all for the same thing. The same product. The material is the same. It makes 
no sense. So we have these two contracts and they’re both valid. It’s a mess. We have to 
spend a minimum amount every year with the supplier based on this contract. And we have 
to spend a minimum amount based on the new contract. But it’s for the same thing. And 
the new amount fixes prices at a higher price. So we’re going to start ordering based on 
the new contract and spending more. But the old contract is valid too, so we’re paying for 
that too. I don’t know who’s making money off of this. But somebody certainly is. And I 
asked my manager. But he just told me to do it. So I did, who am I to question it? 
 
                                                          
24 Interview was conducted in 2015. 
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This pattern of denying any misconduct at Agency X, only to later reveal acts that they 
deemed wrong (under different labels, never referring to it as corruption), repeated itself through 
several of the interviews held, which in itself is a reflection of moral disengagement as will be 
discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this Chapter.  
The types of wrongdoing identified can be categorized as follows: nepotism, kickbacks and 
bribery, bidding process irregularities, and civil servants providing services to the Agency. In 
addition, a fifth type of wrongdoing was identified which involved skipping steps in the bidding 
process, which resulted in massive overspending and financial losses to the government (see Table 
6.4). Though this might not be regarded as a serious form of corruption, it did consist nevertheless 
in corrupting a formal process, which is considered a serious ethical violation and is subject to 
disciplinary action. All of these will be described in more detail below. 
 
Table 6.4 – Summary of Incidences of Corruption at Agency X 
Type Summary 
Nepotism 
Hiring of family members by circumventing 
recruitment processes. 
Fraudulent bidding 
processes 
Most common form of corruption at Agency 
X. Circumvention of bidding processes to 
favor certain suppliers in lieu of others. 
Kickbacks 
Percentage of contracts paid to "middlemen" 
or consultants who formerly worked for the 
government. 
Civil Servants who supply 
their own services 
Civil servants who illegally supply their own 
services to Agency X. 
Non-observance of 
procurement procedures 
Ignoring procedures and skipping stages 
resulting in financial loss and over-
expenditures. 
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6.4.1.1 Nepotism 
Civil servants must go through a formal and extensive process in order to be hired within 
the federal government. This typically involves going through an exam whereby only those that 
achieve best results are hired. However, there are ways in which this process can be eschewed and 
this is a practice that has very often been raised by civil servants as a recurring corruption process, 
both by those interviewed in the investigative phase of this research and in surveys conducted by 
Vox Populi (Nóbrega 2016). 
Distorting the hiring process is achieved by use of influence on those responsible for 
managing the testing phase. A common phrase heard in the investigative phase was “that position 
was already earmarked”, meaning that the hiring process was not a fair one since the candidate 
that would win the position, at the end of the process, had already been determined from the start.  
In the case of Agency X, the employees who were interviewed noted that this does in fact occur 
there as well. However, they reported that a more common practice of nepotism occurs through 
transfers. Either a spouse or a parent would transfer their relatives from other governmental 
agencies to positions that were beyond their original paygrade – and, as a result, those transferred 
did not necessarily present the expertise or skillset required for that specific position – or, as 
reported, there was a specific instance whereby a position was created for the sole purpose of 
accommodating the relative of a director at the agency. This new position was not required by the 
organization and consisted mostly of organizing events, something the agency rarely is involved 
with.  
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6.4.1.2 Fraudulent Bidding Process 
 Within the wider sphere of the federal government, frauds concerning the bidding process 
are regarded as the most common source of corruption by civil servants (Nóbrega 2016). The fact 
that it occurs within this specific agency is consistent therefore with the general trend. Frauds in 
this process can occur in several ways and, in the case of this specific agency, they were observed 
in the form of favoring certain suppliers over others, in exchange for favors or benefits (these are 
referred to as “um pequeno agrado”, loosely translated as a “small gift” or “small token of 
appreciation”). 
 Circumventing the bidding process can be achieved in several ways: first of all, the 
legislation itself pertaining bidding processes allows for exceptions. As can be observed in 
Appendix VII, the labels used to describe the non-observance of the bidding process are vague and 
non-specific – “inapplicable” and “ineligible”. What this means is that no bidding will take place 
and the legislative exceptions are used to justify not doing so. 
Secondly, the process of choosing the suppliers whom to contact for quotes is non-specific 
and subjective. There is in fact no specific rule regarding this, and the process allows for buyers to 
apply their own personal criteria. As reported in section 6.3.3.3 of this Chapter: 
 
INTERVIEWER: So there’s no specific rule? For selecting a supplier? 
Int18: No. The rule is the IntSys makes a few suggestions. The rest is up to each person, 
her way of working, what she finds on the Internet. We have to ask quotes to up to 10 
suppliers. We then send it to the next stage when we have received at least 3 quotes back. 
So really, in fact, it’s up to each one’s criteria. So that person will do their research, their 
way. Obviously, if somebody asks you to do it a specific way, or via a certain supplier, you 
do it. You follow orders.  
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What this means is that either the buyer can circumvent this process for their own personal 
gain, or an order from higher up can be made and the buyer will comply (especially since as 
discussed previously, hierarchy and power structures are a strong characteristic of this work 
environment). In terms of registering this procedure however, this will be done as normal, giving 
it the official “make over” that everything followed according to procedure. 
Thirdly, there were reported incidents of invoices that were processed not corresponding 
to the actual purchase. As explained: 
 
Int15v2: I received the invoice and it demonstrated that there we were paying for more 
than what was ordered [quantity ordered was superior to what was in fact delivered]. So 
my manager took it from me and then a few days later gave me a new invoice. And that 
information, about the details of the quantity, that wasn’t there anymore [quantity had been 
omitted but amount to be paid remained the same]. They had changed it. He told them to 
change it and they did. And then he just gave it to me to process it as I normally would. 
 
  Fourthly, as the example illustrated at the beginning of this Chapter demonstrated, more 
than one contract may be signed with the same supplier. Though formally it will look different 
(recall that an attachment had to be added because it did not conform to what was foreseen by the 
system), in reality, as the interviewee reported, it was for the exact same product category. 
 
6.4.1.3 Kickbacks for “Middlemen” 
 A practice that is commonly observed refers to former civil servants who leave the 
government in order to set up their consulting practices. Such was the case with former Chief of 
Staff, José Dirceu, during President Lula’s tenure (2003 – 2010) who has been arrested twice due 
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to his connection with two of the largest corruption scandals to have engulfed Brazil, Mensalão 
and Operation Car-Wash (detailed in the previous Chapter). After being forced to resign, José 
Dirceu set up a consulting practice that aided private corporations in winning governmental 
contracts. In reality, this was a huge corruption scheme, which translated into a R$ 10.2 million25  
financial gain for him. 
 Though the kickback scheme exerted at Agency X does not amount to the same magnitude 
as the one practiced by José Dirceu, the procedure is exactly the same. Former government 
employees will use their influence to win contracts for private corporations and a percentage of 
these contracts will be funneled to these “middlemen” in exchange for their services. These 
instances of corruption were only observed in the case of larger and long-term contracts. 
 It is important to note that these former civil servants were not lower-level employees when 
they left the government. On the contrary, they typically occupied the highest levels in the 
hierarchy. As a result, when questioned why they would go along with such a scheme, the civil 
servants involved reported that they felt obligated due to the weight of hierarchy. Though these 
middlemen were no longer their direct boss, the employees noted that they felt they could still 
jeopardize their careers, in case they decided to report these occurrences, so they acted under the 
pressure of the power imbalance between them. 
 
6.4.1.4 Civil Servants Who Both Offer and Contract their Own Services 
 The Brazilian legislation prohibits civil servants from supplying services to the agencies 
where they work at due to a conflict of interest. There are ways of circumventing this law however 
                                                          
25 Approximately US$ 3.15 million. 
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which involves naming someone else – such as a relative – the owner of their company, making it 
seem, at least from a legal standpoint, as if there were no conflict.  
 In practice, those involved know precisely who the true owners of those companies are and 
these bidding processes are won precisely because of the personal relationship they have within 
the agency. Such is the case at Agency X, where one of the civil servants, in addition to his work 
in the public sector, also owns a catering company and is hired by the upper management for every 
single event they organize, such as end of year parties. Important to note that the services provided 
by this individual not only are typically more expensive than those provided by other suppliers 
but, according to those interviewed, the service provided is of lower quality. Furthermore, civil 
servants remarked that, on the day of the events, this individual does not make his way to the 
office, but instead goes to the event location to prepare it. This day-off however is still 
compensated for his work at the office, generating a certain level of discomfort in view of the fact 
that he is remunerated twice. 
 This apparent preferential treatment was achieved, according to those interviewed, by 
creating close ties to upper management and apparently being more willing than most to engage 
in illicit activities. Not only has this preferential treatment translated into these revenue 
opportunities, but also those interviewed reported that he is consistently favored over others for 
promotions and raises.  
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6.4.1.5 Skipping Stages in the Procurement Process 
 As previously discussed, the procurement process that must be followed when making 
purchases consists of eight stages. There have been instances when one of these steps, critical to 
budgetary control, had been consistently overlooked: the reserve of cash (“empenho”) stage.  
 The main reason given by those interviewed for skipping this step altogether was the 
bureaucracy involved in observing every single stage of purchase. Thus, to speed things up, they 
claimed, shortcuts had to be taken. The result of this action was that it negatively impacted the 
financial planning of this office and often resulted in overspending. The solution for this typically 
involved requesting the Ministry for more cash, thus generating deficits for the federal 
government. In addition, it resulted in many unnecessary purchases that were made simply because 
the cash could be easily obtained by the Ministry. The justification in doing so presented by those 
interviewed was that more money spent demonstrated the need for a bigger cut of the budget and 
would aid in budgetary negotiations for the following fiscal year. This adverse practice was 
therefore portrayed as positive and necessary. 
 Surprisingly, this practice ceased to occur shortly after I first interviewed the employees at 
Agency X in 2015. When I was back in 2016 and questioned them about this, I was informed that 
it was no longer ongoing due to budget cuts by the federal government. Following the re-election 
of then President Dilma Rouseff in 2014 (impeached in August of 2016), a huge deficit in 
government accounts was uncovered and, as a result, the entire federal budget, which was already 
26.5% less than the 2014 budget, suffered further cuts – R$ 69.9 billion26 - the following year 
(2015). As a result, expenses became more tightly controlled and an express order was given from 
                                                          
26 Approximately US$ 21.6 billion. It is important to note that President Rousseff’s mismanagement of the 
federal budget formed the basis for the impeachment process conducted against her. 
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the Ministry that every single purchase would need to be approved beforehand, forcing Agency X 
to start strictly observing the “reserve of cash” stage in the procurement process. As explained: 
Int9: We had to. If the money is there, we have to spend it. Because if we only spend our 
yearly budget minus 10%, that’s what they’re going to give us the next year. Because 
they’re going to think we don’t need it. So we have to spend it. 
 
 
A year later, when asked about this practice, the same interviewee then clarified that it had 
ceased to exist:  
 
 
Int9v2: Oh no, now everything’s changed. The order came for us to stop because there was 
no more money. Dilma cut the budget and then all of a sudden there was no money to pay 
the suppliers. And they keep calling us asking “where’s the money” and there is nothing 
we can do. We don’t have the money. Pretty soon we won’t even have money to pay for our 
electricity. I dread when they call me, I keep wanting to avoid the calls.  
 
 This incident highlights that it is possible for pernicious practices to be stopped under 
exceptional circumstances, and that the Ministry can and will exert control over agencies under its 
command when willing to do so.  
 In summary, corruption at Agency X can take several guises. Moreover, the system that 
should curb this from happening can be circumvented in several ways. Note that not everyone that 
takes part in these acts directly benefits from it. In fact, based on the evidence gathered, it seems 
most do not. Nevertheless, they indirectly participate in it and support it, either by registering 
erroneous information on the system which they are aware do not correspond to reality or by 
following orders and selecting a supplier they know are not the best option, but only because it is 
for someone else’s personal benefit.  
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 In the next section of this Chapter, the theory of moral disengagement will be reviewed, 
and data will be analyzed so as to identify in what ways its mechanisms have allowed for 
corruption to persist within this environment.   
 
6.4.2 Moral Disengagement 
 In this section data will be analyzed through a moral disengagement theoretical lens. This 
will be done in two parts: first by analyzing the data gathered as a result of applying Moore et al.’s 
(2012) Moral Disengagement Measure; second, by coding data for moral disengagement 
mechanisms, in accordance with Bandura’s (2006) guidelines.  
 
6.4.2.1 Moral Disengagement Measure 
 Moore et al. (2012: 2) argue that a predictor for unethical behavior is an individual’s 
inclination to morally disengage, “that is, an individual difference in the way that people 
cognitively process decisions and behavior with ethical import that allows those inclined to 
morally disengage to behave unethically without feeling distress. Broadly speaking, we know that 
how individuals process, frame, or understand information relevant to ethically meaningful 
decisions plays an important role in their ethical and unethical choices”.  
To that extent, they have devised the Moral Disengagement Measure, which was applied 
to those interviewed at Agency X (as presented in Chapter 4). As they explain, the Moral 
Disengagement Measure constitutes a validated and parsimonious form of measuring an 
individual’s propensity to disengage. It is composed of eight questions measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree (7) (see Appendix IV), each 
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of which measures one of the mechanisms established by Bandura (1986; 1999; 2016): moral 
justification; euphemistic labeling; advantageous comparison; displacement of responsibility; 
diffusion of responsibility; minimizing or distorting harmful effects, attribution of blame; and 
dehumanization. 
As can be visualized in Figures, 6.9, 6.10, and 6.11, results confirm that individuals at 
Agency X present a high propensity for morally disengaging. 97% of individuals scored 5 or above 
in at least one of Bandura’s constructs; 46% of individuals recorded a score of 5 or above in at 
least five Bandura’s categories of moral disengagement27.   
 
Figure 6.9 – Score of 5 or Above per Category28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 Unfortunately, a similar set of data is not available for other country governments. As discussed in previous 
chapters, this is the first time the MD theoretical framework was applied to a public institutional setting. This 
absence of data should serve as motivator for future studies. 
28 None of the participants signaled a score of higher than 5 for the three moral disengagement mechanisms 
omitted from Figure 6.9: dehumanization, attribution of blame, and minimization. 
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Figure 6.10 – Number of Individuals Who Scored 5 or Above In 1 or 3 Constructs 
 
 
Figure 6.11 – Number of Individuals Who Scored 6 or Above In 1 or 3 Constructs 
 
 
79% of individuals recorded a score of 6 or above in at least one of the constructs (Figure 
6.11), with 33% scoring 6 or above in at least three different categories. This is significant since, 
according to Moore et al. (2012), there is a positive correlation between the propensity to morally 
disengage and engaging in unethical decision-making. Thus, in an environment where most people 
present a high propensity towards morally disengaging, there is a greater chance that corruption 
will take place. 
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Another interesting finding refers to the categories in which individuals most scored highly. 
Over 60% of individuals tested registered a score of 5 or above in the categories: displacement of 
responsibility, advantageous comparison, moral justification, and diffusion of responsibility. The 
highest rated mechanism was displacement of responsibility (97% scored 5 or above), reflecting 
the strong hierarchical culture reported in section 6.3.4.2 of this Chapter. These results are also 
reflected in the coding of data, as per Bandura’s (2006) Manual for Coding Modes of Moral 
Disengagement. This will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
6.4.2.2 Coding for Moral Disengagement 
 In the previous section, moral disengagement was measured quantitatively by utilizing 
Moore et al.’s (2012) Moral Disengagement Measure. This form of measuring for moral 
disengagement mechanisms is useful in the sense that it indicates the presence of such mechanisms 
and, consequently, the propensity of individuals to engage in unethical behavior. In order to add 
further insight into this analysis, in this section, data will be analyzed in a qualitative manner. This 
was accomplished by coding transcripts of the interviews that were conducted (see Chapter 4 for 
details). 
 Coding was carried out by following the guidelines set forth by Bandura (2006) in his 
Manual for Coding Modes of Moral Disengagement. As White et al. (2009: 46) explain, Bandura’s 
manual “includes formal definitions of each of the mechanisms and exemplars representing the 
different ways in which moral disengagement is manifested”. Table 6.5 is a summary of the moral 
disengagement mechanisms which were evident.  
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As can be observed, data gathered was coded into five different categories of moral 
disengagement: moral justification, advantageous comparison, euphemistic labeling, displacement 
of responsibility, and diffusion of responsibility. No evidence of dehumanization, attribution of 
blame or minimizing effects mechanisms was found. This is consistent with data presented in 
Chapter 5 regarding the presence of moral disengagement mechanisms in the discourse of the 
perpetrators of the Car-Wash corruption case. As discussed in section 5.2.5, dehumanization, 
attribution of blame, and minimization (or distortion of consequence) sit at the victim locus. In 
instances of corruption, the victims of such acts may be difficult to identify, particularly when the 
victim is an unseen entity such as civil society at large or public coffers. This would probably 
explain why such mechanisms were not observed both amongst individuals involved in the Car-
Wash case and within Agency X. 
 
 
Table 6.5 – Overview of Moral Disengagement Mechanisms Observed at Agency X 
Categories Definition Examples 
Moral Justification 
Moral, social and economic 
justifications are used to sanctify 
injurious practices and decisions, and 
to challenge regulations. Harmful 
actions are regarded as serving worthy 
purposes and actors reward 
themselves for performance. 
"Sometimes you just need to get things 
done"; "we needed to meet his needs"; "if 
we follow procedure, it just takes too long"; 
"system is so inefficient, you just have to"; 
"somebody else would have done it"; "I'm 
just doing my job" 
Advantageous 
Comparison 
Comparing or contrasting harmful 
activities to actions that appear 
benign, of little consequence, or of 
lesser negative effect. 
"there are many bad things going on out 
there"; "that is nothing [in reference to other 
actions]" 
Euphemistic Labeling 
The use of sanitizing, convoluted, and 
innocuous language to make harmful 
decisions personally and socially 
acceptable. 
"It's not standard procedure"; "a favor" 
Displacement of 
Responsibility 
Evasion of personal accountability for 
harmful conduct and decisions by 
displacing responsibility on others 
(e.g. manager or authority). As such, 
they are not the actual agent of their 
actions. May intentionally keep 
themselves uninformed. 
"He told me"; "if your manager tells you to, 
you have to follow orders"; "the order came 
from above"; "I don't even know what they 
do"; "I had no choice" 
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Diffusion of 
Responsibility 
Personal responsibility is diffused 
through group decision-making, 
division of labor, or by attributing own 
behavior to the behavior of others 
(behavior mimic). Attention is shifted 
from the morality of action to 
operational details and efficiency of 
specific job. 
"Everyone does it"; "it's common practice"; 
"it's the way things are done" 
 
 
  
In the case of moral justification, Bandura (2016: 49) defines it as the act of morally and 
socially sanctifying “harmful practices by investing them with honorable purposes. Righteous and 
worthy ends are used to justify harmful means”. At Agency X, moral justification often took the 
form of blaming what they believed to be inefficiencies (both procedures and systems) and some 
form of higher purpose such as, for example, to guarantee the same level of budgets for coming 
years: 
 
Int9: We had to. If the money is there, we have to spend it. Because if we only spend our 
yearly budget minus 10%, that’s what they’re going to give us the next year. Because 
they’re going to think we don’t need it. So we have to spend it. 
 
INTERVIEWER: In what way do you spend it? Could you clarify? 
 
Int9: It’s money that’s been set aside for maintenance. It’s set aside at the beginning of the 
year. And they set aside an ‘X” amount, not knowing exactly how much we’ll need during 
the year. So things like water, electricity… it all comes out of that money. But then we 
didn’t use it all. So we use it for other things and classify it as maintenance. Like, for 
example, we have a monthly social. And they pay for it. They pay for it all. And it’s that 
budget that it comes out of. 
  
 
In the exchange above, it is possible to observe that the act of needlessly spending money 
on things such as a “monthly social” is justified as a “need”. If they do not spend it then, the 
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following year, the budget they receive is reduced. In other words, they are “forced” to spend that 
amount, meaning that wrongdoing is justified by a higher cause.  
Moral justification was also used to justify bypassing procedures, such as the example 
below: 
 
Int13: The system just doesn’t work. It keeps crashing. And you keep asking them to fix. 
And they don’t. We end up having to do things out of the system. Because otherwise it just 
takes too long. And you end up skipping steps. Eventually you go back and correct things 
on the system so that it’s there. But you know, it’s hard. The system stops us from doing 
things the way they’re meant to be done. 
 
  
System failings were reported throughout most of the interviews. Several of those 
interviewed referred to it as a “school project” delivered by “interns”. The failings are real, and 
one such occasion was witnessed by me. But the act of blaming the system to justify not following 
procedures is indeed moral justification, making the action of unethical decision making seem 
noble. Often, however, a certain exchange revealed not just one form of moral disengagement, but 
more. In the example given in a previous section regarding an invoice that was fraudulently 
changed in order to conceal what it in fact was paying for, the participant goes on to affirm: 
 
Int15v2: And then he just gave it to me to process it [insert the information in the system 
so that it can be processed for payment] as I normally would. But I didn’t like it. I really 
didn’t. 
INTERVIEWER: But you processed it anyway? 
Int15v2: I had to. I can’t go against my boss. And if I hadn’t done it, then somebody else 
would have done it. And I would have got into bad terms with my manager over nothing. 
Because it was a one-off. He’s a nice guy. I like him. 
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In the exchange above, the employee was aware that the invoice did not match the actual 
request but processed the invoice for payment anyway. The employee quite clearly feels some 
level of discomfort (“I didn’t like it”), but eases that feeling by first blaming the action on his 
manager (“I can’t go against my boss”), which reflects displacement of responsibility. He then 
went on to affirm that “somebody else would have done it”, reflecting diffusion of responsibility. 
Finally, he justifies his actions by affirming that “I would have got into bad terms (…) over nothing. 
(…) it was a one-off. He’s a nice guy”, reflecting the action of morally justifying his actions. As 
Bandura (2016: 28) affirms, people “are especially influenced by the evaluative reactions of those 
to whom they are emotionally attached and whose views they value”, and this is clearly the case 
here. Int15v2 expresses that he values what his manager thinks of him and uses that as justification 
in collaborating with a wrongful behavior.  
With displacement of responsibility, Bandura (2016: 58) explains that individuals “view 
their actions as arising from the dictates of authorities. Because they are not the actual agents of 
their actions, they are spared self-condemning reactions”. This particular mechanism was the most 
observed of all in the data gathered. A reflection of the strong hierarchy and power structure, it 
allows participants at Agency X, to carry out acts at the directive of their superiors whilst evading 
feelings of self-blame and self-condemnation, such as in the quotes extracted below: 
 
Int18: Obviously, if somebody asks you do it a specific way, or via a certain supplier, you 
do it. You follow orders.  
 
Int3: So someone from above, comes and says “exceptionally, that’s the way we’ll do 
things”.  
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Int13v2: You have to do what they tell you to do. And if they’re telling you to do something 
before the others then you do. Sometimes, they’re colleagues, and it’s a special favor. 
 
 
Int5: But he just told me to do it. So I did, who am I to question it? 
 
 
Int17: When I do something... I’m the one who is doing it, ok. But in the end, it’s the 
manager who approves it. It’s his name, not mine. Who is actually giving orders? It’s him, 
not me.  
 
Int3v2: I can argue against, but the final decision is the manager’s.  
 
 
 Another MD mechanism that was observed quite frequently, was diffusion of 
responsibility. Bandura (2016: 62) explains that in this instance, “any harm done by a group can 
always be attributed largely to the behavior of others”. This sort of disengagement mechanism 
supports cognitions such as “it’s always been done this way” and supports the perpetuation of 
detrimental practices on the basis that that is the culture of that particular work environment. 
Another form of making use of this specific mechanism is by ignoring what is done by others: 
 
Int6: I only know what’s in my group. I don’t know what goes on in the other teams. 
 
Ignoring the action of others is a difficult task in an environment which is an open-floor 
work space. Recall, however, that the financial department does not share the same space as the 
purchasing team. They are in fact located on a separate floor, which means that though there is an 
awareness that not all processes follow procedures (especially since they are asked to break rules 
themselves, such as processing payments without the presence of an invoice), they can largely 
allow themselves to remain in the dark regarding most unethical acts that take place.  
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 Though advantageous comparison was not as prominent as other mechanisms, it was still 
identified in the data gathered. According to Bandura (2016: 46), this mechanism takes place when 
individuals compare their actions to more harmful practices, thus diminishing the severity of their 
own actions. Such mechanism was identified in quotes such as: 
 
Int1: What we do here is small. We are very small compared to other agencies. If something 
isn’t in conformity, the impact of that is very little.  
  
 
Finally, the last MD mechanism identified through the data was euphemistic labeling. As 
Bandura (2016: 53) explains, “language shapes the perception of events and the thought patterns 
on which people base many of their actions”. Thus, alternative language is used as a form of 
sanitizing actions. This was persistently identified in most interviews. If, when questioned, the 
word “corruption” was used, interviewees immediately denied the existence of any such practice 
at Agency X. If, when enquiring about such practices, alternative language was used such as “non-
conforming” and “deviating from practice”, then interviewees were more forthcoming. They 
themselves used language such as “wrong” or “not cool” to refer to such practices, but never the 
term “corrupt”. The term corruption obviously carries with it a very negative connotation and is 
not an idea which any of them would want to associate themselves with. Hence, the use of 
euphemistic labeling which exempts them from self-condemnation.  
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6.5 Conclusion 
 This Chapter applied the theoretical frameworks of distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995) 
and moral disengagement (Bandura 1986) to the data gathered in an attempt to address the research 
questions proposed. 
 Distributed cognition (DCog) was applied by way of the DiCoT (distributed cognition for 
teamwork) methodological framework established by Furniss and Blandford (2006). In doing so, 
data collected through interviews, observations and notes were coded for DCog principles 
delineated by them (see Appendix II), thus building five different models: physical layout, 
artefacts, information flow, social structures, and evolutionary. These five models paint a picture 
of how cognitive processes are distributed amongst agents (technical and human) and give 
evidence as to the sources of information breakdown. 
 Moral disengagement was applied by firstly utilizing Moore et al.’s (2012) Moral 
Disengagement Measure so as to confirm the presence of such mechanisms at Agency X. Then, 
data was coded for the mechanisms proposed by Bandura (1986) in his theoretical framework: 
moral justification, advantageous comparison, euphemistic labeling, displacement of 
responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, minimizing harmful effects, attribution of blame and 
dehumanization. The data confirmed that individuals at Agency X do morally disengage in order 
to perpetuate acts of wrongdoing whilst exempting themselves from self-sanction and self-
condemnation. The data gathered indicated in which ways such mechanisms support the 
breakdown of information. These findings will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter sought to address the research questions proposed previously by 
applying the theoretical frameworks, defined in Chapter 3, to the unit of analysis under study here: 
the cognitive system at Agency X. The overarching research puzzle driving this thesis is to 
understand how information that is published on the Brazilian federal government’s Transparency 
Portal is produced so as to identify why it has failed to curb corruption in Brazil. 
In order to address the research questions proposed, a case study approach was adopted 
and data gathered (through interviews, observations, and documents) was analyzed through the 
lens of the theoretical frameworks proposed: Distributed Cognition (DCog) and Moral 
Disengagement (MD). In order to apply DCog in a structured and coherent manner, the DiCoT 
methodological framework delineated by Furniss and Blandford (2006) was used.  
A second line of inquiry was established, seeking to understand wrongdoing and unethical-
decision making and the impact of that on the quality of information produced. Thus, MD as a 
theoretical framework was proposed and data was analyzed in a two-stage manner. First, in order 
to confirm that MD mechanisms were at work at Agency X, Moore et al.’s (2012) Moral 
Disengagement Measure was applied, and data quantitatively measured. Second, with the intent 
of comprehending how MD was present and aided in unethical-decision making, data was 
qualitatively coded in accordance with guidelines established by Bandura (2006). 
This present Chapter thus seeks to address the research questions proposed based on the 
findings presented in the previous  Chapter. As such, this chapter is divided in the following 
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manner: section 7.2 will review how the unit of analysis functions as a distributed cognitive system 
in order to address the first research question that was proposed in Chapter 3. Section 7.3 will then 
present a discussion on the breakdowns to information identified within this cognitive system in 
order to address the second research question established in Chapter 3. Then, section 7.4 will 
review the moral disengagement mechanisms identified and discuss how these facilitate the 
breakdown of information (thus addressing the third research question previously proposed). 
Section 7.5 consists of a discussion of findings, and section 7.6 ends with some concluding 
remarks. 
 
7.2 A Distributed Cognitive System 
 Based on the analysis of the data presented in the previous chapter, it is possible to establish 
that the procurement processes conducted at Agency X can be understood as a distributed cognitive 
system, in which tasks and procedures are distributed through people and artefacts within a 
physical environment. As Rogers and Ellis (1994: 123) explain, DCog “provides a theoretical and 
methodological framework for analyzing complex, socially distributed work activities of which a 
diversity of technological and other tools are an indispensable part”. As an analytical approach, 
DCog provides a clear picture of how distributed components of the information system are 
coordinated. 
 In order to analyze this system through DCog, I opted to use the methodological approach 
delineated by Furniss and Blandford (2006) which they refer to as DiCoT. As per their framework, 
the data was coded for 22 different principles which are broken down into five models (see 
Appendix II): physical layout, artefacts, information flow, social structures, and evolutionary. The 
data gathered was coded both in a deductive way, using the DCog principles as a coding tool, and 
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in an inductive way to allow for the identification of any other meaningful themes. The result was 
the validation of all five models, with one of them, the social structures model, being extended to 
account for the breakdown of the two principles Furniss and Blandford (2006) had originally 
proposed, into six: goal tree and parity, hierarchy and high-level coordination, division of labor, 
distribution of knowledge, sequential control of action, and mediating structure. The extension of 
this particular model reflected the dominant lead individuals have in conducting the flow of 
information.  
The mapping of all five models provided a clear picture of how this distributed cognitive 
system operates, and in which ways it is distributed amongst the various components that make it 
up. A brief summary of each will be reviewed here, so as to then unite them and discuss how this 
distributed cognitive system works. 
 
7.2.1 Physical Layout Model 
The physical layout analysis highlighted the open-floor environment at Agency X, which 
promotes greater exchange and communication between those that are integral towards pushing 
forward the information in this cognitive system. Moreover, it encourages dynamism and allows 
for a high degree of situation awareness and horizon of information. This means that all those 
involved in the procurement process and in producing information are privy to the exchanges and 
aware of the exchanges that place. The exception to this is the financial department, which is 
located on a separate floor, resulting into a reduced situation awareness and horizon of information. 
That translates into being mostly aware only of the information that is intentionally shared with 
them and being absent from most general and informal exchanges. 
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7.2.2 Artefact Model 
 Artefacts play an important role in propagating information through the system. The IntSys 
is the main technical artefact used in this regard. The initial request for a supply is made through 
this system, and from thereinafter, all stages of the process are registered on this system. However, 
IntSys presents a few technical constraints inherent to it, which means that it at times is considered 
an obstacle towards achieving the end-goal of completing the procurement process. Thus, IntSys 
serves the main purpose of registering steps of the procurement process, but it does not lead the 
process; it does not even have automatic reminders and triggers built into the system. Everything 
is therefore manually processed, and individuals have to keep going back into IntSys to register 
information, input data that is not automatically populated into it, and inform the system that the 
process has moved forward. 
 The other main mediating artefact is not a technical one, but a paper-based one: the physical 
file (PF).  The PF serves the purpose of distributed memory, since it stores redundant pieces of 
information regarding the process – even beyond that which is registered on IntSys like, for 
example, copies of e-mails exchanged regarding the process between Agency X and suppliers. It 
is also the main coordinating resource, since it will be moved from one team to another as the 
process progresses, serving as both a behavioral trigger to act and a reminder of what still needs 
to be done. For the financial department also, the real trigger for them to act does not come through 
the technical system, but via paper (either the RoC at the reserve of cash stage or in the form of an 
invoice at the payment stage). These also serve the purpose of mediating contact between 
purchasing teams and financial department. 
 Another main technical artefact is SIAFI, which is managed by the financial department 
team. It is on SIAFI that the financial department will register the RoC and payment, information 
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which will then be fed into the Transparency Portal. Thus, SIAFI is the gateway between processes 
that take place at Agency X and the external community (i.e. civil society). 
 
7.2.3 Information Flow 
As discussed in the previous chapter, information moves and transforms through the system 
through the action of individuals. With the exception of information that is automatically fed from 
SIAFI to the Transparency Portal, nothing moves automatically without the direct involvement of 
a human agent. Thus, the main behavioral trigger within this system are the people themselves, 
who will notify the next team in the chain of tasks that the process has evolved via the delivery of 
the PF to them. Moreover, as identified in the previous chapter, the artefacts do not communicate 
with one another directly, relying instead on the individual to propagate the information through 
the various different media. What guarantees that information is continuously flowing through the 
system is the action of individuals. They are the ones who will input data into the IntSys and 
compile the PF, according to both their own interpretation of how procedures should be followed 
and according to the imbued properties of the systems (modularity), which will have been pre-
established by those who designed these systems (external to Agency X). 
The only time IntSys acts like a trigger is when the supply request is entered into the 
system, at which point the entire distributed cognitive system is prompted to, one by one, act. 
Communication bandwidth and informal communication play a significant role in this system. 
Informal communication takes place often, in part encouraged by the physical layout which 
encourages proximity and provides a high degree of situation awareness and horizon of 
observation, and partially due to the way the process has been structured. The way information 
propagates through it, means that, internally, communication bandwidth is the main form of 
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communication – again, the process only moves forward when an individual hand delivers the PF 
to the next team in charge. This results in the fact that some pertinent pieces of data to purchasing 
processes will not ever be formally registered.  
 
7.2.4 Social Structures 
 This particular model had to be extended due to the importance of it in this information 
system. Drawing from DCog literature for codes, six new principles were identified: goal tree and 
parity, hierarchy and high level coordination, division of labor, knowledge of distribution, 
sequential control of action, and mediating structure. Extending Furniss and Blandford’s (2006) 
DiCoT model to encompass new sources of evidence is not something new. In fact, they admit in 
their original paper that this was an underdeveloped model, omitting it altogether from research 
they later conducted with others (Berndt et al. 2014; Furniss et al. 2015). A later study (Rajkomar 
et al. 2015) even introduced a new model (the system activity model), attesting to the flexible 
nature of this methodological framework.  
 In this particular model, a few key features were identified: the first, and most important 
characteristic of this system, is the relevant role hierarchy plays. This was a theme that emerged 
often from the data; that is, the delegation of one’s decision-making power to a higher authority 
(in this case, upper management). For the most part, individuals carried on their tasks and 
completed their goals which had been established previously. Division of labor was also clear to 
all, with each participant aware of what his/her role in the process entailed. This meant that tasks 
and procedures were sequentially constrained. However, if upper management intervened 
introducing changes to this system (be it by establishing new goals or disrupting work sequences), 
this order was followed by participants without question.  
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This characteristic also highlighted the importance of spoken language over written one, 
with internal discussions over changing and disrupting practices occurring in an informal way. 
These disruptions were therefore not formally registered and provided support for procedures to 
be broken.  
 
7.2.5 Evolutionary Model 
 The mapping of this particular model provided evidence for the fact that the way things are 
done at Agency X, and the way in which tasks are carried out, are long-held traditions and resistant 
to change. Hierarchy and the way knowledge is distributed play a role in this since they are 
elements which reinforce this cultural element. Distribution of knowledge is in fact mostly 
contained within individuals. This means, that for new participants, they will be socialized into 
this system by observing and learning from others, not from written norms (which exist but are 
rarely referenced).  
 Another principle in this model refers to expert coupling, which indicates the degree to 
which user and system work in tandem. In the case of this particular system, the level of interaction 
is high between participant and IntSys.  
 
 
7.2.6 Discussion 
 DiCoT is a structured methodological framework for studying information systems. 
Drawing from key DCog principles, DiCoT results in establishing five models, all interrelated, 
which help guide the researcher in identifying the context of interactions, the system’s dynamics, 
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the part agents – both artefact and human – play in this system, and how information flows and 
transforms through this system.  
As discussed, the relevant role social structures play in this information system led to an 
extension of this model, which was previously underdeveloped (Berndt et al. 2014). Table 7.1 
presents a summary of these findings. Structuring data through these models also aids in 
identifying problems, or breakdowns in the information flow, as will be discussed in the sections 
that follow. Having reviewed the summary of findings for each of the DiCoT models established, 
it is possible to now address the first research question, which will be achieved in the next section. 
 
 
Table 7.1 – Summary of Findings: DiCoT Models and DCog Principles Applied  
to Unit of Analysis 
Model Principle Brief Explanation Observations 
Physical 
Space and 
cognition 
How physical layout 
supports (or fails to 
support) cognition. 
Worktop space is taken up by a vast amount of 
paperwork which serves as a reminder of ongoing 
processes. 
Situation 
awareness 
Refers to how accessible 
work of the team is, 
including proximity of 
others around them. 
Open-office environment results in high level of 
proximity amongst members of the purchasing 
teams. Financial team is located on a separate 
floor. 
Horizon of 
observation 
Refers to what can be 
seen or heard by a 
person. 
High for those in the purchasing team. Low for 
the financial team which is located in a separate 
area. 
Arrangement of 
equipment 
The physical layout of 
equipment. 
Promotes dynamism and interaction due to 
where they are located, i.e. file cabinets agains 
walls reducing barriers and equipment (such as 
printer) in the center of the room. 
Artefact 
Mediating 
artefacts 
Includes artefacts that are 
introduced in order to 
complete the task. 
All artefacts serve as mediators in some way. 
Main ones: the IntSys and PF promote mediation 
amongst individuals. SIAFI is the mediating 
structure between the internal process at Agency 
X and the Transparency Portal. 
Creating 
scaffolding 
External artefacts and 
environmental cues 
introduced to simplify 
cognitive tasks. 
IntSys and PF provide scaffolding to support 
teams, both containing information that supports 
the procurement process, i.e. work progress and 
procurement stage.  
Representation - 
goal parity 
Representation of the 
relationship between 
current state and goal 
state of the artefact. 
Steps in the procurement process can often be 
skipped and conducted out of the technical 
artefact, meaning parity between goal and 
representation is low. 
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Coordination of 
resources 
Resources can be 
internally and externally 
coordinated to aid action 
and cognition. 
PF and IntSys are the key coordinating resources. 
PF is the main coordinating artefact between 
purchasing teams, and IntSys integrates 
purchasing and financial team. 
Distributed 
Memory (*) 
How information is 
redundantly collected and 
stored. 
PF is the back-up memory to IntSys. Individuals 
are redundant records of information (beyond 
PF). 
Modularity (*) 
Imbued 
"precomputational 
activities" and properties 
in artefacts. 
IntSys and SIAFI possess innate properties 
established by developers (Ministry X, and 
Treasury, respectively), which constrain and 
shape the information inputted into them. 
Information 
Flow 
Information 
movement 
How information moves 
around the system, e.g. 
artifacts, text, verbal, 
telephone, etc. 
Information moves both through artefacts and 
individuals (face-to-face). Most interactions will 
not be formally registered. 
Information 
transformation 
Transformation takes 
place when the 
representation of 
information changes. 
Information transforms through the entire 
system as new events take place and new 
information is generated. The process is led by 
individuals. 
Information hubs 
Where different 
information channels 
meet and different 
sources are processed 
together. 
Observed in nearly all instances of the 
procurement process, most especially where 
IntSys and PF meet. 
Buffering 
Refers to the arrival of 
new information that may 
interfere with ongoing 
activity. 
IntSys acts as buffer throughout all stages of the 
purchasing process. It does not alert individuals 
of new processes or information, thereby stalling 
the process. 
Communication 
bandwidth 
Face-to-face 
communication that takes 
place. 
Most common type of information exchange due 
to the physical layout and role of certain artefacts 
(PF and paper) in moving the process along (i.e. 
they have to be physically handed over). 
Informal 
communication 
Informal communication 
which represents an 
important function. 
Often takes place due to close proximity  
between individuals (due to the physical layout) 
and social structures present which favor direct 
contact. 
Behavioral 
trigger factors 
Trigger mechanisms that 
elicit behavior. 
Different artefacts will trigger different 
responses. The main trigger is the people who 
will deliver PF themselves to the next team 
member in the chain of tasks, alerting them that 
the process has moved along. 
Social 
Goal Tree and 
Parity (*) 
A clear and established 
main goal and sub-goals. 
Roles and attributions are well-defined. Personal 
goals may diverge however from the main goal of 
the process (disparity). In other words, formal 
procedures are not always followed. 
Hierarchy and 
High Level 
Coordination (*) 
Delegating power of 
decision. 
A very well-defined power structure, which is 
strictly observed, and results in participants 
delegating their power of decision. 
Division of Labor 
(*) 
Cognition of tasks and 
coordination. 
Every individual is clear on what their role is in 
the process. Artefacts support that, acting as a 
register of actions undertaken. 
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Distribution of 
Knowledge (*) 
How knowledge is shared 
among individuals. 
Knowledge is mostly contained in individuals. 
New team members will learn by observation, 
explanation or documents, but will mostly rely on 
their peers. (Informal environment). 
Sequential 
Control of Action 
(*) 
The procedure is 
sequentially constrained if 
reliant on the completion 
of previous tasks. 
True for procurement processes at Agency X but 
can be informally disabled if and when required 
(i.e. manager requests this). 
Mediating 
Structure (*) 
How communication and 
social interactions take 
place (artefacts or 
language). 
Spoken language is most common form, meaning 
that much of what is communicated regarding 
procurement processes will not be formally 
registered via an artefact. 
Evolutionary 
Cultural heritage 
How processes 
established through time 
shape current behavior. 
Certain cultural elements (i.e. hierarchy, 
informality, distribution of knowledge etc.) are 
long-held traditions and resistant to change. 
Expert coupling 
The degree to which user 
and system work in 
tandem and are coupled. 
Level of interaction between user and system is 
high. Individuals are integral to the functioning of 
the system, dictating how it works and evolves. 
(*) New DCog principles introduced to these models. 
 
7.2.6.1 How are cognitive processes distributed between agents (technical and human) at 
Agency X? 
 The first research question was motivated by the attempt to understand the roles played by 
both technical and human agents in the cognitively distributed system that is under analysis here. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, DCog establishes that cognition is not constrained to one individual 
mind (Clegg 1994; Hutchins 1995). Rather, as Clegg (1994: 467) explains, “aspects of cognition 
are also in the world, in social groupings and differentiated roles, in the human-designed artifacts 
and procedures and systems that people use, and also in the legacy of historical and cultural 
assumptions and ideas. And of course, this is exactly what organizations are designed for. 
Organizations are human designed systems for distributed agency, cognition and action”. 
 Thus, in socio-technical systems, cognition will be distributed amongst both technical 
artefacts and human agents. As such, cognition is not restricted to one individual, but rather 
extended into the environment, where it is shared both with other individuals and artefacts, through 
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both internal and external representation. Both – artefacts and human agents – will work in tandem 
to produce information, motivating and constraining each other in a bi-directional manner, 
confirming Bandura’s (1999; 2016) proposition of triadic co-determination, through which both 
the individual’s construal of reality and the environment constantly reinforce one another. As he 
stresses in several of his papers, “the environment is not a monolithic entity” (Bandura 1999: 23). 
In that regard, their immediate context, i.e. the physical layout of their surroundings, will also play 
a role in shaping this distributed cognitive system. That is not to say however, that artefacts and 
individuals both play an equal part in the system and, in applying the DiCoT methodological 
framework to the data gathered, the intent was to understand what the role of each one was, how 
they interacted with one another, and how information was produced, transmitted, and transformed 
as a result of this interplay.  In understanding this dynamic, the intent was to better comprehend 
how information is created and what the effect of this would be in how effective transparency is 
as an anti-corruption mechanism. 
 As discussed in both Chapters 3 and 6, through the DiCoT methodological approach, data 
was analyzed in a structured way and coded for the twenty-two DCog principles delineated by 
Furniss and Blandford (2006), which translated into five models: physical layout, artefact, 
information flow, social structure, and evolutionary. Data was then inductively coded again, which 
revealed further DCog principles not originally included in the DiCoT model. Through the 
unification of all five models, a clear picture of how the distributed cognitive system operates at 
Agency X thus became clear.  
 Firstly, information processing in this distributed cognitive system reveals itself through 
the propagation of representational state across the different media. The input of a purchase request 
into the IntSys triggers the entire system into action, and information will then be processed as it 
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moves through the entire cognitive system through the different media, i.e. the technical systems, 
other artefacts such as paper, and finally, through the people themselves. Analyzing how 
information moves through this system revealed the first and important characteristic: the 
fundamental role individuals play in the cognitive system.  
As the data analyzed showed, though the information stored and registered in the technical 
system is constrained by its inherent design (modularity), it is ultimately up to the human agents 
to move the information forward and dictate what gets stored and how it gets stored into technical 
systems. Moreover, since technical artefacts do not communicate directly with one another, 
humans act as both hub and behavioral triggers in the sequential control of action.  
 The core of representational media is therefore between individuals, through language, 
revealing the high prevalence of communication bandwidth and informal communication that 
takes place at Agency X. This means that individuals act as mediating structures, communicating 
directly with one another, and bypassing technical systems, in addition to carrying the information 
forward across the different artefacts.   
 Non-technical artefacts (paper) also play an important role, acting both as a trigger and 
distributed memory. It is, therefore, the PF which, as it moves through the system will trigger the 
next team member to act, also functioning as a reminder that processes are still pending, not the 
IntSys. Paper, however, is a non-intelligent artefact. Alone, it accomplishes very little, thereby 
once again reinforcing the dominant role individuals play in the information system. Not only is it 
the human agents who have to physically move through the physical space of the work 
environment to move the PF to the next team member, but it is also human agents who determine 
what gets stored into the PF or not. Thus, human agents act as more than hubs and behavioral 
triggers; they are also the largest retainers of knowledge as well.  
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This strong human component of the system is the result of a few factors: first, the cultural 
heritage principle was strongly observed, i.e. long held-traditions, “how things have always been 
done”. This element is very much present and very resistant to change. The fact that the distribution 
of knowledge is mostly done via observation and verbal communication only reinforces this 
cultural aspect. Written manuals and guidelines do exist and are stored on Agency X’s intranet, 
but are largely ignored and the socialization of new participants will be accomplished in this 
informal way. This cultural heritage principle is manifested in how new technical systems (to 
support the new transparency legislation enacted in 2009 and 2011) were introduced: no formal 
training, learning was largely done via informal communication, procedures only changed to the 
extent that they had to, to accommodate the new systems’ designs, but the mindset and the informal 
way of accomplishing things remained intact. In other words, the introduction of new technical 
systems only provoked changes to the cognitive system to the extent that they imposed on the 
system their inherent technical features forcing human agents to adapt to it. How information 
propagated through the system, however, remained intact, with human agents retaining most of 
the cognitive processes and leading the information flow. 
 A second factor which places the human component at the forefront of the cognitive system 
refers to the physical layout of Agency X. The open-floor plan observed and described in Chapter 
6, encourages proximity between individuals, augmenting situation awareness and horizon of 
observation. This physical characteristic reinforces informal communication, thereby 
automatically selecting what information is registered and stored in technical systems (a sort of 
natural selection). Communication can, by the way, be intentional or not. As per the horizon of 
observation principle, the mere fact of being in the same room means you are in a position to 
overhear and see things that may be pertinent to how you conduct activities or to the activities of 
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others, whether you are actively participating in that specific exchange or not. This characteristic 
of the cognitive system further serves to enforce the cultural heritage principle, ensuring that all 
forms of behavior are replicated and perpetuated by all those exposed to it (whether positive or 
negative/illictit behavior). It also means that upper management, though they do not actively 
participate in all instances of the procurement processes, will still retain a high level of awareness 
of the activities that are being undertaken, whether they are actively involved or not.  
The exception here are the agents who integrate the financial department and constitute an 
integral part to the sequential control of action but are physically removed from the rest of the 
procurement team since they are located on a separate floor. This means that their horizon of 
observation is low and their knowledge of the procurement processes will depend on what the 
purchasing department chooses to share with them, either verbally or through the information 
contained in the IntSys. They are however the ones who are responsible for registering information 
on SIAFI, the mediating artefact between the internal environment at Agency X, and the external 
environment via the Transparency Portal. SIAFI is limited in regards to the information that it 
stores, registering only two instances of the procurement process, RoC and payment. The financial 
department is however still subject to the same social structures, including hierarchy.  
What this means is that it is not all human agents will be driving and controlling the 
information flow. The main leaders of cognitive processes are the purchasing team. Technical 
artefacts and the financial department personnel are supporters in this system, despite the fact that 
they are the communicators of transparency. 
 The strong presence of the hierarchy and high level coordination principles is the third 
factor in reinforcing how cognitive processes are distributed. Hierarchy is strictly observed, with 
individuals delegating total power of decision to a higher authority. This means that it is the upper 
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instances of the organization which will dictate how processes should be undertaken. As a result, 
though goal tree and parity are well established (and for the most part observed), and the sequential 
control of action is respected, upper management has the power to disrupt that, thus setting new 
goals and re-organizing the sequential control of action. The representational media through which 
this is communicated is language, i.e. informal communication. Disruptions to the goals and tasks 
will not be formally registered on artefacts, knowledge of which will be constrained to the human 
agents. Note that such disruptions tend to be the result of unethical-decision making as will be 
discussed in more detail in section 7.4. 
Hierarchy is observed both within Agency X and outside it, with the upper ranks of 
Ministry X having the power to dictate what happens within that environment. The deployment of 
IntSys is an example of that. It took place in a centralized manner, dictated by instances superior 
to Agency X. Thus, the design of IntSys attends to what the upper ranks of Ministry X deem 
important, but not necessarily what participants at Agency X believe are. This characteristic is very 
important to this study since not only will hierarchy be one of the sources of information 
breakdown, but it will also be a facilitating factor in collective moral disengagement. 
 In summary, cognitive processes are unevenly distributed between technical and human 
agents. Human agents are the ones leading the information flow, determining how information is 
created and stored. The technical component enforces certain processing rules, dictating how 
information is registered on its systems (according to its imbued properties), but not what gets 
stored, or even when. This temporal aspect is one hundred percent controlled by participants since, 
as discussed in Chapter 6, information is not always registered on technical systems when 
processes happen, but at a later stage. The physical environment, on the other hand, acts as a 
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facilitator of this dynamic by enabling high horizon of information and situation awareness, which 
encourages informal communication. 
 This uneven distribution of cognitive processes between the components of the system 
implicates in several of the breakdowns that were observed. These breakdowns are the focus of 
the second research question that was proposed in Chapter 3, the details of which will be reviewed 
in the next section.    
 
7.3 Potential Breakdowns 
 According to Sharp and Robinson (2006: 4), breakdowns are defined as “potential failures 
in communication or information flows that will impair the system’s performance or prevent the 
system from achieving its goals”. Breakdowns in the information flow have the ability to 
compromise the integrity of the data produced, hence why it became a point of interest in this 
study. In other words, corrupted data compromises transparency. 
The identified goal for those who are a part of this system – the cognitive system at Agency 
X – is to meet the supply requirements of those with an identified need whilst observing formal 
procedures (i.e. legislative). As part of the process of meeting this goal, information is registered, 
propagated, and transformed throughout the system which comprises both human agents and 
artefacts, as previously reviewed. Breakdowns compromise the effectiveness of the system and in 
this section of the chapter, the sources of information breakdown will be identified, and the extent 
of the impact on the system will be discussed. 
According to Galliers et al. (2007), the first step towards identifying whether breakdowns 
do, in fact, occur is to delineate how a system should work and from thereon identify what the 
253 
 
pitfalls are. What follows, therefore, is a brief summary of the information system at Agency X 
works. A visual representation of how information flows through this information system is 
depicted in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1 – Representation of Information Flows at Agency X 
 
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the procurement process is triggered when “Z” places 
a request on the IntSys (refer to Appendix VII for a step-by-step of the procurement process). 
Without any disruptions whatsoever, the process should take place in the following manner: the 
request placed by “Z” will be received by “A”, who will redirect it (via the IntSys) to the team 
member responsible for dealing with that certain product category (“B”). 
 “B” will be prompted to take action when the request is received through the IntSys. He/she 
will then investigate potential suppliers and contact those selected to request a quote. The 
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investigation process can be done by checking purchasing history registered in the IntSys, or by 
searching the Internet. There is no set of criteria for this. The suppliers selected will be sent an e-
mail generated by the IntSys. Responses to those quote requests, on the other hand, will come via 
Outlook, to a team e-mail account. “B” then has the responsibility to check daily that e-mail 
account for responses and re-direct relevant e-mails to their own account. Once three quotes have 
been received, “B” will print these, compile them into a physical folder (PF), and hand off the 
process to team member “C”. “B” will also have to remember to register the process has been 
handed off on the IntSys. 
 For team member “C”, their responsibility is to select a supplier and confirm the purchase. 
In order to do so, “C” will type in the IntSys all of the information for the quotes “B” had received 
and placed in the PF. The IntSys will then generate a “comparative map” and assign a winning 
bid. In order to proceed with this request, “C” will then have to (1) obtain their manager’s approval 
through the IntSys, and (2) request that the financial department allocate the budget for this 
purchase. This will be done by filling out a Reserve of Cash (RoC) form on MS Word and 
physically taking this to the financial department team (“D”).  
 Upon receipt of the RoC, “D” will check on IntSys the details of this purchase and confirm 
on SIAFI that cash has been reserved. SIAFI will register this information automatically on the 
Transparency Portal. 
 “D” will then print the RoC confirmation that SIAFI has generated, scan it, and send it 
back to “C” via e-mail. The e-mail will be sent to the entire department in bulk (several RoCs at 
the same time), and “C” must check these e-mails to ensure that their particular purchase order is 
included. “C” will then register on IntSys that purchase has been approved and will e-mail the 
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supplier with the winning bid with instructions. Once the supplier has acknowledged the request, 
“C” will mark this on IntSys and will take the PF to “E”, who will take over the process from there. 
 The responsibility for “E” is to finalize the process so that it can be sent back to the financial 
department for payment. Thus, “E” will expect to receive an invoice from the supplier and will 
also send “Z” delivery instructions of the supplies ordered. Once the invoice has been received 
and “Z” has confirmed that everything has been delivered, “E” will then place a copy of the invoice 
in the PF. This will be stored, marking the end of the process for the purchasing team. The original 
copy will be taken to the financial department (“D”). “D” will check on IntSys details of this order 
and will approve payment, formally registering this information on SIAFI, which will register this 
also on the Transparency Portal. The invoice will be filed away, marking the end of the process. 
 Having established how the information system should work, the next step is to identify 
where and how breakdowns occur. This was achieved through the analysis of the data collected, 
coding it for DCog principles, and structuring it into the five DiCoT models. The breakdowns 
identified can be classified into three categories: artefact breakdown, non-intentional human 
breakdown, and intentional human breakdown. These are summarized in Table 7.2 and will be 
individually listed and discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
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Table 7.2 – Summary of Breakdowns 
Artefacts Non-Intentional Human Intentional Human 
1. IntSys does not automatically 
redirect requests to the correct team 
member due to a system error (Step II 
of the procurement process). 
1. Participant must register on IntSys 
when a process progresses to the 
next stage in the procurement 
process (e.g. Steps X an XVIII). 
Individuals reported that they 
sometimes forget. 
1. A fake purchase need may be 
created. As a result, information on 
the technical system is faulty. Source 
of breakdown will typically be "Z", but 
will involve the cooperation of others. 
  
2. IntSys built-in search engine is 
limited and often fails (Step V of the 
procurement process).  
2. E-mails received from suppliers 
through team e-mail account will 
sometimes be overlooked, leading to 
the halt of a process (Step VII of the 
procurement process). 
2. Quotes inputted into IntSys will be 
done in a way to favor a specific 
supplier. As a result, information in 
the system does not, in fact, reflect 
reality. Source of breakdown may be 
either "Z", "B", or "C", or upper 
management. If not "B" or "C", their 
collaboration will be required anyway. 
  
3. IntSys crashes result in team 
member "B" having to send a request 
for quotes by e-mail and not via IntSys 
(Step VII of the procurement process). 
3. Quote information must be 
inputted manually, which can result in 
mistakes (Step XVII of the 
procurement process). 
3. A certain supplier may be favored 
under the false pretense that it falls 
into legislative exemptions for the 
bidding process. The result will be 
false information. The source will be 
either "Z" or upper management and 
will require the collaboration of 
others ("B", "C", and "D"). 
  
4. IntSys has no alert mechanisms, 
resulting in participants having to 
periodically check for new 
information. 
4. RoCs are sent to the entire team in 
bulk via e-mail. Participants will 
sometimes not identify that their 
process has been included, resulting 
in process halt (Step XXIV). 
4. Document alteration to conceal 
irregular requests, such as an invoice 
that does not contain within it the 
exact nature of the purchase. 
Information entered on SIAFI will not, 
therefore, match reality. Source of 
breakdown may be "Z" or upper 
management and will require the 
collaboration of others. 
  
  
5. Requester "Z" must confirm 
delivery receipt before payment can 
be processed. When "Z" fails, 
suppliers may complain that they 
have not been paid. 
5. Conducting a process "out of the 
system", only to later go back and 
register it on the IntSys as if it had 
occurred at that later stage. 
Information entered on the technical 
artefact does therefore not 
correspond to reality. Source of 
breakdown will typically be upper 
management but will require the 
collaboration of others. 
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7.3.1 Artefact Breakdown 
 The first category of breakdowns identified refers to when artefacts cause the breakdown 
in the information flow. A few instances were identified: 
1. In Step II of the procurement process (refer to Appendix XII for step-by-step), “A” 
must redirect requests to the appropriate team member. This stage in the process is 
because of a technical systems’ breakdown. IntSys should be able to automatically 
identify the relevant team member, thus eliminating this step altogether. However, 
IntSys only recognizes a former worker, someone who left Agency X quite some time 
ago (according to the data gathered, this individual had left five years prior to the 
interview taking place). In spite of repeated requests to have this corrected it had not, 
which created the need to have a dedicated person to check the IntSys on a daily basis 
and re-direct requests. If this person is therefore not present to perform this procedure, 
requests will accumulate and not be tended to, thus creating a bottleneck.  
2. In Step V of the procurement process, “B” can either search for suppliers via the IntSys 
or on the Internet. Participants, however, reported that IntSys’s search mechanism fails 
and often the information they require is hard to find. Since Google is a much easier 
search engine to manage, it becomes easier to just resort to that, meaning that this 
search for suppliers goes unregistered. The impact of this has been that buyers now 
have no norm or criteria to follow and can choose suppliers based on their own personal 
set of criteria. 
3. In Step VII of the procurement process, “B” must contact suppliers requesting for a 
quote via IntSys so that this step is registered on it. In reality, IntSys often crashes and 
this mechanism rarely works. The result is that these requests for quotes are sent out of 
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IntSys, via e-mail. The e-mails will then later be stored on the PF, but it is up to the 
buyer what he/she stores in the PF with no possible oversight mechanism, something 
that would only have been possible had the process been carried out through the IntSys. 
4. IntSys has no alert mechanisms, meaning that it is up to participants to check IntSys 
periodically to ensure that no new information has been inserted there. For example, if 
a request is urgent and time has lapsed on it, the IntSys will not advise the buyer of this 
information. Thus, a process can lie there overdue and unchecked indefinitely. This 
will only be corrected when the buyer checks IntSys or somebody calls asking for an 
update (requester “Z” or a manager). 
 
Four sources of artefacts’ breakdowns were identified as listed above. They are all in 
reference to IntSys. No breakdown was identified for any of the other artefacts. 
 
 
7.3.2 Non-Intentional Human Breakdown 
 Non-intentional human breakdowns were identified as those instances in which a human 
agent was the source of the breakdown, but in an unintentional way. These were identified as: 
1. In several instances throughout the procurement process, it is up to the individual 
participant to register on the IntSys that a step has been completed and that it has 
progressed (such as Steps X and XVIII in the procurement process. Refer to Appendix 
VII). However, it emerged from the interview data that sometimes individuals forget 
to do this. The result is that the IntSys will show that a processis still under the care of 
a certain individual, when in fact, it has already moved on. This is in part due to the 
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fact that, from an individual’s perspective, the true marker that the process has moved 
to the next person, is the fact that the PF will have been physically handed off. 
2. In Step VII of the procurement process, e-mails from suppliers are received through 
the team’s e-mail inbox. This means that participants have to keep checking that inbox 
to ensure that no new information has been received. Due to the large number of quotes 
received (since it is a shared inbox), sometimes e-mails can be overlooked and a process 
will stagnate. In addition, if a participant goes away on annual leave, then it will be up 
to the person that is covering him/her to retrieve these messages. If that person is 
unfamiliar with the process and the suppliers who had been contacted, these messages 
may sit in the inbox indefinitely. 
3. In Step XVII, it is up to team member “C” to input quote data into IntSys, one by one. 
Based on the data gathered, since quotes contain many pieces of information, mistakes 
will sometimes be made and the data registered will not be accurate. As a result, the 
“comparative map” that IntSys generates to award a winning bid will be based on faulty 
information. 
4. In Step XXIV of the procurement process, RoCs are sent to the entire department in 
bulk (in other words, several at a time). This means that sometimes individuals will 
overlook their processes and fail to identify that the RoC will have already been 
approved. The result will be a delay in processing the order. 
5. In Step XXXIII, “Z” has to confirm delivery in order for team member “E” to proceed 
with payment. If “Z” fails to do this (as sometimes does happen), then the process will 
not be finalized on IntSys and payment will not be processed. The result is that suppliers 
will then start to complain and inquire as to why they had not yet received payment. 
260 
 
 
Breakdowns in this instance typically occur due to the technical system’s limitations (not 
automatically populating certain fields and requiring this to be completed manually instead), and 
how procedures have been built (over-reliance on paper and e-mails). 
 
7.3.3 Intentional Human Breakdown 
 Sometimes breakdowns occur due to an intentional action on the part of the human agent. 
These instances have been identified as: 
1. A fake need may be created, which will result in a series of fabricated information 
being registered and stored. An example is that of the double contract, discussed in the 
previous chapter. Two contracts with the same supplier, for the same product category, 
were signed, with only slightly different terms. Both carried a minimum order amount 
that had to be paid yearly, meaning that whether Agency X requested that amount or 
not, the payment would still need to be made. The source of this breakdown would 
typically be “Z”, though would require cooperation by other participants of the 
procurement process. 
2. A certain supplier may be intentionally favored over others, meaning that the 
information registered on the information system does not correspond to reality. Since 
it is up to the buyer whom and how to request quotes from, with no formal procedure 
in place, the request will retain the appearance of a regular bidding process on the 
technical system, when in reality it is not. The source of this breakdown may be either 
“Z”, who placed the request, or a member of upper management. The involvement of 
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“B” or “C” typically came at the direction of others. I found no evidence that they had 
personally benefitted from this (though this possibility cannot be fully discarded).  
3. A certain supplier may be intentionally favored over others, but under the false pretense 
that it falls into certain legislative exceptions for bidding processes (see Appendix VI 
for exact legislation). Whatever winning bid IntSys then appoints (Steps XIV and XV 
in the procurement process) can be overridden. The source of this breakdown may be 
either “Z” or upper management. This would require the collaboration of other team 
members too (“B”, “C”, and possibly “D”). 
4. Changing documents to conceal irregular requests. An example of this is the invoice 
that was altered to conceal the exact contents of the purchase. The actual invoice is not 
registered on the technical artefacts, only on paper, with only certain pieces of 
information regarding the invoice being formally registered on SIAFI. Thus, such 
inconsistency or lack of information would not be easily identified, most especially by 
an external audience. Based on the data gathered, the source of this breakdown was 
both requester “Z” and upper management, but would also require the cooperation of 
others. 
5. Skipping steps in the procurement process in the name of speediness or to favor certain 
suppliers, such as payment without an invoice. The process is then conducted “out of 
the system” (as described in interviews), and only later registered, after completed. This 
means that the information on the system will not correspond to reality. An entire 
process can be handled extra-officially, according to those interviewed. The source of 
this breakdown will typically be upper management, but would require the 
collaboration of all those involved in the process. 
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The instances identified above can be largely attributed to unethical-decision making. 
Moreover, although the source of that decision-making will typically be a member of upper 
management (or high-ranking individual, even in the case of “Z”), carrying out such actions will 
require the collaboration of several individuals, most of whom will not profit from such actions 
themselves.  
 
 
7.3.4 Checklist Analysis 
 There are no previous studies which have applied DCog to a similar setting, and therefore 
no basis for comparison in terms of the findings obtained. Thus, to confirm breakdowns have been 
correctly identified, Galliers et al. (2007)’s checklist analysis has been used here. It consists of 
seven questions that should be addressed (see Figure 7.2) in order to ensure that all points of 
breakdown have been identified. This section will, therefore, address this checklist. 
 
Figure 7.2 – Checklist Analysis 
Source: Galliers et al. (2007) 
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One of the questions posed by Galliers et al. (2007) refers to whether information should 
be in the system according to current practice or whether it could be anywhere else. Based on the 
discussion in the previous section, though information tends to be stored where it should be in 
accordance with procedures in place, this does not necessarily mean that it is the optimal way of 
accomplishing things. As reviewed, participants are limited by the technical systems’ designs in 
terms of what can effectively be inputted into it. Thus, there are pieces of information which will 
only be stored in the PF, but not on the IntSys, which is more easily open to scrutiny and oversight. 
Likewise, SIAFI also does not store within it the entire procurement process, only two instances 
of it, RoC and payment. Thus, these are the only two instances of a process comprised of thirty-
nine steps, that is communicated to the Transparency Portal and which will be open to scrutiny 
from civil society (the “public access” phase of transparency). 
 The fact that information in the PF is not effectively open to scrutiny or monitoring, leads 
to the third and fourth questions in Galliers et al.’s (2007) checklist: has information not been 
communicated/transmitted effectively, and is any necessary information missing from the system. 
From the standpoint of a procedural analysis only, it can be assumed that the information that is 
not inputted into the system will not jeopardize the process itself; in other words, it can still be 
concluded and supply needs will still be met. As discussed previously, an entire procurement 
process can take place outside of the technical system and will still be concluded. Thus, IntSys is 
not fundamental to the process. However, these technical artefacts were officially put in place to 
attend to legislature demands, i.e. increased transparency, in accordance with laws enacted in 2009 
and 2010 (see Chapter 5 for a full discussion). From this standpoint, the one of monitoring and 
oversight, any information that is not inputted into the system greatly jeopardizes that possibility. 
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 This leads to Galliers et al.’s (2007) fifth question, which refers to whether incorrect 
information has been stored in the system. As the data gathered shows, the answer to that question 
is unfortunately positive. This, however, can be due to both unintentional as well as intentional 
actions, as presented in the previous section of this chapter. If due to an unintentional error, this 
will have been the result of information has had to be inputted manually into the system, as opposed 
to it being automatically populated (in the instance of quote information, for example). It can also 
be the result of an intentional action. As discussed in previous sections of both this chapter and the 
previous one, information is subject to manipulation. Such is the case regarding the invoice 
whereby information was intentionally omitted so as to conceal the true nature of the purchase 
made. The incorrect information will, however, be placed into the system giving the process the 
auspices of having taken place in accordance with procedures.  
 The sixth question in Galliers et al.’s (2007) checklist is similar to the fifth one, asking 
whether any inconsistent information had been placed in the system. As with the fifth question, 
the answer is yes. Reality does not always conform to what is portrayed in the system such as, for 
instance, in the case of suppliers that have already been pre-selected. Though in the system it will 
appear as if procedure had been followed with the three quotes being registered, in reality, the 
procedure would have been circumvented. Since the selection of quotes is up to the buyer, not 
necessarily the best quotes will be registered on the IntSys, leading IntSys to pick a winning bid 
based on a false premise and faulty information. 
 The final question in Galliers et al.’s (2007) list refers to whether action has been taken on 
the basis of incorrect information. The answer is once again, yes. Internally, regarding solely the 
procurement process, purchase requests will be completed and payment remitted based on the 
information that was initially fed into the system. Externally, from a transparency standpoint, civil 
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society can only act upon information which is stored and displayed on the Transparency Portal. 
If the information that is publicized there appears to be correct, then there is no wrongdoing to act 
upon or contest. 
 And information on the Transparency Portal will indeed appear to be correct because of 
two fundamental reasons: (1) as has already been discussed, the Transparency Portal does not 
capture the entire procurement process, only two distinct stages of it, RoC and payment, which are 
registered on SIAFI. Moreover, recall that there is no integration between SIAFI and IntSys, 
meaning that the mediating structure between both systems are the individuals. (2) The 
manipulation of information will have taken place in the pockets of informality of the procurement 
process. As established in the previous chapter, the way in which the procurement process has 
been structured (the PF is a main mediating artefact) and layout of Agency X not only allows but 
encourages a high level of communication bandwidth (face-to-face communication) and informal 
exchange. Thus, even if civil society did have an insight into the entire process, the way IntSys is 
designed to capture information allows for the process to be corrupted and appear as if it were in 
accordance with legislation, when in fact it was not. 
 It stands to reason that the aim of the Transparency Portal is to provide scrutiny to global 
amounts spent (i.e. is budget execution within limits), but not to scrutinize specific elements, nor 
the exact nature of expenditure, which leads to the question of how transparent is, in fact, the 
system. 
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7.3.5 Discussion 
 This information system is subject to various breakdowns, categorized above in instances 
of artefact, non-intentional human, and intentional human breakdowns. Having identified the 
sources of breakdowns to the information flow, it is now possible to address the second research 
question established in Chapter 3, which will be done in the next section. 
 
 
7.3.5.1 How do breakdowns impact the cognitive system? 
 As presented in this chapter, breakdowns are defined as failures to the information flow 
(Sharp and Robinson 2006) and can impact the information system in several ways. The first step 
towards measuring the impact was identifying the ways in which breakdowns occurred and what 
the sources of those were. In order to do so, Galliers et al. (2007) suggest that a map be established 
of how the information system should work under optimal conditions and then based on that 
identify the pitfalls and error points. 
In order to achieve that, I relied on the information obtained as a result of analytically 
decomposing the procurement process, as established by the theoretical framework, DCog, 
adopted (see Figure 6.1 in Chapter 6 for a visual map, and Appendix VII for a detailed step-by-
step), and then, based on the DiCoT models delineated as a result of the data analysis, it was 
possible to identify what the problem-areas were. 
As a result, three categories of breakdowns were identified: those caused due to 
shortcomings and failures of artefacts; those caused due to an unintentional action by human 
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agents; and those breakdowns that were intentionally caused by human agents (please refer to 
Table 7.2 for an overview). 
The breakdowns that take place as a result of failures of artefacts were found to have a 
more limited and contained impact than those caused by human agents in terms of the quality of 
information that is produced. These breakdowns were all caused by limitations and the inherent 
design flaws of the IntSys. The impact of these mostly referred to procedures being delayed and/or 
the creation of bottlenecks. It meant additional work for human agents, who often expressed their 
frustration with it, describing it as inefficient. Another felt impact was that certain pieces of 
information were not registered on the system due to it crashing, such as outgoing requests for 
quotes to suppliers, which should go through the IntSys, but ended up more often than not being 
carried out by e-mail. A more perverse impact of these breakdowns, however, was the opportunity 
it gave individuals to proceed with processes outside of the technical system, using its inefficiency 
as a source of moral disengagement. Moreover, such instances compromised the quality of the 
information being produced. 
Regarding non-intentional human breakdowns, these referred to unintentional actions 
which impacted the information system in different ways. The most concerning of such 
breakdowns referred to those which compromised the integrity of the information being stored in 
the IntSys, such as, for example, not registering on it when a stage in the procurement process had 
been completed or inputting incorrect information into it. In both these cases, the IntSys itself was 
partly to blame for the breakdown. Due to technical design failures, the IntSys is unable to 
automatically populate certain fields of information (such as quotes) nor does it automatically 
register when processes have evolved to the next team, relying solely on the actions of participants 
(further corroborating what was discussed in the previous section as to the dominant role 
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individuals play in propagating information through this system). An important aspect regarding 
this type of breakdown is that it usually occurred due to the sole action of a single individual. In 
the case of intentional human breakdowns, however, these were usually due to a concerted group 
action. 
Intentional human breakdowns were defined as precisely that: the intentional action of 
human agents. In other words, individuals had an intent to purposefully compromise the integrity 
of the system. Hence, the reason for such breakdowns was mostly due to unethical decision-
making on behalf of individuals. The impact was that compromised and incorrect information was 
stored in the technical system, which did not portray reality. 
An important aspect concerns the source of such breakdowns, which, as gathered from the 
data collected and analyzed, was more often than not, a member of the upper levels of the 
hierarchy. As discussed extensively already, power structures are a strong feature of this work 
environment, not only within Agency X but also outside of it, throughout Ministry X. What this 
means for this type of breakdown is that it went uncontested and all individuals involved in a 
specific purchase process collaborated in inputting the wrong information in the technical system. 
Such information would later be registered on SIAFI and, in turn, on the Transparency Portal. 
The impact for all three types of breakdown can be split into two categories: they either 
delay processes or compromise the integrity of the information stored in the technical system. In 
other words, incorrect information is being stored in the technical system and then later reported 
on the Transparency Portal. This obviously limits the effectiveness of transparency. Of interest 
here are the cognitive mechanisms which support such information breakdowns, i.e. moral 
disengagement. This will be addressed as part of the third research question proposed in Chapter 
3. 
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 Moral disengagement and how such mechanisms facilitated the breakdowns identified will 
be reviewed in the next section of this chapter. 
 
 
7.4 Moral Disengagement 
 As discussed in the previous Chapter, collective moral disengagement is present within 
Agency X, as measured by Moore et al.’s (2012) Moral Disengagement Measure, and then further 
corroborated by the qualitative data gathered and then coded in accordance with Bandura’s (2006) 
guidelines and coding procedures. The results indicated not only a propensity to morally disengage 
by individuals at Agency X but that this, in fact, did occur through various guises. Table 7.3 
summarizes the main findings. 
 
Table 7.3 – Sources of Moral Disengagement  
Moral Justification Displacement of 
Responsibility 
Diffusion of 
Responsibility 
Euphemistic 
Labelling 
Advantageous 
Comparison 
1. Technical systems 
are inefficient 
(modularity) 
2. Procedures are 
counter-productive. 
3. The formal 
process takes too 
long. 
4. Rules need to be 
broken to address 
supply needs faster. 
5. Money needs to 
be spent to 
guarantee a budget 
for the following 
fiscal year. 
 
1. Upper 
management 
dictate rules 
(hierarchy) 
2. Orders must be 
followed (hierarchy) 
1. Long-held 
traditions, “the way 
things have always 
been done” 
(cultural heritage) 
2. Willfully ignoring 
what others do 
(Low horizon of 
observation) 
Use of alternative 
labels for 
corruption, such as: 
wrong, non-
conforming, break 
of procedure, a 
favor 
1. Size of 
organization 
(smaller than other 
entities within the 
Brazilian federal 
government). 
2. Monetary, i.e. 
funds diverted are 
smaller than in 
other agencies 
(such as Petrobrás).  
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 As discussed in Chapter 3, moral disengagement refers to how individuals engage in 
morally reprehensible acts in a manner that deactivates self-regulatory processes that habitually 
govern moral behavior. It refers to individuals reframing their own actions in order to downplay 
the ethical content of their actions. As Bandura et al. (1996: 365) affirm, “people do not ordinarily 
engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the rightness of their 
actions. What is culpable can be made righteous through cognitive reconstrual”.  
Rooted in social cognitive psychology, Bandura (1999; 2016) highlights in several 
instances the “selective” quality to MD.   In other words, individuals tend to adopt different 
standards of morality depending on their context. Thus, an individual who is morally disengaged 
within their work environment might be an upstanding citizen in other areas of their life, such as 
a faithful spouse, a charitable citizen etc. In accordance with Bandura’s (1999) triadic reciprocal 
causation model, what sets the standard for whether an individual will morally disengage or not is 
the context within which they are embedded. 
As discussed previously, people are essentially social beings. Thus, the opinion of others 
matter, be it their peers or a superior. Not conforming to their social environment means running 
the risk of being shamed, embarrassed or ostracized, which, as Warren and Smith (2008) observe, 
causes feelings of distress. Moreover, as Bandura (2016) adds, individuals value being positively 
viewed by those whose opinions they care about, such as a manager or a colleague. Thus, MD 
allows individuals to, when confronted with evidence that would challenge their positive self-view, 
“question its credibility, dismiss its relevance, or twist it to fit their views” (Bandura 1991: 95). 
The effect of such cognitive mechanisms is the perpetuation of morally reprehensible acts, 
which in the case of Agency X, translates into unethical decision-making and wrongdoing. The 
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moral disengagement theory establishes eight mechanisms through which individuals will strive 
to self-justify their actions. Five of these mechanisms were observed at Agency X, as listed in 
Table 7.3. The ways in which individuals morally disengaged varied. However, the first three 
mechanisms listed in Table 7.3 were certainly the most prevalent, as could be attested by the data 
gathered.  
As discussed, hierarchy was a strong feature present in this organization and, as data 
demonstrates, also one of most common forms of moral disengagement (displacement of 
authority). The power structure at Agency X thus facilitated corruption, with individuals 
delegating their power of decision to a higher authority and using this as a way of evading self-
condemnation and any negative feelings that could arise as a result of collaborating in such actions. 
This is consistent with findings by Moore et al. (2012) and White et al. (2009) who studied 
unethical decision-making in organizational settings.  
In fact, several studies have stressed the effect unethical leadership has on driving unethical 
behavior amongst subordinates in organizations (Brown et al. 2005; Brown and Treviño 2006; 
Moore 2008; Brown and Mitchel 2010). To this extent, Moore et al. (2018: 1) affirm that 
“leadership is often singled out as a critical driver of both ethical and unethical behavior inside 
organizations”. Though these studies have been in the area of organizations, results here suggest 
that these same mechanisms are reflected within governmental institutions. Obviously, results 
obtained in this study cannot be generalized due to the single case approach that was adopted, 
however, the consistency of similar findings in other disparate settings (private corporations in 
countries with different cultural contexts) suggest that this specific finding is not restricted to this 
particular setting.  
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Reinforcing this finding, Bandura (2016: 35) affirms that “individuals who believe they are 
simply powerless cogs in a system feel no responsibility for their actions, whereas those who 
believe they have some influence over what they do hold themselves at least partially accountable”. 
This characterization of accountability emerged from the data, as individuals, by practicing proxy 
agency, handed over their power of decision to their managers and also any sense of accountability, 
allowing themselves to feel exempt from morally-reprehensible actions undertaken. This is 
significant since these are structures that remained intact even in the face of the deployment of 
technology which, officially, had the objective of curbing corrupt practices and enhancing levels 
of personal accountability. However, even with the implementation of new technical systems, 
personal accountability remained firmly shifted to a proxy, i.e. their managers.  
The strong social structures present at Agency X also manifested themselves as a form of 
moral disengagement, through the diffusion of responsibility mechanism. This is also consistent 
with findings by White et al. (2009: 43), who explain “people do not operate as autonomous moral 
agents, impervious to the social forces operating within the corporate system in which they are 
enmeshed. Collective moral disengagement at the social system level requires a network of 
participants”. This feature, of a network of willing participants, was also observed at Agency X, 
whereby an entire team cooperated and supported acts of wrongdoing, whether they directly 
benefitted from it or not.  
Thus, corruption does not manifest itself as the result of the actions of one single individual. 
Rather, it requires that all those present collaborate somehow, be it in the form of inputting 
incorrect data into the information system or ignoring what took place around them allowing it to 
perpetuate. As stressed in the previous section, intentional human breakdowns are often the result 
of a team effort since, at all stages of the procurement process, information will have to be 
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distorted. This finding reinforces the notion that people are not impervious to their social settings, 
adopting certain codes of conduct to fit into that particular environment. It is also consistent with 
the results of corruption in organizational settings (Anand et al. 2005; Treviño et al. 2006; Pinto et 
al. 2008). To this extent, Ashforth and Mael (1989) observe that individuals develop social 
identities in accordance with the different social groups they are inserted in and the different social 
roles they play.  
The only issue with these studies is the lack of acknowledgement regarding the fact that 
not all of those who partake in the process of unethical decision-making directly benefit from it. 
In the case of Pinto et al.’s (2008) research, for example, they refer to only two classes of 
individuals: those who engage in corruption and benefit directly from it, and those that engage in 
corruption to benefit their company. For most of the human agents who are integral to the cognitive 
system under analysis, they neither directly benefit from it, nor are they doing it to benefit their 
organization, i.e. the government. Quite the contrary, public funds are being abused. However, 
these individuals still facilitate the process and collaborate with it.   
Important also to note the principles which allow such social structure to perpetuate: firstly, 
cultural heritage reinforces the historical aspect of this cognitive system, aiding in the belief that 
procedures should be followed in a certain way since that is the way it has traditionally been done. 
Secondly, distribution of knowledge is a facilitator since it is largely contained within the human 
component of this cognitive system. Thus, the representational media between individuals is 
language, meaning that procedures and norms are largely communicated in an informal manner 
and face-to-face. As already discussed, written norms do exist but they are largely ignored in favor 
of consulting with other individuals.   
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Another mechanism commonly used was moral justification which often came in the form 
of blaming technical systems’ perceived flaws and inefficiencies. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
failings are real. So much so, that an additional stage in the procurement process was inserted into 
it in order to accommodate such failings and a specific person (“A”) was designated solely for this 
purpose (IntSys’s inability to direct requests itself to the appropriate team member). However, the 
act of blaming the artefact to justify wrongdoing is, in fact, moral justification. For example, 
choosing suppliers according to personal interest because the IntSys’s search engine is faulty. It 
seems therefore reasonable to infer that whether the technical system responded to the needs or 
not, individuals would continue to blame it; it had already become an ingrained form of justifying 
actions that would otherwise be considered morally reprehensible. In that regard, the technical 
artefact itself became the source of moral disengagement, thus facilitating unethical decision-
making. In other words, the technical system which had been designed to curb corruption, created 
pockets of opportunities for the social system to behave unethically.  
In this regard, the use of euphemistic language also aided in this process. Alternative 
language has the impact of “sanitizing” actions and making them seem benign. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, individuals never described the practices that took place at Agency X as “corrupt”, 
instead using alternative terms to describe such actions, such as “wrong”, “non-conforming”, “a 
favor”, words that are imbued with meanings more tolerable than “corrupt”. The use of such a 
mechanism has the ability to “normalize” a situation and make individuals more at ease to be 
engaging in it. It minimizes self-condemnation and feelings of distress that would have resulted 
had individuals objectively viewed their actions as corrupt. 
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In summary, findings here confirmed the presence of moral disengagement mechanisms 
within Agency X and its use to support and facilitate unethical decision-making. Through the 
disengagement of their moral codes, individuals are able to minimize feelings of self-
condemnation and support the wrongdoing that takes place within that environment, whether they 
benefit directly from it or not. Through moral disengagement, individuals confer their agency to a 
proxy, exempting themselves from culpability, and granting their power of decision, and thus 
personal accountability, to another instance, be it their manager or the social system in which they 
are enmeshed. This results for individuals in the belief that their actions are acceptable, and that 
no unethical decision-making or wrongdoing takes place in that environment (as reflected by the 
answers obtained to the question of whether corruption took place at Agency X or not, and 90% 
of respondents categorically denying it). 
Moreover, the themes that emerged here matched the ones that had emerged as a result of 
the DCog data analysis. Equivalent themes were found in both sets of analyses: what under MD is 
identified as displacement of responsibility and diffusion of responsibility, finds its equivalency in 
DCog principles under the social structure DiCoT model. This thus reinforces the validity of 
findings and analysis results.  
 
 
7.4.1 Discussion  
Having already discussed how the cognitive system under analysis is distributed, how 
breakdowns occur, and how moral disengagement mechanisms manifest themselves, it is thus 
necessary to address the third research question proposed, which will be done in the next section. 
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7.4.1.1 How do moral disengagement mechanisms facilitate the breakdown of cognitive 
systems? 
The third research question was motivated by the attempt to comprehend whether moral 
disengagement mechanisms had facilitated the breakdowns identified in previous sections of this 
Chapter. As discussed previously, the sources of breakdown to the information system under study 
were classified into three categories: artefact, non-intentional human, and intentional human. In 
the case of artefact and non-intentional human breakdowns, moral disengagement played no part. 
This because such breakdowns were either the result of imbued technical design flaws that 
technical artefacts present (as discussed in previous sections at length), or the lack of intent in 
causing a breakdown by the individuals (mostly due to the way the procurement process is 
delineated and IntSys’s design failings).  
In the case of intentional human types of breakdown, these were found to be the result of 
unethical-decision making, since they were caused due to the direct intent of compromising the 
cognitive system.  Moreover, intentional breakdowns were facilitated by collective action.  In other 
words, the intent to distort information required a team effort. It involved almost everyone in the 
task sequence, at the very least “B” and “C” (please refer to Appendix VII for a step-by step of the 
procurement process), but possibly “Z” and “D” and, at times even “E”. Yet, in spite of this 
collaborative effort, only a handful benefitted from a particular activity. As identified, members of 
upper management were the main beneficiaries, rarely it being a low-ranking civil servant (the 
only exception identified was the individual who used their own company to supply catering 
services to Agency X; see Chapter 6).  
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Thus, two principles discussed previously played a significant role in facilitating such 
breakdowns: hierarchy and the immediate social context, both of which were often found to be 
used as a form to morally disengage (in the form of displacement of responsibility and diffusion 
of responsibility, respectively). Thus, it is possible to affirm that moral disengagement played a 
significant role in facilitating such actions since it is by disengaging that individuals allow 
themselves to partake in activities which would have otherwise caused them discomfort, that is, 
breaking their personal moral codes. 
As Bandura (2016: 10) affirms, “people do not operate as autonomous moral agents, 
impervious to the social realities in which they are enmeshed”. As such, through the daily 
interactions and gradual socialization, individuals are gradually habituated into this form of local 
culture. As reviewed, social structures at Agency X were found to be the result of long-held 
traditions, resistant to change (cultural heritage). Personal conduct expectations will have been 
established as a result of that. In this regard, Bandura (2016: 27) further explains that “moral 
mandates are often overridden by emotions, enticing incentives, and coercive social pressures”. 
Thus, individuals will feel social pressure to conform to these locally established norms, gradually 
disengaging their own personal moral self-regulatory processes, and freeing themselves from any 
feeling of self-condemnation or self-sanction.  
As a result, the action of morally disengaging allows individuals to partake in acts of 
wrongdoing. The fact that individuals are so heavily influenced by their immediate contexts and 
hierarchy also emerged through the analysis of data through DCog, thus confirming the validity of 
these findings. In terms of information breakdown, these actions compromise the integrity of the 
data stored and propagated through this information system. Thus, it is possible to affirm that MD 
278 
 
mechanisms facilitate the unethical intent to distort information in instances of intentional human 
breakdown.  
It is, however, important to note that though morally disengaging facilitates wrongdoing 
within a certain environment, it is not the cause of the wrongdoing. Moral disengagement merely 
aids in perpetuating corruption, since it ensures the willing and unwavering participation of an 
entire group, a requirement in this cognitive system whereby different human agents retain 
different parts of the procurement process, each with their own individual task-goals. The exact 
origins of corruption within Agency X would require further investigation and a different 
methodological approach (i.e. a longitudinal study). This was not the intent of this research, and 
any discussion in this regard would be mere speculation. Nothing in the findings suggest a 
definitive answer to that question. An answer as to why it takes place now, however, can be given 
and will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter.  
In summary, deliberate intention to distort the information system is the result of unethical 
decision-making by an individual, which is then facilitated by a collective and concerted effort. 
Such unethical-decision making enjoys the support of others due to the fact that individuals within 
this environment are morally disengaged. They, through processes of socialization (such as the 
way distribution of knowledge is imparted), and seeking to feel accepted, will gradually disengage 
their moral codes, thus avoiding feelings of distress or self-condemnation.  As such, it is possible 
to affirm that morally disengaged individuals do disrupt the information system, thus causing 
breakdowns in the information flow, in order to conceal certain pieces of information that might 
otherwise reveal illegalities. The result of this is that transparency is compromised.  
Having addressed the core research questions, some key findings will be discussed in the 
next section of this chapter. 
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7.5 Discussion of Findings  
Sections 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 aimed at directly addressing the research questions proposed in 
Chapter 3. The intent was to gain a better understanding as to how this cognitive system operates 
and thus, comprehend how information is created (relevant to the “creation” phase of transparency) 
and disrupted, and draw relevant conclusions regarding, not only the unit of analysis but also the 
themes of transparency and corruption, which are central to this thesis. Thus, this section of the 
Chapter will discuss some of the most relevant findings. 
  
 
7.5.1 Corruption: Why?  
As discussed previously, it is not possible to ascertain with precision the origins of 
corruption at Agency X. Such query falls outside the scope of this study. However, it is possible 
to determine why it perpetuates and has remained largely undeterred. Upon analyzing the data, a 
few themes emerged which allows me to draw some meaningful conclusions. 
The first aspect refers to the power structure present within this system. As discussed in 
previous sections, power and unethical leadership have often been found to be correlated to 
wrongdoing in organizations, as studies such as those conducted by Moore et al. (2018) and Brown 
and Mitchel (2010) show. Such findings were replicated here. As extensively discussed, the 
unethical leadership at Agency X was the largest source of wrongdoing, leading to the most causes 
of intentional breakdowns in the information system. Such leadership ensured the cooperation of 
all involved who, in turn, conferred their power of decision and personal accountability to leaders. 
The displacement of responsibility disengagement mechanism allowed individuals who 
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collaborated with such actions (by knowingly distorting processes and inputting incorrect 
information into technical systems) to do so without feeling self-condemnation or distress. 
Moreover, it guaranteed their participation even though they did not personally profit from them. 
The second aspect refers to the social dynamics that are present at Agency X. They 
implicate in the perpetuation of corruption in several ways. Firstly, it ensures a network of willing 
participants through the diffusion of responsibility moral disengagement mechanism. Secondly, 
the characteristics of the social dynamics present also aid in this respect. For example, the way 
knowledge is distributed (verbally) ensures that certain practices remain intact, reinforcing the 
cultural heritage principle. In addition, as identified, it contributes to the informal environment 
present within this system, which creates pockets of opportunity for corruption to occur, since it 
ensures such instances are never formally registered. This is consistent with findings by Smith-
Crowe et al. (2015) who note that it is the dynamics between formal and informal arrangements 
that dictate the ethical climate in an organization. To this extent, formal arrangements, such as 
norms and codes of conduct “act as a constraint” (Smith-Crowe et al. 2015: 12). As noted, formal 
norms do exist and are available for consultation at Agency X’s intranet. However, they are 
ignored in favor of consulting with colleagues in case of doubts. 
The third aspect that needs to be highlighted, refers to the role technical systems themselves 
play in perpetuating corruption. As discussed, the way the cognitive system has been idealized 
means that human agents are the hubs between artefacts, which do not communicate directly 
between themselves. In addition, the most used technical system, IntSys, presents many imbued 
flaws and, as observed, does not meet the demands of this cognitive system. IntSys itself creates 
opportunities for wrongdoing to flourish, such as how it documents the quotes received from 
suppliers allowing buyers the opportunity to manipulate the integrity of the process. Moreover, the 
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many technical failings have led IntSys to become a source of moral justification. IntSys has been 
identified with terms such as “inefficient” and “slow” meaning that in order to be effective or 
speedy, one must circumvent it (as constantly occurs. At the time I last interviewed participants at 
Agency X, I was informed that there were at least twenty processes not being formally registered 
on the IntSys, which they would get to doing so when possible). The fact that IntSys was centrally 
deployed by Ministry X without consulting those at the forefront of actually using the system is 
obviously a contributing factor in this and consistent with what has been documented by Heeks 
(2006). 
 Thus, it can be inferred that the perpetuation of corruption within this cognitive system has 
been due to three factors: (1) power structure, and the role unethical leadership has played; (2) 
social dynamics, which have been perpetuated due to distribution of knowledge and informality; 
(3) the technical systems’ imbued properties, allowing for human agents to be the mediating 
structures, hubs, and the leaders in information flow. In addition, all three aspects functioned as 
mechanisms for moral disengagement in the form of (1) displacement of responsibility, (2) 
diffusion of responsibility, and (3) moral justification. This confirms the applicability of Bandura’s 
(1986) MD theory to this setting. The mechanisms which he delineates in his theory have been 
clearly observed. 
A few more observations should be made regarding corruption at Agency X. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, a significant body of research on corruption has treated individuals as people of a 
morally dubious character (Darley 2005), who rationally reflect about the costs and benefits prior 
to engaging in acts of corruption. As the data gathered shows, this conception of wrongdoers does 
not seem to apply to individuals at Agency X. Rather, the decision to support unethical decision-
making is not a rational one. Moreover, most who support and facilitate wrongdoing do not 
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personally benefit from it, which means there cannot have been a rational cost-benefit analysis if 
the benefit is so low. Benefits can be mostly attributed to social acceptance, but there is no 
monetary gain. Nor can these individuals claim fear at losing their jobs as would individuals who 
work for private organizations. As public officers, employed by the Brazilian federal government, 
these individuals enjoy stability and can only be fired under one single rule: misconduct and 
wrongdoing29. Thus, the view of individuals who are maximum utility-seekers does not apply here, 
rather Palmer’s (2012) categorization of such individuals as “mindless” seems to be more fitting. 
 Another consideration regarding corruption at Agency X is the openness of it. Corruption 
is often thought of as extremely covert, difficult to uncover. Yet, at Agency X, it takes place quite 
openly. As discussed, this is an open-floor environment whereby proximity is quite high, as are 
the exchanges between individuals. Not even upper management can claim privacy, despite having 
an office space since, as reported, the walls to those offices are thin, meaning that any conversation 
that takes place in these spaces can be overheard – in addition to the fact that managers tend to 
have an open door policy. Furthermore, as discussed, wrongdoing requires a team effort. It requires 
that most individuals on the task chain facilitate such actions in some way. 
 In summary, the combination of both DCog and MD as applied to this research has allowed 
for some insights as to how corruption operates in the context of this governmental agency. It can 
be inferred from the data gathered that the perpetuation of corruption is multi-pronged and not due 
to one single reason. Both social and technical aspects have been identified which allow for 
corruption to keep taking place, meaning that the solution for curbing it must be multi-pronged as 
well. Solutions that favor one aspect over the other will probably have a limited effect. This further 
                                                          
29 Even in the case of wrongdoing, civil servant will only be dismissed after a long investigation process 
conducted by the Comptroller General of the Union. 
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corroborates the notion that the cognitive system under analysis constitutes a socio-technical 
system. 
 
 
7.5.2 How Transparent Is It Really?  
 The DiCoT methodological approach determines that the researcher delineate five distinct 
models: physical layout, artefact, information flow, social structure, and evolutionary. As a result 
of coding data for principles and building the models, a very clear picture of how the cognitive 
system under analysis operates starts to emerge. And the findings obtained resulted in one specific 
question regarding the transparency efforts by the Brazilian federal government: how transparent 
is it really? 
 The Transparency Portal established in 2004, was considered one of the first in the world 
at the time. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 6, Brazil has often sat at the top of indices that 
demonstrate the degree of openness of countries. This means that Brazil has consistently been 
found to be one of the most transparent countries in the world. However, upon analyzing the data 
gathered through the DiCoT structure, a few issues seem to emerge. The first one refers to the 
limitations of the technical systems that were deployed and form the basis of the transparency 
system, IntSys, which is tasked with registering the entire procurement process, and SIAFI which 
registers financial aspects of the process and then feeds it into the Transparency Portal. As 
discussed both in Chapter 6 and in earlier sections of this present Chapter, IntSys is incapable of 
capturing everything owing largely to its own imbued limitations. For example, even if the request 
for quotes goes through IntSys (step VI of the procurement process; see Appendix VII), the replies 
come back via e-mail, and it is up to the buyer to insert this information manually back into the 
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system (step XIII). Not only does this leave the technical system subject to error, since the buyer 
may make mistakes upon typing this information, but also leaves it up to the buyer what exactly 
they want to insert in the system. 
 The way the procurement process is set up means that there are several pockets of 
informality. For example, there are no defined criteria for selecting which suppliers to contact for 
quotes (it is at buyers’ discretion) and much of the discussion that takes place regarding these 
processes is done directly, a characteristic which is encouraged by the physical layout of the office 
(open-floor setup). In addition, the cognitive system has been set up so that human agents are both 
hub and trigger in the sequential control of action. More importantly, though, they are also the 
ones who act as mediating structures between technical systems. That means that IntSys and SIAFI 
do not communicate directly. An individual is responsible for that mediation, located in the 
financial department, on a separate floor, away from negotiations that take place regarding 
processes. Though, as reviewed, these individuals in the financial department will at times be 
caught up in unethical decisions that are taken by their superiors, for the most part, their horizon 
of observation is low, as is their situation awareness. 
 Another feature of this procurement process is the prominent role the artefact paper has, 
acting as both distributed memory and trigger. Though it is an inanimate artefact, its importance 
is greater than that of IntSys, since it will carry more information than IntSys does, and act as a 
reminder for individuals to act (PFs will be placed on top of desks where they are visible), a 
capability which IntSys does not have (as reviewed, it does not send trigger reminders, not even 
when processes are overdue). 
 In addition to the characteristics mentioned, as can be observed in Figure 6.7 (Chapter 6), 
the procurement process is a long one, consisting of thirty-nine sequential steps. However, only 
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two of these steps, steps XXIII and XXXVIII, are recorded on the Transparency Portal through 
SIAFI. Hence, even if IntSys were an excellent technical system, with no flaws, capable of 
attending the needs of those at Agency X and of capturing every single piece of information 
inherent to the procurement process, the output would remain the same: only two instances of 
information, out of a long range of steps, is open to scrutiny by citizens. Thus, it is possible to 
conclude that the transparency system, as currently designed, is limited in its capacity to capture 
information and thus limited in what information it publishes. Citizens who access the 
Transparency Portal looking to monitor spending will have access to only a limited piece of 
information. In spite of this, as reviewed in Chapter 2, most of the research conducted on 
transparency has concerned itself with enhancing citizens’ participation, or how to make web 
portals more accessible. It seems, however, that the creation stage of transparency, which remains 
largely overlooked, should garner more attention and, in that regard, the DiCoT framework has 
been an excellent form of evaluating such systems. 
 Though DCog had never been applied to a governmental setting, this study has validated 
its applicability for this area of research. This will be discussed further in the next section. 
 
 
7.5.3 A “Disengaged” Distributed Cognitive System   
One of the motivators behind this piece of research was the perception that a certain class 
of individuals had remained largely overlooked by researchers: low ranking civil servants, 
particularly those with no contact with citizens, functioning as internal cogs of government, 
helping the government machine run. Though this class of government workers constitutes one of 
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the largest content providers for transparency portals (at least in Brazil), they have been, for the 
most part, under-researched by those who study transparency. 
Having already established that a socio-technical approach was needed (due to how 
transparency had been conceptualized in Chapter 2), DCog and MD were adopted as the theoretical 
underpinnings. Though neither had ever been applied to the context of a government setting, nor 
had they ever been applied in conjunction, both seemed a perfect fit for what was the overarching 
puzzle that had been established previously: understanding why transparency had failed to yield 
the results expected (i.e. less corruption) in the Brazilian federal government. The fact that DCog 
favors a micro-approach to the unit of analysis also contributed to how it fit into this study. 
The unit of analysis in question, was the cognitive system at Agency X. And in order to 
apply the DCog theoretical framework to this study in a semi-structured way, the DiCoT 
methodological framework was adopted. The intent was to make it clear what steps were taken in 
this research in terms of data gathering and analysis thus setting up the framework for other 
researchers to replicate this study in future (especially to other settings). 
The result was the clear identification of how the cognitive system under analysis operated, 
how information propagated through the system, which agent – artefact or human – responsible 
for each part of the process, what the points of breakdown were and why, and what other elements 
(for instance social) contributed to this specific cognitive system’s characteristics, in addition to 
how the environment influences this system.  
Coupled with MD, it then became possible to visualize at which points the system was 
disengaged and contributed towards causing breakdowns. Both MD and DCog are rooted in (or 
derive from) cognitive psychology, making them compatible. Both reinforce the cognitive aspect 
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of individuals, without however dismissing the role the external environment has in shaping the 
way individuals operate or distribute knowledge. As visualized in Bandura’s (1999) triadic 
reciprocal causation model, both – the environment and the individual – reinforce one another in 
a bi-directional way. With DCog, a third element is added, which is the artefact. This non-
reductionist view was one I was interested in, since, as discussed in Chapter 2, much of the research 
conducted in e-government has emphasized a technological deterministic view. And, as the result 
of the way transparency was conceptualized in Chapter 2, it was my contention that transparency 
was indeed a socio-technical system, whereby individuals and artefacts work in tandem, restricting 
and reinforcing one another in a bi-directional way. This view, through this study, was confirmed.  
An observation regarding the DiCoT methodological framework that was adopted is that it 
is not a substitute for DCog, the theoretical framework from which it draws its principles. DiCoT 
merely adds a structure with which to study it, making this research more easily replicable. In other 
words, one should familiarize onself with DCog prior to utilizing the DiCoT framework. Another 
observation is that DiCoT should not be taken as a static framework. On the contrary, it is 
malleable in the sense that as new codes emerge for other DCog principles, the framework can be 
extended to accommodate these. As previously discussed in Chapter 6, to that extent other studies 
have similarly either extended the framework or limited it (Berndt et al. 2014; Furniss et al. 2015). 
The extension of the social structure model in this scenario (see Appendix VIII) reflected the 
prominent role human agents took in propagating information through the cognitive system. 
As previously discussed, the picture painted as a result of analyzing data through the 
theoretical lens of DCog and MD, demonstrated that though the cognitive system under analysis 
was indeed a distributed cognitive system, it also showed it was not equally distributed between 
human agents and artefacts. Rather, individuals functioned as leaders of the information flow and, 
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in addition as the largest retainers of knowledge. As morally disengaged individuals, this translated 
into disengaged responses to intentional human breakdowns whenever these occurred. As such, 
not only can this cognitive system be characterized as distributed, it is also morally disengaged. 
Though it had never been applied to the study of an information system at a governmental 
agency, DiCoT had been applied to several other work settings, such as mobile healthcare work 
(McKnight and Doherty 2008) and software team interactions (Sharp and Robinson 2006), 
attesting to its wide range applicability and flexibility. This study further validates its use for this 
type of setting. The framework set forth in this study can be used as the basis for future studies. 
The extended social structure model which was formed (see Appendix VIII) should also be 
considered by those who wish to apply the DiCoT to similar settings, i.e. where the social 
component clearly leads the technical one. 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 This Chapter was aimed at discussing findings and addressing the research questions that 
had been proposed in Chapter 3. Some meaningful insights were gathered, such as: 
• The cognitive distribution between human agents and artefacts, in addition to the 
environmental influence, demonstrating that individuals led the propagation of 
information. Though the technical component plays a role in how information is 
registered (according to its own design limitations), it does not dictate what gets 
stored, or even when. This attribution is the responsibility of human agents. Thus, 
it is the individuals who retain the largest portion of knowledge, with the physical 
layout acting as a facilitator.  
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• The points of breakdown in the information flow, demonstrating three categories 
of breakdown: artefact, non-intentional human, and intentional human. This 
demonstrated that breakdowns occur for different reasons, but also that, in the case 
of intentional breakdowns, this is due to unethical decision-making (most often 
from the leadership team). Such breakdowns compromise the quality and integrity 
of the cognitive system. Moreover, the information stored into technical systems 
fails to portray reality. 
• The presence of moral disengagement mechanisms. Individuals that were integral 
to the cognitive system were found to be morally disengaged, demonstrating their 
propensity to engage in wrongdoing. Certain disengagement mechanisms were 
found to be more frequent than others (such as the displacement of responsibility 
and diffusion of responsibility), reflecting the social structure within this 
environment. Moreover, it facilitated breakdowns caused by the intentional action 
of human agents since it guaranteed collaboration from all, even those who 
personally did not benefit from such actions. 
 
In addition to the findings above, this Chapter also discussed the reasons for why corruption 
has persisted within this environment, in addition to issues pertaining to the transparency system 
and mechanisms in place, questioning how transparent the system actually is. Finally, this Chapter 
discussed the applicability of the theoretical framework adopted to this research. Though neither 
DCog nor MD had even been applied to this type of setting (a governmental agency, and to study 
the links between transparency and corruption), it allowed the researcher to draw meaningful 
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conclusions and insights. In addition, it proved to be a good framework for future studies in this 
area.  
The next Chapter will further discuss the contributions made as a result of this study, in 
addition to presenting other pertinent concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed the research questions by applying the theoretical 
frameworks defined in Chapter 3 to the unit of analysis under study here: the cognitive system at 
Agency X. Moreover, it discussed findings, as well as offered additional observations regarding 
transparency and corruption at Agency X, so as to address the overarching puzzle which has guided 
this research, which is why transparency has been unable to deter corruption within the Brazilian 
federal government. 
This Chapter is therefore aimed at reviewing the main research findings, in addition to 
discussing contributions, limitations, and paths for future research. As such, this Chapter is divided 
as follows: section 8.2 gives an overview of this thesis and how it was structured whilst section 
8.3 reviews the main findings discussed in Chapter 7. Section 8.4 then discusses the main 
contributions this thesis has made and section 8.5 offers some comments regarding generalizability 
and areas for future studies. Section 8.6 then ends with a few concluding remarks. 
 
8.2 Overview 
 In Chapter 1, the main intent of this thesis was presented, which was to address the concept 
of transparency as applied to governments as part of wider investment efforts in the area of e-
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government. As more and more governments across the world invest in deploying transparency in 
order to address issues such as corruption, it seems important to discuss how effective such 
mechanisms really are. As reviewed, the motivation for this piece of research came from 
concluding my MSc, whereby my topic of research was the links between transparency and 
corruption. The conclusion of such work was that transparency had been unable to effectively deter 
corruption in Brazil; in spite of consistent investments in transparency and opening up government 
data, Brazil has continued to experience high levels of government corruption. 
 Such reality was in stark contrast to what findings by scholars such as Bertot et al. (2010) 
were reporting at the time, which was that countries who most invested in transparency 
experienced decreasing levels of corruption. Chapter 2, therefore, had the aim of reviewing this 
literature.  
  As part of that discussion, it was presented that scholars have mostly approached e-
government and transparency through a technological deterministic lens. In other words, the belief 
has been that technology is transformative and has been the driving force behind change. However, 
such deterministic view of technology has received criticism, especially as a growing number of 
e-government initiatives fail to meet their goals. The main reason has been, according to Luna-
Reyes et al. (2004) and Rose (2005), that such efforts have overlooked social and organizational 
factors which play a part in how successful an initiative can be. 
 Another issue identified in Chapter 2 was regarding the lack of consensus on defining what 
transparency is. As a result of that discussion, it was proposed that transparency, for the purposes 
of this study, would be conceptualized as an information flow comprising of three distinct phases: 
creation of information, publication of information, and public access of information. 
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Conceptualizing transparency in such a manner, not only clarifies what is meant by transparency 
within a governmental setting, but also made it easier to identify where the gaps in the literature 
are. As such, it was identified that the “creation” phase of transparency has been largely 
overlooked, with most studies concentrating efforts in the publication and public access phases, 
targeting issues such as how to improve web portals (publication) and how to enhance public civic 
participation (public access). With few exceptions, however, (Arellano-Gault and Lepore, 2011; 
González-Zapata and Heeks 2015), the creational aspect of information has hardly been looked at, 
even though it is what determines the quality of information produced and what information is 
transmitted to citizens. In addition, it was also identified that even studies which concentrate on 
this aspect have not researched lower-level civil servants, especially those with no contact with 
citizens, even though they constitute the largest group of content providers within the government. 
Thus, this became the focus of this research, i.e. to address this gap in the literature. In doing so, a 
socio-technical approach was adopted. Likewise, a non-deterministic view on corruption (bounded 
rationality) was also adopted, since it complements the socio-technical approach better than 
mindful rationality does.  
 Chapter 3 then concerned itself with presenting the theoretical framework which would be 
adopted in this thesis: distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995) and moral disengagement (Bandura 
1986) theories, both of which emphasize cognitive aspects. DCog, which draws influence from 
Vygotsky (1980), proposes that cognition is not constrained to an individual mind. Rather, it is 
distributed between individuals and artefacts within a particular environment and focuses its 
attention on cognitive systems and information flows in a particular context. In order to apply 
DCog to data analysis, the DiCoT methodological framework was adopted. DiCoT draws 
principles from the DCog theory in order to build five models (physical layout, artefact, 
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information flow, social structure, and evolutionary) which, together, paint a clear picture of how 
the cognitive system under analysis operates. Though neither had ever been applied to a 
governmental institutional setting, its wide-ranging applicability indicated that this framework 
would be suitable for this research. 
 In addition to DCog, MD was adopted in order to study the issue of corruption. MD, which 
is rooted in Bandura’s (1986) moral agency concept as part of his social cognitive theory, posits 
that, in order for individuals to engage in acts of corruption, they go through a process of 
“switching off” their moral codes. In other words, they morally disengage in order to avoid 
negative feelings such as distress and self-condemnation. As explained, most people operate by a 
high standard of moral code. However, individuals are not immune to their social contexts and are 
largely influenced by it. Additionally, individuals tend to value the opinion of others within their 
social circles. In a work environment where a high level of unethical decision-making exists, the 
tendency would be for individuals to gradually morally disengage in order to conform to that 
particular environment. As a result, normally reprehensible actions then become “normalized” in 
the eyes of those within that system, allowing for unethical decision-making to perpetuate. Eight 
moral disengagement mechanisms are delineated by Bandura (1986): moral justification, 
advantageous comparison, euphemistic labeling, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of 
responsibility, minimization, dehumanization, and attribution of blame. 
 By combining both DCog and MD, the objective was to (1) comprehend how the cognitive 
system under analysis operated, and how cognitive processes were distributed between members 
(artefacts and human agents); (2) identify causes of breakdown to the information flow, and its 
effects on the information system; and (3) comprehend how MD mechanisms facilitated the 
breakdown of cognitive processes. By being able to address these questions, and through an in-
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depth study at the micro-level, it was hoped that an understanding of how transparency and 
corruption, and the links between the two, operate. 
 Chapter 4 then presented the research design that was adopted. As reviewed, a case study 
approach was outlined, an approach which is suitable for interpretive types of studies. In order to 
approach such study, a governmental agency, referred to as Agency X throughout this study due 
to privacy issues, was chosen as the locus for the unit of analysis: the cognitive system (in 
accordance with the DCog theoretical framework). The selection of such agency obeyed certain 
criteria: (1) this agency had to be located within the Brazilian federal government, since the main 
motivation for this research was the Brazilian Transparency Portal; (2) traces of acts of 
wrongdoing had to be present, since the intent was to analyze the links between transparency and 
corruption; (3) access had to be granted in order to gather a meaningful amount of data for analysis. 
 Data collection methods used were semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and 
document analysis. Furthermore, Moore et al.’s (2012) Moral Disengagement Measure was 
applied in order to identify the existence of moral disengagement mechanisms. The intention for 
utilizing this quantitative method was merely to reinforce the validity of the data that would later 
be qualitatively analyzed. Data was analyzed by coding it for DCog principles listed in the DiCoT 
methodological framework. Data was also coded for moral disengagement mechanisms, in 
accordance with Bandura’s (2006) coding manual, and then coded a third time in an inductive 
manner in order to ensure that no significant theme had been unaccounted for.  
 Chapter 5 then presented a discussion of the context in which the unit of analysis operates 
in. As discussed, in such complex settings such as a governmental institution, it is important to 
understand the dynamics that may constrain or encourage the information system.  Thus, what 
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followed was an extensive discussion of broader legal and political factors, in conjunction with 
organizational aspects, which have affected how this system operates. At the end of that Chapter, 
Figure 5.19 gave an overview of the many influencing factors the information system under 
analysis is subject to. 
 Chapter 6 had the aim of analyzing the data gathered and coded by firstly building the five 
models delineated by Furniss and Blandford (2006) in their methodological framework, and then 
analyzing the data for MD mechanisms. By employing DiCoT, a clear picture emerged of how the 
cognitive system at Agency X operates. The different models highlighted different aspects of the 
system, which when combined gave clear indications of how cognitive processes are coordinated 
and in which ways breakdowns occur. Thus, the DiCoT model allowed for the first two research 
questions to be addressed. Regarding the analysis through MD, it was possible to identify that 
human agents within this cognitive system are indeed morally disengaged. Moreover, it was 
possible to identify how such disengaged thinking facilitated breakdowns. These findings, both 
DiCoT and MD, were then the focus of discussion in Chapter 7. These will be discussed in the 
next section of this Chapter. 
 
8.3 Overview of Findings 
 As a result of applying the theoretical framework that had been proposed for data analysis, 
some meaningful findings were made. Most of these directly addressed the research questions that 
had been proposed in Chapter 3: 
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R1: How are cognitive processes distributed between agents (human and artefact) at 
Agency X? 
R2: How do breakdowns impact the cognitive system at Agency X? 
R3: How do moral disengagement mechanisms facilitate the breakdown of cognitive 
systems? 
   
  
Regarding R1, by applying the DiCoT methodological framework to data and building the 
five models dictated by Furniss and Blandford (2006), a clear view of how the cognitive system at 
Agency X was distributed was established. Firstly, it became clear that cognition is not evenly 
distributed, with the human component largely responsible for leading information propagation 
and flow in the sequential control of action. Since artefacts (technical and paper) do not 
communicate with one another, it was up to individuals to act as the hub between them. In addition, 
due to the imbued technical properties of IntSys, the component also played the role of the trigger, 
aided by the PF.  
This dynamic meant that the core of representation media between individuals was verbal 
language, which revealed the high prevalence of informal communication that took place at 
Agency X. This also meant that human agents act as mediating structures, communicating directly 
with one another and often bypassing the system. This characteristic of the system was facilitated 
by the physical layout which promoted proximity between individuals thereby resulting in a high 
horizon of information. Additionally, due to the fact that the PF had a more important role in the 
information system than the technical system did and that it is an inanimate object, individuals 
were forced to move through the physical space of the environment in order to take the PF to the 
next team member in the sequential control of action. This characteristic of the work process also 
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facilitated the high level of informality of the cognitive system. Aspects of the social structure, 
such as the distribution of knowledge and hierarchy, also ensured the perpetuation of such practices 
(cultural heritage). 
These aspects of the cognitive system – the dominant role of the human component and 
the high level of informality, coupled with aspects of the social structure contributed to many of 
the points of breakdown, as would then later be discussed in response to R2. As reviewed, three 
categories for breakdown were identified: artefact, non-intentional-human, and intentional human. 
Regarding the breakdowns due to artefacts, this was the result of limitations and crashes 
experienced with the use of IntSys. As discussed in Chapter 7, IntSys did not fully attend to the 
needs of this cognitive system, in addition to at times being unreliable and failing to correspond in 
the way it was meant to. This led to breakdowns in the information flow, forcing the human agent 
to work around such technical difficulties. In the case of non-intentional human breakdowns, this 
was mostly because of the dominant role individuals had to take in propagating and transforming 
information and how procedures have been built. Additionally, such breakdowns constituted the 
action of one single individual. 
In the case of intentional breakdowns, on the other hand, this would have been normally 
due to the concerted effort of several individuals working together at the direction of a member of 
the upper management team. This particular breakdown revealed how exactly wrongdoing takes 
place within this cognitive system, which was largely facilitated by the social dynamics at play. 
The source of such breakdown was mostly managers who directed individuals to distort 
information and bypass procedures in order to conceal illegalities. Such breakdowns required the 
concerted effort of several team members due to how tasks are sequenced (i.e. each team member 
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retains a part). Thus, intentional breakdowns were a team effort. Such breakdowns compromised 
the quality of the information stored and later divulged to the external environment via the 
Transparency Portal. It was also largely facilitated by collective moral disengagement which had 
been identified and addressed the third research question proposed. 
Data analyzed not only showed that individuals were morally disengaged, but also how it 
facilitated and supported unethical decision-making. The three most commonly identified 
mechanisms of disengagement were displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, and 
moral justification. The most common of all, displacement of responsibility, reflected the strong 
hierarchical structure within this cognitive system, a finding which had revealed itself through the 
DiCoT analysis. Displacement of responsibility allowed individuals to follow their managers’ 
orders to bypass procedures and system whilst evading self-condemnation and distress. It was 
made possible since individuals delegated their own personal accountability and power of decision 
to a proxy, i.e. their managers. This finding was consistent with those obtained in organizational 
studies, whereby unethical leadership is often singled out as a driver for wrongdoing (Brown et al. 
2005; Moore et al. 2018), contributing to the validity of these findings. 
The social dynamics present also manifested themselves as a form of moral disengagement, 
in the form of diffusion of responsibility. As identified, wrongdoing was a collaborative effort, and 
individuals were found to collaborate whether they benefitted from such actions themselves or not. 
This finding demonstrated the extent of social influence, as discussed in Chapter 3. Reinforcing 
this mechanism are the cultural heritage and distribution of knowledge principles. The former 
ensures that certain procedures are perpetuated due to the belief that “it has always been like that”. 
The latter reinforces the informal manner through which information is communicated, ensuring 
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that the human agents are the largest retainers of knowledge, thus serving as a reference to new 
participants to this cognitive system. 
The third most observed moral disengagement mechanism was moral justification, which 
often manifested itself in the form of blaming technical systems’ imbued flaws. Though the system 
failings are real, these were used as an excuse to justify bypassing procedures and thus causing 
breakdowns to the information. Together, all three disengagement mechanisms ensured that 
participants in the cognitive system became “willing” participants in wrongdoing and facilitators 
in unethical decision-making. 
The findings obtained confirmed that this work system, responsible for creating 
information as a necessary phase of the transparency system, can indeed be framed as a distributed 
cognitive system, making DCog a suitable theoretical framework for this type of study. Moreover, 
when coupled with MD, it painted a clear picture of the points at which this cognitive system 
disengaged and how that facilitates the perpetuation of wrongdoing. 
In that regard, as part of the discussion on findings in Chapter 7, three factors were 
highlighted as to what has allowed for corruption to persist within this cognitive system: (1) power 
structure; (2) social dynamics; (3) technical systems’ imbued properties. All three of these aspects 
functioned as mechanisms for moral disengagement, in the form of (1) displacement of 
responsibility, (2) diffusion of responsibility, and (2) moral justification. 
This not only confirms the applicability of Bandura’s (1986) theory but also reinforces that 
to deal with corruption effectively, a multi-pronged solution must be adopted. An emphasis solely 
on the technical will mean that the social aspects will be overlooked. Likewise, pure emphasis on 
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the social will result in technical systems which continue to fall short, in terms of the needs 
identified. 
 The final finding discussed in Chapter 7 referred to the question of how transparent the 
system that has been deployed by the Brazilian federal government is. Findings suggest that it is 
only partially transparent, particularly since it is only designed to reveal two instances in a 
procurement process which comprises of thirty-nine steps (see Appendix VII). It seems therefore 
disingenuous to continue to invest efforts in enhancing citizen engagement and participation in a 
transparency system that is only partially transparent, in spite of claims to the contrary and this is 
an area that would perhaps warrant future studies in this regard. 
 This research has provided an in-depth view of how information is created within a 
governmental agency, comprising of the creation stage of transparency. Thus, several 
contributions were made, which will be discussed in the next section of this Chapter. 
 
8.4 Contributions  
 The need for this piece of research arose out of the need to fill a gap in the existing e-
government literature, which has mostly produced technological-deterministic studies, 
overlooking social and cognitive aspects which also impact the efficacy of a technical solution. As 
a result, several contributions can be listed as a result of this research effort. 
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8.4.1 Conceptual   
 The first contribution that can be listed is in regard to how transparency has been 
conceptualized in this study. As discussed in Chapter 2, researchers have been unable to agree on 
one single definition for transparency, leading to a preponderance of elusive definitions, such as 
“lifting the veil”, which result in a difficulty in approaching the concept, measuring it, and studying 
it. 
 As a result, based on Taylor and Lips’ (2008) definition that transparency refers to the 
creation and flow of information, and Hosseini et al.’s (2018) recommendation that to understand 
transparency it is necessary to understand who the stakeholders are, in addition to the medium 
through which it is transmitted, transparency was conceptualized here as an information system. 
Moreover, based on the identification of stakeholders and medium, it was possible to ascertain that 
this information system comprised of three distinct phases: the creation of information, the 
publication of information, and public access.  
Conceptualizing transparency in such a manner thus sets the basis for comparison between 
studies in this field. In that regard, it is possible to view that though many pieces of research 
approach the same topic of transparency, they are in fact discussing different aspects of it, which 
means findings between them are not directly comparable. Moreover, such conceptualization 
highlights the fact that researchers have mostly concentrated their efforts on the publication and 
public access phases of transparency, revealing where the gaps in the literature exist. In addition, 
unpacking the concept makes it clear that in order for transparency to be truly effective, all three 
stages of the information system must be addressed. Only concentrating efforts on how to engage 
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citizens will not make transparency effective if the creation phase of it is subject to faults, as is the 
case of the unit of analysis which was studied in this thesis.  
 
8.4.2 Framework 
 The approach to this study was a novel one since it involved studying a system that was 
disengaged and actively partaking in corruption. To my knowledge, there is no other study that 
has taken such an approach in the e-government field. This meant that there was no basis for 
comparison to other similar studies on how to undertake such a topic. As a result, a new framework 
had to be established. 
 Borrowing from other disciplines the DCog theoretical framework, this research also 
served to validate such an approach to this setting, i.e. a governmental institution. Its wide-ranging 
application in previous studies (as discussed in Chapter 3), indicated that it would indeed be 
applicable, particularly since the focus of DCog is on cognitive systems or information systems 
(terms are at times used interchangeably), precisely what transparency had been conceptualized 
as. In addition to DCog, the DiCoT methodological framework was also adopted, which had 
mostly been applied to medical settings in the past. Thus, this thesis also served to validate its use 
within a governmental institution. 
 The DiCoT framework, as a semi-structured approach to data analysis, had one of its 
models – the social structure model – extended and consolidated, serving as a framework for future 
studies with similar characteristics; that is, whereby the social component of the cognitive system 
is more dominant than the technical one. DiCoT has several qualities to it: (1) it provides a structure 
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on how to apply DCog to data analysis; (2) the models generated by the DiCoT analysis grant a 
very clear picture of how the cognitive system operates, and what role each component has in 
making information flow; (3) it gives a clear overview of where the breakdowns are located and 
what their sources are; (4) it gives indications of how the system can be improved in order to close 
such gaps; (5) its structured approach allows other researchers to replicate this study and test it in 
other similar settings. This is a characteristic that is especially useful in this scenario since, as 
reviewed in Chapter 5, governments are very complex organizations subject to many different 
influencing factors. Figure 5.19 summarized that by demonstrating the many factors of influence 
to which this cognitive system was subject to. As such, this structured approach allows the 
researcher to navigate through that, with DCog’s emphasis on the cognitive system as the unit of 
analysis aiding in that regard. 
 
8.4.3 Contribution to the Field of e-Government 
This thesis has made several contributions to the field of e-government, which are worth 
mentioning. First of all, it identified a gap in the transparency literature, demonstrating that: (1) 
studies to date have been mostly technological deterministic, revealing the need for more socio-
technological studies; (2) that studies have concentrated themselves mostly on certain aspects of 
transparency, whilst overlooking others, such as the creation of information. 
Moreover, as part of the literature review undertaken, it seems that a certain category of 
civil servants, the low-ranking ones, with no decision-making power and no contact with citizens, 
has been overlooked, even though they constitute the largest group of content providers to the 
Transparency Portal (at least in Brazil, that is the case). As the largest group of content providers, 
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it seems that they should merit some attention, especially since they are the ones dictating the 
quality of information that is being produced and published on portals. 
Another innovation in terms of the approach undertaken in this thesis refers to the fact that 
it picked an agency where ongoing acts of corruption exist, thereby giving a detailed and actual 
account of how corruption takes place in a governmental institution, and how such actions 
undermine transparency effort. No study to date has undertaken such an approach. The result is 
that some meaningful insights were generated, in addition to actionable items to be undertaken in 
order to effectively deal with the issue. 
This thesis, therefore, sought to fill several gaps and, as a result, provided a meaningful set 
of results and a methodological framework which can be replicated in future studies. This will be 
discussed in the next section of this Chapter. 
 
8.5 Generalization and Future Research 
 The downfall of undertaking a case study approach refers to the fact that findings obtained 
here cannot be generalized. They are thus restricted to this particular setting. 
 However, the findings obtained do give some indication as to the validity of them in other 
settings. First of all, regarding moral disengagement mechanisms, findings obtained as a result of 
this study replicated results obtained in other disparate settings, i.e. corporations (Moore et al. 
2018). This thus indicates that such findings are not restricted to Agency X. As MD, however, had 
never been applied to study government corruption, it would be interesting for other researchers 
to extend this finding and verify whether it continues to replicate in other national contexts.  
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 In this regard, the framework set forth in this thesis for approaching moral disengagement 
can and should be applied to other governmental institutions. As Moore et al. (2012) affirm, the 
Moral Disengagement Measure tests individuals’ propensity to morally disengage, which is linked 
to unethical decision-making. Testing individuals’ propensity within governments should be an 
area of future research. This would allow for the identification of areas in government more likely 
to engage in corruption, thus allowing for similar in-depth studies such as the one undertaken here. 
 Regarding other general findings, such as how the cognitive system is distributed within 
Agency X, though the results itself are not replicable, the framework of analysis is. As discussed 
previously, the social structure model in the DiCoT framework was extended in order to account 
for the dominance of the social over the technical (see Appendix VIII). This extended model may 
serve as a basis for future pieces of research whereby similar dynamics are observed. In fact, more 
studies which adopt DCog as a theoretical framework for the study of transparency are encouraged. 
More studies concerning themselves with the creation phase of transparency are required in order 
to broaden the understanding of how information is produced and how to make transparency more 
effective, and DCog, in conjunction with DiCoT makes for an ideal theoretical framework, as 
validated in this thesis. 
 This thesis has also indicated the need for more studies which focus on low-level civil 
servants. These are the cogs to the government machine and, as such, an integral part of the 
government institution. As the largest content providers of information, more research is 
encouraged, particularly in other national contexts, as to how they operate and the dynamics of 
their particular cognitive systems. 
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8.6 Concluding Remarks 
 This thesis sought to fill a clear gap in the e-government literature regarding transparency 
studies. As discussed extensively in Chapter 2, most studies that have approached the topic of 
transparency have failed to give a full account as to how exactly transparency operates and why it 
has failed to yield expected results, i.e. less corruption, in certain national contexts. 
 As identified, there has been a plethora of studies emphasizing the transformative effects 
of technology, which have overlooked social aspects and have the ability to undermine the efficacy 
of technology. Though there has been a growing number of studies seeking to fill that gap and 
which have adopted a socio-technical approach to technology, more research still needs to be 
undertaken in that regard. 
 Another issue identified is in reference to how transparency has been conceptualized thus 
far. Such effusive use of elusive terms to describe it makes it difficult to measure transparency and 
even study it. As a result of these discussions, a new form of conceptualizing transparency was 
introduced, whereby it refers to an information flow, consisting of three distinct phases: creation 
of information, publication, and public access. By conceptualizing transparency in such a way, it 
became clear that the creation aspect of transparency has been largely overlooked. Thus, in order 
to address the various gaps in the literature, this became the focus of this thesis. In that regard, a 
DCog theoretical approach, combined with MD, was adopted, the combination of which, along 
with DiCoT as a methodological framework, allowed for some meaningful insights and 
conclusions, amongst which insights as to why corruption continues to flourish at the 
governmental agency used as the locus for unit of analysis – the cognitive system – in spite of 
apparent efforts to curb it. 
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 One of the main results obtained here was that transparency is not so transparent after all, 
something which could only be confirmed through this micro-level approach to the issue. This, 
within itself, attests to the value of this thesis, thereby setting the framework for future studies in 
this field. 
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APPENDIX I 
Data Corpus 
 
 
 
 
 
Profile of interviewees (Agency X) –  
1st round: 
 
Director (1) 
Manager (5) 
Purchasing Department (16) 
Financial Department (5) 
Technical Support (1) 
Profile of interviewees (Agency X) –  
2nd round: 
 
Manager (1) 
Purchasing Department (13) 
Financial Department (3) 
 
 
 
CASE STUDY DATA INTERVIEWS
DIRECT 
OBSERVATION
DOCUMENTS INTERVIEWS
EXTERNAL 
DOCUMENTS
NUMBER 45 42 71 7 339
SOURCES OF 
EVIDENCE
Transcripts for 
semi-structured 
interviews
Field notes
UNIT OF ANALYSIS CONTEXT
Transcripts for 
semi-structured 
interviews
Internal procedure 
manuals (2); 
Internal norm 
guidelines (62); 
presentations 
(.ppt) (1); 
screenshots of 
internal systems 
(23); copies of 
purchase orders.
Pieces of 
legislation (5); 
Government 
manuals (6); 
Government 
websites (6); 
Government 
reports (12);  
Investigation 
documents (49); 
Witness 
statement videos 
(113); 
Newspaper 
articles (143); 
Reports from 
external agencies 
(7); Social media 
screenshots (4)
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APPENDIX II 
DCog Concepts and Principles Associated with DiCoT  
(Furniss and Blandford 2006) 
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APPENDIX III 
Moral Disengagement Measure 
 
 
(Original in English) 
 
1. It is okay to spread rumors to defend those you care about. (MJ) 
2. Taking something without the owner's permission is okay as long as you're just borrowing it. (EL) 
3. Considering the ways people grossly misrepresent themselves, it's hardly a sin to inflate your own 
accomplishments a bit. (AC) 
4. People shouldn't be held accountable for doing questionable things when they were just doing what an 
authority figure told them to do. (DIS) 
5. People can’t be blamed for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends are doing it 
too. (DIF)  
6. Taking personal credit for ideas that were not your own is no big deal. (DC)  
7. Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt. (DH)  
8. People who get mistreated have usually done something to bring it on themselves. (AB)  
 
Items measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”.  
MJ=Moral justification; EL=Euphemistic labeling; AC=Advantageous comparison; DIS=Displacement 
of responsibility; DIF=Diffusion of responsibility; DC=Distorting consequences; AB=Attribution of 
blame; DH=Dehumanization 
 
Reference: Moore, C., Detert, J.R., Trevino, L.K., Baker, V.L., & Mayer, D.M. (2012). Why employees 
do bad things: Moral disengagement and unethical organizational behavior. Personnel Psychology, 65, 1-
48. 
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(Translated to Portuguese) 
 
Escala de Desengajamento Moral 
 
Em uma escala de 1 a 7 (1 = discordo totalmente; 7 = concordo totalmente), responda: 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Não há problemas em espalhar rumores se for 
para defender pessoas próximas de quem 
gostamos.  
        
Tomar algo de alguém sem sua permissão não 
tem nada demais contanto que você esteja 
apenas tomando emprestado. 
        
Considerando as formas como as pessoas 
frequentemente mentem a respeito de si 
mesmas, não é nenhum pecado inflar as próprias 
conquistas de vez em quando. 
        
As pessoas não deveriam ser responsabilizadas 
por fazerem algumas coisas questionáveis se 
estavam apenas cumprindo ordens. 
       
As pessoas não podem ser culpadas por fazer 
coisas que são tecnicamente erradas se todos os 
seus amigos também o estão. 
        
Se apropriar das ideias dos outros não tem nada 
demais. 
        
Algumas pessoas devem ser maltratadas pois 
não são facilmente magoadas. 
        
As pessoas que são maltratadas normalmente 
fizeram por merecer. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Manual for Coding Moral Disengagement  
(Bandura 2006) 
 
 
Categories Definition
Moral Justification
Harmful products and practices are made socially acceptable and sanctified by moral, social, and economic 
justifications
Advantageous Comparison
How products and organizational practices are viewed is colored by what they are compared against. By 
exploiting the contrast principle, harmful products and practices are made acceptable or even benign.
Euphemistic Labeling
Activities can take on different appearances, depending on what they are called. Euphemistic language is 
widely used to make harmful products and activities respectable and to reduce personal responsibility for it. 
Different varieties of language of nonresponsibility exist. One form relies on sanitizing language.
Displacement of Responsibility
Displacement of responsibility operates by obscuring or minimizing personal accountability for the harm 
caused by an organization or social system. Under displaced responsibility, members view their actions as 
stemming from the dictates of authorities rather than being personally responsible for them. Because they 
are not the actual agent of their actions, they are spared self-condemning reactions. They are simply carrying 
out orders issued by others. Sometimes the responsibility is shifted to compelling social circumstances as 
when employees argue they should not be blamed for offering money to foreign officials if that’s what is 
needed to do business in their society. In the sanctioning of harmful practices, responsibility is rarely assumed 
openly. Only obtuse authorities would leave themselves accusable of authorizing harmful practices. They 
usually invite and support them in insidious ways by surreptitious sanctioning systems for personal and social 
protection.
Authorities often act in ways that keep themselves intentionally uninformed. They do not search for negative 
evidence. Obvious questions that would reveal incriminating information remain unasked, so that officials do 
not find out what they do not want to know. Implicit agreements and insulating social arrangements are 
created that leave the higher echelons free from blame.
Diffusion of Responsibility
Personal accountability is also weakened or obscured by diffusing responsibility. Personal accountability for 
one’s contribution to harmful activities can be dispersed in three ways.
Group decision making is a common practice to reduce a sense of personal accountability for harmful 
practices. Social organizations go to great lengths to devise mechanisms for obscuring responsibility for 
decisions that will affect others adversely. A sense of responsibility can be diffused, and thereby diminished, 
by division of labor. Collective action is still another expedient for weakening moral control. Any harm done by 
a group can always be attributed largely to the behavior of others Most enterprises require the services of 
many people, each performing subdivided jobs that seem harmless in themselves. After activities become 
routinized into detached subfunctions, people shift their attention from the morality of what they are doing to 
the operational details and efficiency of their specific job.
When everyone is allegedly responsible, no one really feels responsible. These are two ways in which 
nonresponsibility through displacement and diffusion of responsibility is revealed.
Social arrangements of mazzy and diffused modes of authorization of harmful products, and social practices 
that permit personal deniability, i.e., I didn’t authorize it. I didn’t know the research evidence, I didn’t know 
they were ignoring the safeguards.
Minimizing or Distorting Harmful Effects
Other ways of weakening moral control operate by minimizing, disregarding or even disputing the harmful 
effects of one's action. When people pursue activities that harm others, they avoid facing the harm they cause 
or minimize it. If minimization does not work, the evidence of harm can be discredited. As long as the harmful 
results of one's conduct are ignored, minimized, or disbelieved there is little reason for self-censure to be 
activated.
This is a central mechanism in corporate moral disengagement because producing products or engaging in 
practices that are known to injure or kill people would result in social censure and self-condemnation.
Attribution of Blame
Blaming the victim for bringing the suffering on themselves is another expedient that serves self-exonerative 
purposes. Attribution of blame should be distinguished from displacement of responsibility. In responsibility 
displacement, accountability for our actions is shifted to the persons giving the orders. They are not the 
decision makers or prescribers of the corporate practices. They are simply carrying out orders. In blame 
attribution, the victims of the products or the harmful practices are blamed for bringing the suffering on 
themselves. In short, responsibility displacement blames the chain of command; attribution of blame, blames 
the victim.
Dehumanization
The final set of disengagement practices operates on the recipients of detrimental practices. The strength of 
moral self-censure depends on how the perpetrators regard the people they mistreat. To perceive another as 
human activates empathetic reactions through a sense of common humanity. The joys and suffering of those 
with whom one identifies are more vicariously arousing than are those of strangers or those divested of 
human qualities. It is difficult to mistreat humanized persons without risking personal distress and self-
condemnation.
Self-censure for cruel conduct can be disengaged or blunted by stripping people of human qualities. Once 
dehumanized, they are no longer viewed as persons with feelings, hopes, and concerns but as subhuman 
objects. If dispossessing one's foes of humanness does not weaken self-censure, it can be eliminated by 
attributing demonic or bestial qualities to them.
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APPENDIX V 
Organogram for the Brazilian Federal Government 
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APPENDIX VI 
Legislative Exemptions for Bidding Processes (Law N. 8666/1993) 
 
Article 24. Needless to bidding: 
I - for works and engineering services worth up to 10% (ten percent) of the limit provided in paragraph "a" 
of item I of the preceding article, provided they do not relate to portions of the same work or service or to 
works and services of the same nature on the same site that may be made jointly and concurrently; (Writing 
amended by Law No. 9648 of 1998) 
II - for shopping and other services of value to 10% (ten percent) of the limit provided in paragraph "a" of 
item II of the previous article and divestitures, as provided in this Law, provided they do not relate to a 
parcel of a service, purchase or sale of a major character that can be done at once; (Writing amended by 
Law No. 9648 of 1998) 
III - in case of war or serious disorder; 
IV - in cases of emergency or calamity, when it is urgent to address a situation that can damage or 
compromise the security of persons, works, services, equipment and other property, public or private, and 
only for the goods necessary to address situation of emergency or calamity and for the portions of works 
and services that may be completed within 180 (one hundred and eighty) days consecutive, uninterrupted 
counted the occurrence of emergency or calamity: the extension of their contracts; 
V - when not to respond to the bidding parties before and this, rightly, can not be repeated without prejudice 
to the Government, held in this case, all the set conditions; 
VI - when the Union has to intervene in the economic domain to regulate prices or supplies normalize; 
VII - when the price proposals setting forth clearly higher than in the domestic market, or are 
incompatible with those fixed by the official organs, in which case, subject to the sole paragraph of art. 48 
of this Law and, if the situation persists, you may be awarded directly for goods or services for value not 
exceeding that in the record prices, or services; 
(See § 3 of article 48.) 
VIII - to acquire, by legal persons of public law, goods produced or services provided by the agency or 
entity that integrates the Public Administration and has been created for this specific purpose on a date prior 
to the enactment of this Act, provided that the price contract is consistent with the market price; (Writing 
amended by Law No. 8883, 1994) 
IX - when it may compromise national security, in the cases established by decree of the President, after 
hearing the National Defense Council; 
X - for the purchase or lease of property intended to meet essential needs of the administration, installation 
requirements and location conditioning their choice, provided the price is consistent with the market value, 
according to preliminary assessment; (Writing by Law No. 8883, 1994) 
XI - the hiring of remaining works, service or supply as a result of contract termination, provided that met 
the sort order of the previous bidding and accepting the same terms offered by the winning bidder, including 
as to price, appropriately adjusted; 
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XII - on purchases of fruits and vegetables, bread and other perishable commodities, the time required to 
achieve the corresponding bidding processes, performed directly based on the price of the day: (Text as 
determined by Law No. 8883, 1994) 
XIII - the hiring of Brazilian institution responsible regimental or statutory research, teaching or 
development of institutional or institution dedicated to the social rehabilitation of prisoners, since the 
institution has unquestionable ethical and professional reputation and not for profit; (Wording Law No. 
8883, 1994) 
XIV - to purchase goods or services pursuant to a specific international agreement approved by Congress, 
when the conditions offered are clearly advantageous to the Government; (Writing amended by Law No. 
8883, 1994) 
XV - for the purchase or restoration of works of art and historical objects, certified authenticity, they are 
compatible or related purposes to the agency or entity. 
XVI - to print the official journals, use of standardized forms of management, technical issues and officials 
as well as to provide computer services to a legal entity of public law, by bodies or entities included in the 
Public Administration, created for this specific purpose; (Included by Law No. 8883, 1994) 
XVII - for the purchase of components or parts of domestic or foreign, required for maintenance of 
equipment during the warranty period technique, with the original supplier of equipment, a condition that 
exclusivity is essential for the warranty period; (Included by Law No. 8883, 1994) 
XVIII - shopping or hiring of services for the supply of ships, vessels, aircraft or troops and their means of 
travel when in any short-term stay in ports, airports or locations other than their headquarters, because of 
operational movement or training, when the paucity of legal deadlines can jeopardize the normal operations 
and purposes and provided that its value does not exceed the limit provided in paragraph "a" from 
embarking upon II art. 23 of this Law: (Included by Law No. 8883, 1994) 
XIX - for purchasing material for use in military, with the exception of materials used and administrative 
staff, when necessary to maintain the standardization required by the framework of logistic support of naval, 
air and land, on the advice of the commission established by decree; (Included by Law No. 8883, 1994) 
XX - the hiring of association of the handicapped, nonprofit, and of proven competence, by bodies or 
entities of the Public Admininistração, for the provision of services or supply of manpower, since the 
contracted price is consistent with the market price. (Included by Law No. 8883, 1994) 
XXI - to purchase goods and materials used exclusively for scientific and technological resources provided 
by Capes by FINEP, CNPq or other institutions to promote research CNPq for this specific purpose; 
(Writing amended by Law No. 12,349 , 2010) 
XXII - in contracting to supply or supply of electricity and natural gas operator, permitted or authorized 
under the rules of the specific legislation, (including by Law No. 9648 of 1998) 
XXIII - in hiring by a public enterprise or mixed capital company with its subsidiaries and affiliates for the 
purchase or sale of assets, provision or obtaining services from the contracted price is compatible with 
market prices. (including the Law No. 9648, 1998) 
XXIV - for the procurement of services with social organizations, qualified within their respective spheres 
of government for activities covered by the management contract. (Included by Law No. 9648 of 1998) 
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XXV - the hiring done by the Institute of Science and Technology - ICT or by funding agency for 
technology transfer and licensing rights to use or exploitation of protected intellectual property. (Included 
by Law No. 10,973, 2004) 
XXVI - at the conclusion of the program contract with a federate or with an entity of its in the provision of 
public services so under terms permitted in the public consortium contract or cooperative agreement. 
(Included by Law No. 11,107 , 2005) 
XXVII - in hiring the collection, processing and marketing of municipal waste recycled or reused in areas 
with a system of garbage collection, made by cooperatives formed exclusively by individuals of low income 
recognized by the public and collectors of recyclable materials with the use of equipment compatible with 
the technical, environmental and public health. (Writing amended by Law No. 11,445, 2007). 
XXVIII - to provide goods and services produced or rendered in the country, involving, cumulatively 
complex technological and national defense, by a commission specially appointed by the highest authority 
of the board. (including Law No. 11484 of 2007) . 
XXIX - the acquisition of goods and contracting services to meet the military contingents of the Brazilian 
military services used in peacekeeping operations abroad, necessarily justified regarding the price and 
choice of supplier or service provider and ratified by the Force Commander (Included by Law No. 11783, 
2008). 
XXX - in hiring institution or organization, public or private, or nonprofit, to provide technical assistance 
and rural extension under the National Programme of Technical Assistance and Rural Extension in Family 
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, established by federal law. (including Law No. 12188 of 2010) 
XXXI - hires in order to comply with the provisions of articles. 3 (including Law No. 12349, 2010) to 4 to 
5 to 20 of Law n and the 10 973 of 2 December 2004, the general principles of contract contained therein. 
Sole Paragraph. The percentages mentioned in clauses I and II of the caput of this Article shall be 20% 
(twenty percent) for purchases, works and services contracted by public, mixed-capital company, a public 
authority or foundation and qualified under the law, as Executing Agencies. (Writing amended by Law No. 
11,107, 2005) 
Article 25. Bidding is not required when there is a possibility of competition, in particular: 
I - for purchase of materials, equipment, or genres that can only be supplied by the producer, company or 
sole trade representative, sealed brand preference, and the proof of exclusivity being made by an attestation 
by the national business registry site to be held in the bidding or construction or service by trade union, 
federation or the Employers' Confederation, or even by similar entities; 
II - for the technical services listed in Art. 13 of this Law, whether with professionals or companies of 
recognized expertise, exemption does not apply for advertising and publicity; 
III - to hire professional any artistic endeavor, directly or through a sole entrepreneur, provided they are 
recognized by the critics or the public. 
§ 1 to be deemed to have recognized expertise in the professional or enterprise whose concept within his 
field of expertise, due to previous performance studies, experiments, publications, organizing, equipping, 
technical staff, or other requirements related to their activities, may infer that their work is essential and the 
most appropriate to the full satisfaction of the contract. 
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§ 2 The hypothesis in this article, and in any case of dismissal, if proven overpricing, jointly and severally 
liable for damage caused to the treasury for the supplier or service provider and the responsible public 
officer, subject to legal penalties. 
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APPENDIX VII 
Decomposition of the Procurement Process 
 
Process   Summary 
Procurement Stage I: 
Purchase Request 
I 
A need is identified, which must be met. "Z" places request 
on IntSys detailing requirements (product, product details 
and description, quantity, level of urgency). Request 
Number (RN) is generated. 
Procurement Stage II: 
Receipt of Request 
II 
"A" receives request through IntSys and redirects it to the 
person/team in charge for that particular product category 
("B") through IntSys. 
Procurement Stage III: 
Supplier Selection & 
Contact ("Bidding" - 
Part 1) 
III 
1. "B" receives request through IntSys and acknowledges 
receipt through system. 
IV 
2. "B" ensures that there are no errors and/or missing 
information. If incorrect, sends it back. 
V 
3. "B" searches for suppliers who can attend requirement 
either through IntSys (existing suppliers) or the Internet 
(new suppliers).  
VI 
4. Based on research, "B" sends e-mail to suppliers selected 
requesting quotes though the IntSys. Up to 10 suppliers are 
selected and contacted. 
VII 
5. Quotes from suppliers are received on Outlook, through 
team e-mail. 
VIII 
6. "B" checks team inbox and forwards relevant e-mails to 
own inbox. 
IX 
7. "B" selects 3 quotes from those received, prints them 
and places them in a physical file (PF), with RN and relevant 
notes. 
X 8. "B" marks on IntSys that step has been completed. 
XI 
9. "B" takes PF to "C". "C" accepts the PF and takes over the 
process. 
Procurement Stage IV: 
Supplier Selection & 
Contract (Bidding 
Process - Part 2) 
XII 
1. "C" checks RN on IntSys and ensures completeness of 
information. 
XIII 
2. "C" enters quote information on IntSys. All of the 
information on each quote must be typed into IntSys (i.e. 
supplier, price, payment and delviery conditions). 
XIV 
3. IntSys generates a "comparative map", assigning a 
winning quote. 
XV 
4. "C" either accepts IntSys's determination or chooses to 
override it, opting for another quote. 
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XVI 
4b. If "C" overrides Intsys's choice, he/she must enter 
justification into system, print a copy of this screen and 
have his manager sign it. This copy goes into PF. If "C" 
accepts IntSys's choice, he/she skips straight to next step. 
XVII 5. "C" generates a Purchase Order (PO) on IntSys. 
XVIII 
6. "C" checks on IntSys whether the budget has been 
allocated for this purchase. If it has not, "C" must request 
that "Z" do so. If budget has already been allocated, "C" 
goes straight to the next step. 
XIX 
7. "C" obtains manager approval to proceed with request 
through IntSys. 
XX 
8. In an MS Word document, "C" fills out the "Reserve of 
Cash" (RoC) form, with details and PO number. 
XXI 
9. "C" takes this sheet to "D" in the Financial Department. 
"D" accepts this sheet and takes over process. 
Procurement Stage V: 
Reserve of Cash 
("Empenho") 
XXII 
1. "D" checks IntSys to view details of the PO, check for 
accuracy and ensure budget has been allocated. 
XXIII 
2. "D" enters all relevant information for this PO on SIAFI, 
formally confirming that cash has been reserved for this 
purchase. This step is automatically recorded on the 
Transparency Portal. 
XXIV 
3. "D" prints RoC confirmation off SIAFI, scans it, and sends 
it via e-mail to "C"'s entire team. The e-mail contains 
several RoCs in bulk. "D" also stores a paper copy in his/her 
file. 
Procurement Stage VI: 
Purchase Request 
Confirmation 
XXV 
1. "C"'s entire team receives the e-mail. "C" will check to 
see if his/her RoC is included and will then proceed with 
process. 
XXVI 2. "C" prints e-mail and places it in the PF. 
XXVII 3. On IntSys, "C" confirms that PO has been approved. 
XVIII 
4. "C" informs winning bidder that he has won. "C" sends e-
mail with instructions confirming this information. 
XXIX 
5. Once supplier has acknowledged request and confirmed 
he will supply, it, "C" marks PO on IntSys as "supplier 
acknowledged". 
XXX 
6. "C" takes the PF to "E". "E" accepts the PF and takes over 
the process. 
Procurement Stage 
VII: Delivery & 
Liquidation 
XXXI 
1. "E" waits for supplier to send invoice, both by e-mail and 
by post. If "E" does not receive this within a certain 
timeframe, "E" will contact supplier by either e-mail or 
telephone. 
XXXII 
2. Upon receipt, "E" enter invoice and delivery details into 
IntSys. 
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XXXIII 
3. "E" sends "Z" delivery instructions and awaits his/her 
confirmation that supplies have been delivered. 
XXXIV 4. "E" finalizes PO on IntSys. 
XXXV 5. "E" places in PF a copy of the invoice and files it away.  
XXXVI 
6. "E" takes original copy of invoice to "D". "D" accepts this 
and takes over process. 
Procurement Stage 
VIII: Payment 
XXXVII 
1. "D" checks IntSys to to verify accuracy of details and 
ensure that process has been finalized. 
XXXVIII 
2. "D" approves payment and enter payment information 
on SIAFI. This step is automatically recorded on 
Transparency Portal. 
XXXIX 3. "D" stores the invoice in a file. 
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APPENDIX VIII 
Extended DiCoT Framework 
 
Model Principle Brief Explanation 
Physical 
Space and cognition 
How phsyical layouts supports (or 
fails to support) cognition. 
Perceptual principle 
Mapping between spatial layout and 
cognitive structures. 
Naturalness principle 
Refers to the "stimulus-response" 
compatibility. 
Subtle bodily supports 
The use of body to support cognitive 
processes (e.g. pointing or 
gesticulating). 
Situation awareness 
Refers to how accessible work of the 
team is, including proximity of 
others around them. 
Horizon of observation 
Refers to what can be seen or heard 
by a person. 
Arrangement of equipment Physical layout of equipment. 
Artefact 
Mediating artefacts 
Include artefact that are introduced 
in order to complete task. 
Creating scaffolding 
External artefacts and 
environmental cues introduced to 
simplify cognitive tasks. 
Representation - goal parity 
Representation of the relationship 
between current state and goal 
state of artefact. 
Coordination of resources 
Resources can be internally and 
externally coordinated to aid action 
and cognition. 
Distributed Memory (*) 
How information is redundantly 
collected and stored. 
Modularity (*) 
Imbued "precomputational 
activities" and properties in 
artefacts. 
Information Flow 
Information movement 
How information moves around the 
system, e.g. artifacts, text, verbal, 
telephone, etc. 
Information transformation 
Transformation takes place when 
representation of information 
changes. 
Information hubs 
Where different information 
channels meet and different sources 
are processed together. 
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Buffering 
Refers to the arrival of new 
information that may interfere with 
ongoing activity. 
Communication bandwidth 
Face-to-face communication that 
takes place. 
Informal communication 
Informal communication which 
represent an important function. 
Behavioral trigger factors 
Trigger mechanisms that elicit 
behavior. 
Social 
Goal Tree and Parity (*) 
Clear and established main goal and 
sub-goals. 
Hierarchy and High Level 
Coordination (*) 
Delegating power of decision to a 
higher authority. 
Division of Labor (*) Cognition of tasks and coordination. 
Distribution of Knowledge (*) 
How knowledge is shared amongst 
individuals. 
Sequential Control of Action (*) 
Procedure is sequentially 
constrained if reliant on the 
completion of previous tasks. 
Mediating Structure (*) 
How communication and social 
interactions take place (artefacts or 
language). 
Evolutionary 
Cultural heritage 
How processes established through 
time shape current behavior. 
Expert coupling 
Degree to which user and system 
work in tandem and are coupled. 
 
 
 
 
 
